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Four experiments were conducted to investigate the role of empathy in three distinct 
distribution situations across two cultural groups, Chinese nationals and U.S. Americans. 
In all four studies, participants were asked to assume the role of a high-status person and 
make a distribution decision in a questionnaire. The first and second studies examined 
how empathy affected the equity principle in a bonus distribution situation in a company; 
the third study explored how empathy influenced the need principle in an assistance-fund 
distribution situation in a charity organization; and the fourth study investigated how 
empathy affected the choice between merit and need in a scholarship distribution 
 
  
situation in a university. Data were collected in both China and the U.S. for each of the 
four studies (total N = 1,022).  
Results indicated a significant moderating effect of culture such that empathy had 
different effects on the principles of equity and need in the two cultural groups. Empathy 
narrowed the money gap between low- and high-competence employees for Chinese, but 
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Americans. Interpretations and implications of the results are provided, and the 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction   
In behavioral economics, growing evidence has contradicted hypotheses derived 
from the assumption that all human behaviors are exclusively motivated by material 
self-interest (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003, 2004). Evidence has suggested that people also 
are motivated strongly by justice norms such as equity and reciprocity principles. 
Moreover, research on human cooperation has shown that other-regarding motives, 
including altruism, caring, and trust, can evolve from human cooperation and are 
powerful forces that influence how individuals coordinate with others (e.g., Axelrod, 
1984; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003, 2004; Gintis, Bowles, Boyd, & Fehr, 2003).   
Justice and other-regarding concerns have begun to attract attention from researchers 
studying negotiation and conflict management (e.g., Albin, 2001; Leung & Tong, 2004; 
Tyler & Blader, 2004). The motivation for and influence of justice and other-regarding 
concerns in conflicts are not very well understood and are further complicated by 
research that shows these concerns differ across cultures. Cultural variations have been 
found across types of justice, including distributive justice, procedural justice, and 
retributive justice (e.g., Hamilton & Sanders, 1992; Leung, 1997; Leung & Bond, 1982, 
1984; Leung & Stephan, 2001; Na & Loftus, 1998; Yamagishi, 1988). Cultural 
differences also have been found in research on caring versus justice dilemmas (e.g., 
Miller, 1994; Miller & Bersoff, 1992; Miller, Bersoff, & Harwood, 1990; Ohbuchi, 
Fukushima, & Tedeschi, 1999).    
The principles of caring and justice are important human motives. Caring versus 
justice dilemmas occur when the principles advocated by the ethics of care come into 
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conflict with the principles endorsed by the ethics of justice. The ethics of justice, 
emphasizing impartiality and universality, advocates that individuals should be judged by 
their merits or contributions. On the other hand, the ethics of care, emphasizing 
particularity, cultivates individuals’ ability to care for others, especially those who are 
close. Therefore, in a conflict between care and justice, care may go to those who are not 
the most deserving as assessed by the ethics of justice.      
Caring versus justice dilemmas can be found in many different situations. For 
example, in a distribution situation, resources can be divided based on one of three 
principles, equity, need, and equality (Adams, 1965; Deutsch, 1975; Homans, 1950, 
1961). Unlike equality, the principles of equity and need require that a greater amount of 
resources be given to those who make a greater contribution or have a greater need. 
However, if enough attention is directed toward those who make a lesser contribution or 
have a lesser need, the ethics of care may lead to more resources being distributed to 
them than is justified by the ethics of justice. Moreover, when a distribution situation 
involves comparing those with merit and those with need, the ethics of care may be more 
congruent with the need rather than the equity principle. In this case, the beneficiary’s 
needs rather than contributions are the criterion for reward allocation, in contrast to the 
focus on the beneficiary’s contributions. Therefore, the ethics of care may result in more 
resources being distributed to those with need, who may be perceived as less deserving 
than those with merit according to the ethics of justice. In the current study, the conflict 
between the ethics of care and justice is examined in these distribution situations.   
The decision made between caring and justice principles has been found to differ 
both by gender (Gilligan, 1982; Gilligan, Lyons, & Hanmer, 1989; Gilligan, Ward, & 
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Taylor, 1988) and culture (Miller, 1994; Miller & Bersoff, 1992; Miller, Bersoff, & 
Harwood, 1990; Miller & Luthar, 1989; Simpson, 1974). Miller and her colleagues found 
that greater priority was given to interpersonal and caring relative to justice obligations in 
India, whereas the morality of justice was more fundamental to the U.S. moral code. The 
morality of care and interpersonal responsibilities was also found to be more important 
than the morality of justice in other Asian cultures (Dien, 1982; Ma, 1997; Ohbuchi, 
Fukushima, & Tedeschi, 1999). The choice between care and justice has also been found 
to differ across cultures (for reviews, see Leung 1988, 1997). However, no mechanisms 
have been proposed to account for these cultural differences in the conflict between the 
ethics of care and the ethics of justice. 
Why do Asians regard the ethics of care as more important than the ethics of justice, 
as compared to people in the U.S.? This question indicates the lack of mechanisms that 
can explain the preference of the ethics of care over the ethics of justice in some Asian 
cultures. Empathy may be able to explain these cultural differences in the conflict 
between care and justice because empathy has been found to facilitate caring at the cost 
of principles of fairness (Batson, Klein, Highberger, & Shaw, 1995) and people in some 
Asian cultures have been found to have greater empathic reactions than people in some 
Western cultures (Enz, Zoll, & Xu, 2006; Kobayashi & Trommsdorff, 1993; 
Trommsdorff, 1995). Although gender differences in empathy have been widely found 
(Adams, Jones, Schvaneveldt, & Jenson, 1982; Bryant, 1982; Davis, 1996; Enz, Zoll, & 
Xu, 2006; Hoffman, 2000; Lennon & Eisenberg, 1987; McDevitt, Lennon, & Kopriva, 
1991; Singer, Seymour, O’Doherty, Stephan, Dolan, & Frith, 2006), only a few studies 
have looked at cultural differences in empathy (Enz, Zoll, & Xu, 2006; Kobayashi & 
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Trommsdorff, 1993; Trommsdorff, 1995). However, these studies on cultural differences 
in empathy all found that people in some Asian cultures such as Japan and China had 
more empathy than people in some Western cultures such as Germany, Britain, and 
Portugal. The high level of empathy may have made it more likely for people in the 
Asian cultures to choose the ethics of caring over the ethics of justice. Empathy has been 
found to facilitate prosocial behaviors such as helping (e.g., Batson, 1987; Batson, 
Duncan, Ackerman, Buckley, & Birch, 1981, Batson, O’Quin, Fultz, Vanderplas, & Isen, 
1983; Coke, Batson, & McDavis, 1978; Eisenberg & Miller, 1987; Hoffman, 1976; Krebs, 
1975) and also to inspire actions that violate principles of justice (Batson, Klein, 
Highberger, & Shaw, 1995; Hoffman, 1976; Singer, 1995).             
This dissertation examines empathy as a possible explanation for cultural differences 
in the conflict between care and justice as reflected in the use of the need and equity 
distributive principles. The research question addressed in this research is the following: 
How does empathy influence the use of the need and equity principles, and how does 
culture affect this process?  
The first chapter of this dissertation provides a literature review that examines 
existing research on distributive justice principles, the caring versus justice dilemma as 
reflected in the need versus equity principles, and empathy and its relationship to caring. 
The first chapter ends with an overview of the four studies included in this dissertation. 
The next four chapters cover the hypotheses, method, results, and discussion for each of 
the four studies. Finally, an overall discussion of the theoretical and practical implications 
of this research is provided in the last chapter.   
Justice   
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Concern for fairness and justice plays an important role in conflict and its resolution 
in all societies. However, what is a fair standard and outcome is often disputed. Parties in 
conflict often perceive themselves as being fair and the other side as unfair. Different 
standards of fairness and justice are often selected by conflicting parties to serve their 
own interests (e.g., Messick, Bloom, Boldizar, & Samuelson, 1985). Negotiation 
researchers have documented the pervasiveness of self-serving biases in negotiation. 
Negotiators’ egocentric perceptions of fairness and justice have been found to be related 
to settlement delays or impasses (Babcock, Loewenstein, & Issacharoff, 1997; Babcock, 
Loewenstein, Issacharoff, & Camerer, 1995; Loewenstein, Issacharoff, Camerer, & 
Babcock, 1993; Thompson & Loewenstein, 1992), the length of strikes (Babcock, Wang, 
& Loewenstein, 1996), the intensity of conflict (Kramer, Newton, & Pommerenke, 1993), 
and reduced problem-solving and feelings of frustration (de Dreu, Nauta, & van de Vliert, 
1995).   
 Subjective and self-serving perceptions of fairness and justice have been found to 
differ across cultures. In conflict situations, disputants’ self-serving biases of fairness and 
justice were more prevalent in individualistic cultures, such as the United States, but were 
attenuated in collectivistic cultures, such as Japan (Gelfand et al., 2002). Cultural 
variations also have been found in notions of justice, including distributive justice, 
procedural justice, and retributive justice (e.g., Hamilton & Sanders, 1992; Leung, 1997; 
Leung & Bond, 1982, 1984; Leung & Stephan, 2001; Na & Loftus, 1998; Yamagishi, 
1988). The present research examines cultural differences in the use of the distributive 
justice principles of need and equity.       
Distributive Justice 
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 Distributive justice is concerned with the fair and just allocation of resources such as 
power, wealth, goods, and services in society. Related to distributive justice is relative 
deprivation, which is a result of judging one’s situation against the situations of those 
who are more advantaged (Stouffer, Suchman, DeVinney, Starr, Williams, 1949). 
Relative deprivation was first used to explain the findings that more educated soldiers 
with better opportunities were less satisfied with their status and jobs than were less 
educated soldiers (Stouffer et al., 1949). The hypothesized explanation was that the more 
educated soldiers compared their situations with other more successful peers and 
therefore were less satisfied with their status and jobs than were the less educated soldiers, 
who compared their situations with other less successful peers (Stouffer et al., 1949). The 
effect of relative deprivation on job dissatisfaction was further supported in laboratory 
experiments (Gebhard, 1949; Merton & Kitt, 1950; Spector, 1956; Thibaut, 1950). The 
choice of referent affects how people feel when they make comparisons (Tyler, 
Boeckmann, Smith, & Huo, 1997). Adams (1965) pointed out that feelings of injustice 
mediated the effects of relative deprivation on expressions of dissatisfaction. In other 
words, high expectations or comparisons with the better-off were more likely to trigger 
relative deprivation and a greater sense of injustice than were low expectations or 
comparisons with the worse-off (Adams, 1965; Tyler, Boeckmann, Smith, & Huo, 1997). 
The comparative aspect of the judgment was essential for the development of relative 
deprivation and felt injustice (Adams, 1965).  
 Implicit in such comparisons is a sense of one’s deservedness relative to a reference 
group. Therefore, relative deprivation is closely related to distributive justice, the sense of 
fair and just distribution of costs and rewards (Adams, 1965). Distributive justice theory 
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was originally based on quasi-economic terms (Homans, 1950, 1961); according to 
Homans (1961), distributive justice was achieved when the profits obtained by each party 
in an exchange relationship were proportional to each party’s investments. The profits 
were defined as the rewards received in an exchange minus the costs incurred (Homans, 
1961). Therefore, for a dyad of persons A and B, Homans (1961) claimed that 
distributive justice is realized when (A’s rewards – A’s costs) / A’s investments is equal 
to (B’s rewards – B’s costs) / B’s investments. In the case of a third party distributing 
rewards to two or more parties, distributive justice occurs when the third party maintains 
a fair ratio of profits and investments among all parties (Homans, 1961). The difficulties 
of maintaining distributive justice in either the dyad or the third-party situations were that 
person A’s perception of his or her own rewards and costs may not be identical to person 
B’s perception of A’s situation, and the parties may not agree as to what their investments 
were and what weight each investment should get (Adams, 1965).  
 Adams (1965) developed a theory of inequity specifying the causes and 
consequences of inequity in exchange relationships. Based on relative deprivation and 
distributive justice, Adams’ (1965) theory of inequity focused on two features: inputs and 
outcomes. Inputs were defined similarly to Homans’ (1961) investments. Inputs were 
what people perceived as their contributions to an exchange. In an employer-employee 
exchange, these contributions may be employees’ education, intelligence, experience, 
skill, seniority, age, social status, efforts, and sometimes even personal attractiveness and 
health (Adams, 1965). Outcomes were what people received as a result of an exchange. 
In an employer-employee exchange, the outcomes may include salary, rewards intrinsic 
to the job, job status, and job benefits (Adams, 1965). Adams (1965) postulated that 
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inequity exists whenever one party perceives that the ratio of one’s own outcomes to 
inputs is not equal to the ratio of another party’s outcomes to inputs. Based on Festinger’s 
(1957) cognitive dissonance theory, Adams (1965) proposed that the perception of 
inequity would cause a person to feel psychological tension in proportion to the 
magnitude of inequity, and this tension would motivate the person to reduce or eliminate 
it. Adams (1965) claimed that the consequences of inequity thus centered on how to 
reduce inequity and restore balance among the four elements in the equity formula: a 
person’s own outcomes and inputs and another party’s outcomes and inputs. Adams 
(1965) further explained that inequity may be reduced when a person altered any of the 
four elements or changed his or her cognitions about any of them. 
 Based on the theory of inequity (Adams, 1965), the concept of equity was developed 
to explain judgments about whether outcomes are just or not. According to the equity 
principle, benefits should be distributed in proportion to the individuals’ contribution. 
The equity principle was first used to predict workers’ reactions to their wages in 
organizational settings. It later developed into a broad social justice theory that covers 
many aspects of social interaction.   
Deutsch (1975) provided another two distributive justice principles: equality and 
need. The principle of equality posits that resources such as wealth, goods, and services 
be equally distributed without considering the different contributions of individuals. The 
principle of equality is based on the assumption that each person has the same inherent 
value or worth in some larger philosophical sense (Hoffman, 2000). Therefore, everyone 
should receive the same amount of rewards. The need principle posits that the distribution 
of rewards and resources be based on individual needs rather than individual merits. The 
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need principle is a type of “communitarian justice” that follows the Marxist maxim “to 
each according to his needs,” regardless of productivity (Hoffman, 2000, p. 228). The 
determination of the type and magnitude of need may be as difficult as the determination 
of contributions in the equity principle. Need may be based on poverty, disadvantage, or 
loss due to past injustice. Among the three principles, equity is the only principle that 
requires that individuals’ outcomes depend on their contributions in the form of 
productivity, competence, effort, and so on. Subsequent research on distributive justice 
has focused on how people choose among the three distributive justice principles: equity, 
equality, and need.    
 Deutsch (1975) proposed that interpersonal relationships influenced the choice 
among the three distributive justice principles. He provided a typology of relationships 
varying along four dimensions: cooperative versus competitive, equal versus unequal 
power, task versus socioemotional, and formal versus informal (see also Barrett-Howard 
& Tyler, 1986). Individuals also were found to be influenced in their choice of 
distributive justice principles by other factors such as the values they hold (Rasinski, 
1987) and the gender of the allocation recipient (Messé, Hymes, & MacCoun, 1986). 
Moreover, some studies suggested that people made trade-offs between the three 
principles of distributive justice and that principles of distributive justice were also 
affected by situational factors (Tyler, Boeckmann, Smith, & Huo, 1997).  
 The present research focuses on the use of the principles of equity and need. The use 
of the need principle benefits the person in need regardless of his or her contributions, 
whereas the use of the equity principle regards such contributions as essential in 
distributive situations. If prosocial behavior is defined as an act performed with the goal 
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of benefiting others rather than oneself (Aronson, Wilson, & Akert, 2004), the use of the 
need principle in distribution seems to be more prosocial than the use of the equity 
principle. The act of empathizing is hypothesized to influence the use of the equity and 
need principles. Cultural differences in the use of the need and equity principles are 
explained based on cultural differences in empathizing.   
The Caring Versus Justice Dilemma 
 Kohlberg (1963, 1969, 1981) proposed a stage theory of moral judgment. He 
interviewed children and adults to see how they responded to moral dilemmas. The 
following is a typical dilemma called “Heinz steals the drug”:  
In Europe, a woman was near death from a special kind of cancer. There was 
one drug that the doctors thought might save her. It was a form of radium that a 
druggist in the same town had recently discovered. The drug was expensive to 
make, but the druggist was charging ten times what the drug cost him to make. 
He paid $200 for the radium and charged $2,000 for a small dose of the drug. 
The sick woman's husband, Heinz, went to everyone he knew to borrow the 
money, but he could only get together about $1,000, which is half of what it 
cost. He told the druggist that his wife was dying and asked him to sell it 
cheaper or let him pay later. But the druggist said: "No, I discovered the drug 
and I'm going to make money from it." So Heinz got desperate and broke into 
the man's store to steal the drug for his wife. Should the husband have done that? 
(Kohlberg, 1963, p. 19) 
 Based on respondents’ reasoning behind these moral dilemmas, Kohlberg (1963, 
1969, 1981) classified the various responses into three levels: preconventional morality, 
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conventional morality, and postconventional morality. Each level includes two stages for 
a total of six stages. At stage one of the preconventional morality, children see morality 
as something external to them, and they assume they must obey authority in order to 
avoid punishment. At stage two, children see morality as relative and they assume they 
can act freely to pursue their own interests without considering other members of society. 
At stages three and four, young people begin to think of themselves as members of 
conventional society. At stage three, they focus on fulfilling obligations and roles in close 
relationships. At stage four, young people shift the focus from interpersonal relationships 
to maintaining the existing social order by obeying the laws. People at stages five and six 
care about universal principles that make for a just society. At stage five, the social 
contract and individual rights are emphasized. At stage six, commitment to justice creates 
the obligation to disobey unjust laws and thus civil disobedience is more likely to be 
endorsed at this stage than at stage five (Kohlberg, 1963, 1969, 1981). In the drug 
dilemma described above, people at stage five may judge Heinz’s stealing to be morally 
wrong because the druggist’s individual rights should be respected, whereas people at 
stage six may endorse Heinz’s behavior as an obligation to disobey unjust laws.    
 Kohlberg’s (1981) stage theory of moral development culminated in a focus on 
impartiality and justice, emphasizing universal principles of human rights, equality, and 
justice. Kohlberg’s (1981) theory is not without critics. Gilligan and her colleagues 
(Gilligan, 1982; Gilligan, Lyons, & Hanmer, 1989; Gilligan, Ward, & Taylor, 1988) 
proposed two distinct systems of thought and feeling in moral reasoning, one based on 
abstract justice principles and one based on interpersonal obligations. Justice principles, 
these researchers argued, are universalistic and rational, whereas interpersonal 
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obligations are particularistic and affect based. For women, Gilligan (1982) argued that 
moral judgment is determined more by interpersonal relationships and the ethics of care 
rather than by abstract principles and rights. Thus, women’s morality is more 
contextualized and tied to concrete relationships and situations (Gilligan, 1982). The 
morality of care, proposed by Gilligan (1982) to describe women’s moral judgment, 
emphasizes responsiveness and interdependence in contrast to the morality of justice, the 
highest stage in Kohlberg’s (1981) stage model. Johnston (1988) found that males and 
females have knowledge about both the morality of care and of justice. However, the 
morality of care is preferred among women, whereas the morality of justice is preferred 
among men. Johnston (1988) also found that boys used the morality of care much less 
often than girls used the morality of justice, suggesting that girls may be more flexible in 
their moral orientations.   
Simpson (1974) pointed out that Kohlberg’s stages may be culturally biased: The 
stages of moral development and their culmination in justice are based on the Western 
philosophical tradition and may not apply to the Eastern philosophies. Miller (1994) 
argued that both Kohlberg’s model of moral development and Gilligan’s morality of 
caring pay insufficient attention to the role of culture in moral development. Miller 
proposed that two different cultural conceptions of self and human nature led to two 
different conceptions of morality: The individually oriented moralities among U.S. 
Americans versus the duty-based interpersonal moralities among Hindu Indians. The 
modern Western concept of the autonomous individual with freedom of choice and 
human rights and liberty is the basis for the individually oriented interpersonal moralities 
in the U.S. (Miller, 1994). The Hindu Indian concept of the context-based self with duty 
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and role at its core is the basis for the duty-based interpersonal moralities among Hindu 
Indians (Miller, 1994).   
Miller and her colleagues (e.g., Miller, 1994; Miller & Bersoff, 1992; Miller, Bersoff, 
& Harwood, 1990; Miller & Luthar, 1989) tested and found that interpersonal 
responsibilities were broadly defined and socially enforceable in duty-based rather than 
in individually oriented interpersonal moralities, in which interpersonal responsibilities 
were regarded as subject to personal decisions. They pointed out that greater priority was 
given to interpersonal responsibilities relative to justice obligations in duty-based rather 
than in individually oriented interpersonal moral codes. Miller (1994) argued that the U.S. 
moral code reflects the central notion of Western liberalism that individual autonomy is 
more fundamental and more natural than social obligations.  
The duty-based interpersonal moral code was also found in other Asian cultures. 
Morality in traditional Chinese thought centers around the concept of benevolence (Dien, 
1982). Ma (1997) found that the moral judgment of Chinese is affective and is highly 
responsive to the suffering of others. Ohbuchi, Fukushima, and Tedeschi’s (1999) 
research on Japanese moral reasoning also showed that Japanese regarded a justice goal 
as less important and a relationship goal as more important than did Americans.    
Cultural Differences in Moral Judgment: Kantian Versus Confucian Morality  
Cultural differences observed in moral judgment may have their roots in the different 
moral philosophical traditions between the West and the East. In Kantian ethics, moral 
judgment must be based on reason, and reason alone can help determine what duty 
requires (Kant, 1785/1990). Duty, in Kant’s view, is “the necessity to do an action from 
respect for law,” and is independent of any consequences from so acting (Kant, 
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1785/1990, p. 16). Kant emphasized that moral judgment should not be subject to 
“propensions of feeling” and “melting compassion.” Kant believed that compassion was 
“beautiful” but nevertheless had no “moral worth.”  
Kant’s stern stance on refuting the role of emotions in moral judgment was not 
shared by many moral sentimentalists such as David Hume and Adam Smith. Smith 
(1759/1976) argued that the feeling of sympathy instead of reason was at the heart of 
moral judgment. This moral sentimentalist tradition has been revived recently by 
philosophers and social scientists studying ethics and moral judgment (e.g., Nichols, 
2004; Solomon, 2004). Nichols (2004) argued that emotions played a critical role in both 
the psychological and cultural underpinnings of basic moral judgment.  
 The Confucian moral philosophy is more congruent with moral sentimentalism than 
with moral rationalism represented by Kant (1785/1990) and Rawls (1971). Confucian 
moral tradition also placed much emphasis on the role of emotions in moral judgment. 
Mencius (320 BCE/1970) said:  
No man is devoid of a heart sensitive to the suffering of others.… Suppose a man 
were, all of a sudden, to see a young child on the verge of falling into a well. He 
would certainly be moved to compassion, not because he wanted to get in the good 
graces of the parents, nor because he wished to win the praise of his fellow villagers 
or friends, nor yet because he disliked the cry of the child. From this it can be seen 
that whoever is devoid of the heart of compassion is not human, whoever is devoid 
of the heart of shame is not human.… The heart of compassion is the germ of 
benevolence; the heart of shame, of dutifulness.… (pp. 82-83)      
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Compared to the Kantian moral tradition with its focus on impartial justice, 
Confucian moral thinking centers on the notion of benevolence. Rather than focusing on 
the principles of moral conduct, Confucianism emphasizes socially determined roles and 
proper activities to fulfill them (Wang, 2003). Wang (2003) pointed out that the problem 
with Kant’s view compared with Cofucian’s view is its detachment; Kant’s ethics 
requires a moral person to act according to moral principles justified by rationality alone, 
irrespective of his or her emotions, desires, or inclinations. However, a person’s attitudes, 
intentions, emotions, and situational factors are ignored in this detachment, which may be 
important factors that contribute to a moral situation (Wang, 2003). Wang (2003) 
indicated that an explanation for this detachment in Kantian ethics may be due to the 
discounting of feelings in his moral theorizing. According to Kant (1785/1990), human 
feelings should be subject to a law of duty. However, the Confucian moral tradition gives 
moral significance to personal relationships and affection between humans (Mencius, 320 
BCE/1970). According to Confucius, the natural affection that one feels for his or her kin 
can be extended to all human beings (Wang, 2003).     
 The differences in the moral traditions of the West and the East may have accounted 
for the observed differences in moral judgment (e.g., Miller, 1994; Ohbuchi, Fukushima, 
& Tedeschi, 1999) between people in the U.S. and some Asian countries. Cultural 
differences can be expected, therefore, in the conflict between the ethics of care and the 
ethics of justice. People in some Asian countries influenced by Confucianism may be 
greatly affected by the caring mentality whereas people socialized in the Kantian moral 
tradition may be more guided by abstract principles of impartiality and justice in their 
moral reasoning.   
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Need Versus Equity   
The caring versus justice dilemma reflected in distributive justice is the conflict 
between two distributive principles, need and equity. The need distributive principle 
suggests that resources and benefits be distributed in a way that takes into consideration 
individual needs rather than contributions, which is in line with the caring ethic rather 
than the justice ethic. An impartial equitable distribution demands that rewards or 
benefits be distributed based on contributions and investments regardless of one’s needs. 
As there are cultural differences in the choice between the caring and justice ethics, 
evidence also exists for cultural differences in the choice of equity versus need principles 
in distributive situations (for review, see Leung, 1988, 1997). One of the purposes of the 
current research is to examine whether empathy explains the cultural differences in the 
use of the need and equity principles. The following section reviews empathy as the 
proposed mechanism.    
Empathy 
Research on primates has shown that emotional attachment was a decisive factor in 
the development of rhesus monkeys (Harlow, 1971, 1979, 1986). The ability to 
empathize with other people has also been found to be critical in the emotional 
development of humans (e.g., Sacks, 1995). One characteristic of autistic children is their 
inability to empathize with other people. People with Asperger’s syndrome, a type of 
autism, have to be taught to break down and memorize behaviors in order to take the 
perspective of others, a process that is extremely difficult for them. Yet for people with 
normal empathizing abilities, these behaviors are so easy and even unconscious that they 
take them for granted (Sacks, 1995).    
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Empathy is defined as “the ability to share in another’s emotions, thoughts, or 
feelings” (Agnes, 2001, p. 466). The act of empathizing is putting oneself in another 
person’s place and experiencing the cognitive and affective states of the other person. 
The cognitive aspect of empathy refers to the capacity to represent others’ thoughts, 
intentions, and desires, whereas the affective aspect of empathy refers to the ability to 
share the feelings and emotions of others (Agnes, 2001). The cognitive aspect of empathy 
is often referred to as mentalizing (Keysers, Wicker, Gazzola, Anton, Fogassi, & Gallese, 
2004; Singer & Fehr, 2005). The term mentalizing will be used to differentiate cognitive 
empathy from the ability to take the affective perspective of another and experience the 
feelings of others, which is referred to as empathizing. The current research focuses on 
empathizing.    
The neural basis for empathizing has been studied in the fields of neuroscience, 
psychology, and economics (e.g., Frith & Frith, 2003; Preston & de Waal, 2002). The 
neural processes of empathizing are currently attracting attention within the social 
neurosciences. Researchers have recently found that common neural reactions were 
activated both when observers saw disgusted faces and when they smelled disgusting 
odors themselves (Wicker et al., 2003), and both when observers saw someone else being 
touched in a video and when they were touched themselves (Keysers et al., 2004). 
Another study on pain has revealed that different brain areas were activated when 
participants were empathizing with the pain of their loved partners versus when they 
were experiencing pain themselves (Singer, Seymour, O’Doherty, Kaube, Dolan, & Frith, 
2004). Responses in pain-related brain areas could also be elicited by empathizing with 
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the pain of strangers (Jackson, Meltzoff, & Decety, in press; Morrison, Lloyd, di 
Pellegrino, & Roberts, 2004).  
The existence of the neural basis for empathizing indicates the importance of these 
functions for humans. The acts of empathizing, with their roots in the brain, can be so 
easily performed that they are often taken for granted. Only when people witness how 
difficult life can be without the normal functioning of these mechanisms do they realize 
how deeply these functions have influenced their social lives. The following section 
reviews the different ways that empathy can be aroused.    
Empathic Arousal  
 Instead of defining empathy as the matching of feelings, in which one feels what the 
other feels, Hoffman (2000) defined empathy in terms of processes underlying the 
matching. Empathy requires “the involvement of psychological processes that make a 
person have feelings that are more congruent with another’s situation than with his own 
situation” (Hoffman, 2000, p. 30). Hoffman (1978) proposed five psychological 
processes as underlying the matching of emotions: mimicry, classical conditioning, direct 
association, mediated association, and role-taking. Among the five modes of empathy 
arousal, the first three are primitive and involuntary, whereas the last two are more 
advanced and are accomplished through human language and cognitive development 
(Hoffman, 1978, 2000). In the current dissertation research, mediated association and 
role-taking are used to elicit empathy and they are described here.     
 Mediated association is an advanced empathy-arousing mode. In this mode, a 
person’s emotional state is communicated through language. The use of language enables 
empathizing to occur even when the other person is not present. For example, messages 
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about a victim’s feelings or simply his or her situation can arouse empathy in observers 
(Hoffman, 2000). This mode broadens the scope of empathizing because it enables 
people to empathize with almost anyone in different times and places when the person’s 
situation is conveyed through language.  
 Role-taking is another advanced empathy-arousing mode. It involves imagining 
oneself in another’s place. The shift from imagining oneself in another’s situation to 
experiencing the other’s feelings was speculated by philosophers like David Hume 
(1751/1957) and Adam Smith (1759/1976). These philosophers believed that empathy 
was universal and involuntary and emphasized that by imagination, having mental images 
of another’s situation, a person could experience the same feelings as the other person. 
Hoffman (2000) distinguished two types of role-taking: self-focused and other-focused. 
Self-focused role-taking is imagining how one would feel in the same situation when 
observing others, whereas other-focused role-taking focuses directly on the observed and 
involves imagining how that person feels (Hoffman, 2000). Other-focused role-taking can 
be facilitated by knowing personal information about the other and general knowledge of 
how people feel in specific situations (Hoffman, 2000). Self-focused role-taking was 
found to produce more intense empathetic feelings than other-focused role-taking (Batson, 
Early, & Salvarani, 1997; Mead, 1934, Stotland, 1969). The reason for the difference in 
empathetic intensity may be that self-focused role-taking activates a person’s internal 
need system (Hoffman, 2000). According to Hoffman (2000), imagining oneself in the 
other’s place may arouse memories of similar events in one’s past experiences that 
trigger emotional responses similar to the other person’s emotions.  
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This dissertation uses the two advanced modes of empathy, verbal association and 
self-focused role-taking. Both a description of others’ situations and an instruction to do 
self-focused role-taking are used in the research to manipulate empathy.   
Factors Affecting Empathy 
 Individual differences. The ability to empathize differs across individuals (Singer et 
al., 2004). One of the chief components generally recognized in the diagnosis of the 
Narcissistic Personality Disorder (NPD) is the lack of empathy (Watson, Grisham, 
Trotter, & Biderman, 1984). Normal narcissism is necessary for individuals to develop a 
healthy self-esteem, confidence, and a general sense of well-being. But pathological 
narcissism is self-centered and lacking in empathy (Watson et al., 1984). Thus, 
individuals with narcissistic personalities are expected to be less empathetic than 
individuals without narcissism. A study of the personality factors underlying ethical 
behaviors among medical students and physicians revealed that empathy was positively 
related to emotional intelligence, extraversion, open-mindedness, and compliance with 
others, and negatively related to aloofness (Munro, Bore, & Powis, 2005). Individual 
differences in empathy can stem from different individual capabilities, learning history, 
and past experiences (Enz, Zoll, & Xu, 2006). Therefore, in the current research, 
individual differences in trait empathy are statistically controlled in the four studies by 
using trait empathy as a covariate.      
 Gender differences. Enz, Zoll, and Xu’s (2006) study found that in both China and 
Europe, females reported greater empathy than males. The gender difference in empathy 
has been widely confirmed in empathy research across different age groups (Adams, 
Jones, Schvaneveldt, & Jenson, 1982; Bryant, 1982; Davis, 1996; Enz, Zoll, & Xu, 2006; 
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Hoffman, 2000; Lennon & Eisenberg, 1987; McDevitt, Lennon, & Kopriva, 1991). In a 
study investigating if the level of empathic response would be influenced by whether the 
target person is liked or disliked by the observer, researchers also found a significant 
gender effect (Singer, Seymour, O’Doherty, Stephan, Dolan, & Frith, 2006). In that study, 
male and female participants were involved in a prisoner’s dilemma game in which two 
confederates played fairly or unfairly. Later, when participants observed the fair player 
receiving electrical shock, the pain-related brain areas glowed, as measured by fMRI, 
showing empathy-related activation, for both sexes. However, when the unfair player was 
receiving pain, the empathy-related brain activities in male participants were significantly 
reduced, accompanied by the activation of reward-related brain areas. For females, their 
reward-related brain areas did not glow as they observed the unfair player receiving pain, 
whereas their empathy-related brain areas still glowed. This result seems to indicate that 
males are more likely than females to be avengers.   
 In the current research, gender differences in empathy also are statistically controlled 
in the four studies by using it as a predictor.        
 Contextual differences. Relationship between the observer and the target of empathy 
may be a contextual factor affecting the level of empathy. Singer et al. (2006) 
demonstrated that when the target of empathy was liked and experienced pain, both male 
and female participants showed empathy-related brain responses; when the target was 
disliked and received pain, both males and females’ empathy levels significantly dropped, 
and male participants even revealed reward-related brain activity. This result indicates 
that if the relationship between an observer and a target-person is close, the observer will 
demonstrate higher levels of empathy toward the target-person than if the relationship is 
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not close. The relationship between the distributor and the recipient is not a factor 
considered in the current research. The possible relationships of this variable with other 
variables in the current research are discussed in the overall discussion of this research.  
Cultural differences. Only a few studies have investigated cultural differences in 
empathy. Kobayashi and Trommsdorff (1993; see also Trommsdorff, 1995) investigated 
differences in empathy between two cultural groups of girls, German and Japanese. They 
found empathetic differences in the quantity and quality of emotional responses towards 
the distress of others. Specifically, Japanese girls showed a significantly higher level of 
distress toward another person’s plight than did German girls. Enz, Zoll, and Xu (2006) 
investigated cultural differences in empathy among people in China, Portugal, Germany 
and Britain. They validated an empathy questionnaire and found comparable factor 
structures for two dimensions of empathy: affective empathy and cognitive empathy. 
These researchers found that among the four cultures, Chinese participants showed the 
highest affective empathy scores. These cultural differences were further explored in the 
current research.  
Empathy’s Limitations 
Empathy can be biased because empathic arousal is to some degree based on the 
relationship between the observer and the observed (Hoffman, 1984, 1987, 2000). 
Empathy’s biases may weaken empathy’s role as a motivational basis for prosocial 
behaviors (Hoffman, 2000).  
Empathy is vulnerable to two types of bias, familiarity bias and here-and-now bias 
(Hoffman, 2000). Familiarity bias refers to individuals being more likely to empathize 
with those they are familiar with, such as their family members, close friends, ethnic or 
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racial group members, than those they are not familiar with (Hoffman, 2000). Hoffman 
(2000) pointed out three types of familiarity bias: in-group bias, friendship bias, and 
similarity bias. Here-and-now bias suggests that people are more likely to empathize with 
those who are present in the immediate situation than with those who are absent 
(Hoffman, 2000).  
In-group empathic bias arises when individuals show more empathy for people of the 
same ethnic or racial group than for out-group members (Hoffman, 2000). Klein (1971) 
investigated in-group empathy bias in a study on children of different races. In the study, 
black and white girls were shown slides depicting girls of both racial groups in happy, 
sad, and fearful situations. Participants showed more empathy toward those in their same 
racial group, supporting the in-group empathic bias hypothesis. Research in transgression 
guilt (Katz, Glass, & Cohen, 1973; Meindl & Lerner, 1984) showed that criminals felt 
less guilt over committing the same crime against an out-group victim than an in-group 
victim. Similarly, in war propaganda, people of other national, racial or ethnic groups 
have often been depicted as demons and subhuman to eliminate empathy and justify 
killing.  
 The friendship bias is also a type of familiarity bias, because friends are more 
familiar than acquaintances due to frequent interaction and communication with them. 
Costin and Jones (1992) found a friendship empathic bias among 4- to 5-year-old 
children. Participants in the study watched children in some kind of difficulty in puppet 
scenarios. They verbalized more empathic distress toward and were more likely to help a 
child depicted as a friend than a child depicted as an acquaintance.   
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 Similarity bias is another type of familiarity bias. The old saying goes that birds of a 
feather flock together, indicating that people who are similar in character or interest will 
often choose to spend time together, and their increased interaction will lead to their 
increased familiarity. People who are similar also are more likely to become friends and 
form in-groups. Researchers (Houston, 1990; Krebs, 1975) found the similarity empathic 
bias related to personality similarity among college students. In Krebs’ (1975) study, 
students who believed that the other student with whom they had been paired had a 
similar personality had more empathic distress when the other was about to experience 
pain. Houston (1990) found that students with a self-reported shyness personality 
problem experienced more empathic distress when reading a purported transcript of an 
interview with another student who described his problems with shyness.   
  Empathy is aroused easily in immediate situations because situational and personal 
cues are at their peak when a victim is present (Hoffman, 2000). An observer is 
vulnerable to a here-and-now empathic bias when a needy person’s life experiences are 
communicated to the observer and thus brought to the present more readily than those of 
other needy people. Studies on empathy’s here-and-now bias have shown that when a 
person was informed of the personal experiences of one in need, his or her empathy for 
this particular person could operate against the interests of the other people in need 
(Batson, Klein, Highberger, & Shaw, 1995), or to the disadvantage of the group as a 
whole (Batson, et al., 1995).  
 In the current study, the investigation of the effects of empathy is restricted 
relationships that are relatively low on closeness.    
Empathy and Caring  
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The ability to empathize may inhibit selfish motives and render people more 
cooperative and activate other-regarding behaviors (Eisenberg & Miller, 1987; Singer & 
Fehr, 2005). The relationship between empathy and prosocial behavior has been 
investigated for several decades (e.g., Eisenberg & Miller, 1987; Krebs, 1975). Empathy 
has been found to increase altruism (e.g., Coke, Batson, & McDavis, 1978). The 
empathy-altruism hypothesis claims that the prosocial motivation aroused by empathy 
has the ultimate goal of increasing the welfare of the person in need (e.g., Batson, 1987; 
Batson, Duncan, Ackerman, Buckley, & Birch, 1981; Hoffman, 1976). Evidence has 
been accumulating for this hypothesis. The major challenge for researchers of this 
hypothesis is to demonstrate that when an observer’s empathy level is high, the action 
taken by the observer has the ultimate goal of benefiting the other person for whom 
empathy is felt rather than for feeling good about oneself. Initial evidence found that 
when empathy is high, helping remains high even when empathetically aroused 
individuals can easily excuse themselves from helping (Batson, Duncan, Ackerman, 
Buckley, & Birch, 1981; Batson, O’Quin, Fultz, Vanderplas, & Isen, 1983; Fultz, Batson, 
Fortenbach, McCarthy, & Varney, 1986; Toi & Batson, 1982).   
Batson, Dyck et al. (1988) conducted five studies testing two egoistic alternatives: 
The empathy-specific reward hypothesis, in which empathetically aroused individuals 
help to get social and personal rewards such as honor, pride, or enhanced mood; and the 
empathy-specific punishment hypothesis, in which empathetically aroused individuals 
help to avoid punishments. Their studies showed that the two egoistic alternatives were 
not supported. Specifically, high-empathy individuals still felt good if the victim’s need 
was relieved, even if they were not the cause and thus were not rewarded with mood 
                                                                       26                   
                                    
  
improvement. High-empathy individuals’ helping behavior did not decrease when they 
were provided with justifications for not helping and thus were not afraid of being 
punished.  
 Empathizing, taking the affective perspective of the other, therefore, is associated 
with prosocial behaviors such as helping others without expecting anything in return. In 
this sense, empathizing benefits those who may otherwise be perceived as not deserving 
the rewards from a strict sense of justice. For example, in an equity-dominant situation 
(where equity is the most salient distributive principle), such as in a bonus-distribution 
situation in a company, the person who makes the least contribution will be perceived as 
not deserving rewards and therefore not be rewarded or will receive the fewest rewards 
based on a strict equity principle. However, when empathy is aroused, the person who 
makes the least contribution may not be judged so strictly and therefore may receive 
more rewards than when empathy is not aroused. In the same light, in a need-dominant 
situation (where need is the most salient distributive principle), such as in an 
assistance-fund distribution in a charity organization, the person whose need is the lowest 
will be perceived as not deserving help and therefore may not be helped or may receive 
the least help. However, when empathy is aroused, the person who has the lowest need 
may not be judged so strictly and therefore may receive greater assistance than when 
empathy is not aroused. Empathizing also may benefit those who experience negative 
emotions compared with those who experience positive emotions. For example, in a 
mixed-principle situation (where both equity and need are salient distributive principles), 
such as in a need- and merit-based scholarship distribution in a university, the student 
with need may experience more negative emotions, such as helplessness, when compared 
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with the student with merit. Therefore, when empathy is aroused, the student with need 
may receive more rewards than the student with merit.   
Based on the above rationale, in this research empathy is expected to influence the 
use of the need and equity principles in three distinct distribution situations and the effect 
of empathy is expected to be greater for Chinese than for U.S. Americans.    
Overview of Studies 
This dissertation focuses on empathy and its relationship to two distributive justice 
principles: need and equity. Hypothesis testing addresses three relationships: (1) how 
empathy influences the use of the equity principle when equity is the most salient 
distributive justice principle in a situation; (2) how empathy influences the use of the 
need principle when need is the most salient distributive justice principle in a situation; 
and (3) how empathy influences the choice between the need and equity principles when 
both principles are salient in a situation. Four studies are conducted to examine the role of 
empathy in three different distributive situations across two cultural groups, Chinese and 
U.S. Americans. The first and second studies investigate how empathy influences the 
distribution of a bonus in a company, where equity is the most salient distributive justice 
principle. The third study investigates how empathy affects the distribution of charity in a 
charity organization, where need is the most salient distributive justice principle. The 
fourth study investigates how empathy influences the distribution of scholarship money 
in a university, where the scholarship program accepted both merit-based and need-based 
applications; both equity and need are salient distributive justice principles in this 
situation. Hypotheses for each study are presented before the method section of each 
study.   
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The first and second studies investigate the influence of empathy on the distributive 
justice principle of equity in a bonus distribution situation in a company. Based on the 
equity principle, employees who are more competent should receive larger bonuses than 
employees who are less competent. It is hypothesized in Studies 1 and 2 that empathy 
affects the distribution decision based on competence such that the difference in the size 
of bonus distributed between high- and low-competence persons is greater when empathy 
is low than when empathy is high. In other words, empathy decreases the gap between 
high- and low-competence employees in terms of the amount of bonus distributed. 
Moreover, this interaction between empathy and competence is expected to be greater for 
Chinese than for U.S. Americans.  
The third study examines the influence of empathy on the distributive justice 
principle of need in a charity distribution situation. Based on the need principle, people in 
greater need should receive a greater amount of money than people in less need. It is 
expected in Study 3 that empathy affects the distribution decision based on need such that 
the difference in the amounts of money distributed between high- and low-need persons 
is greater when empathy is low than when it is high. Empathy decreases the gap between 
high- and low-need persons in terms of the amount of money distributed. Moreover, this 
interaction between empathy and need is expected to be greater for Chinese than for U.S. 
Americans.   
The fourth study investigates the effect of empathy on the choice between the equity 
and need principles in a scholarship distribution situation in a university. It is expected in 
Study 4 that the need principle is more likely to be chosen than the equity principle when 
empathy is aroused than when it is not. In other words, when empathy is aroused, more 
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money is expected to be distributed to applicants who apply based on need than on merit. 
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Chapter 2 
Study 1: The Distribution Situation in a Company  
Hypotheses 
 In the first study, the distribution of monetary reward was examined based on three 
independent variables: the competence of the receiver (high vs. low competence), the 
level of empathy with the receiver (high vs. low empathy), and culture (Chinese vs. U.S. 
Americans). The following hypotheses are organized based on the effects of competence 
(H1), the role of empathy (H2 and H3), and the role of culture (H4 and the RQ).  
H1: For both cultures, a larger bonus is distributed to people with greater competence 
than to people with less competence.   
H2: For both cultures, a larger bonus is distributed to people with whom the 
distributor empathizes than to people with whom the distributor does not empathize.    
H3: Empathy interacts with competence such that a larger bonus is distributed to 
low-competence people with whom the distributor empathizes than with whom the 
distributor does not empathize, whereas empathy does not increase the size of bonus 
distributed to high-competence people.   
H4: The effect of empathy on the relationship between competence and the size of 
bonus distributed is greater for Chinese than for U.S. Americans.  
RQ: Does culture interact with other variables to influence the size of bonus 
distributed?   
Method 
Participants   
Participants (N = 179) were recruited from China and the U.S. The U.S. participants 
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were 95 undergraduates from communication classes at a large public East Coast 
university. Eighty-four percent of the U.S. participants were female (80 females and 15 
males). The average age of the U.S. participants was 19.67 years (Mdn = 20.00, SD = 
1.54), and the ages ranged from 18 to 29 years. Fifty-seven percent of the U.S. 
participants were Caucasian, 17% were African American, 15% were Asian, 6% were 
Hispanic, and 5% were not in any of the listed categories (rounding is used).   
The Chinese participants were 84 undergraduates from a university in a southwestern 
city of China. One participant did not indicate his or her sex and race, and two 
participants did not indicate their age. Of the 83 participants who indicated sex and race, 
seventy-six percent of the Chinese participants were female (63 females and 20 males). 
The average age of the participants was 21.23 years (Mdn = 21.00, SD = 1.31), and the 
ages ranged from 18 to 24 years. All participants from China identified their ethnic 
background as Chinese (as opposed to Korean or other possible ethnicities in China).      
Procedure 
 U.S. participants received a small amount of extra course credit for participating in 
the study. Participants came to an assigned location, which was not their regular 
classroom, to read and sign the study’s consent form and complete the questionnaire. An 
alternative class assignment or participation in other studies was offered as an option for 
students who did not want to participate in this study.  
The Chinese participants did the study as a voluntary class activity. They read and 
signed the consent form and completed the questionnaire during regular class time 
supervised by their instructors. For both Chinese and U.S. participants, no student 
declined to participate in the study, and questionnaires and consent forms were collected 
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separately. The questionnaire took approximately 30 minutes to complete.    
Stimulus Materials 
Two year-end evaluation packages (see Appendix A) were created to generate two 
levels of competence (high vs. low). The evaluation package included three forms: the 
Employee Performance Review Form, the Employee Training Requirement Form, and 
the Request for Leave of Absence Without Pay Form. The three forms were revised from 
real evaluation forms found on a university’s Web site. The employee was represented by 
an ID number in the three forms to exclude the influence of a name. In the Employee 
Performance Review Form, the employee appeared to have been evaluated by his or her 
direct supervisor on ten aspects of work using a three-level rating scale: outstanding, 
meets expectations, and below expectations. The definitions of meets expectations for 
each of the ten work aspects were given and an overall rating for the employee was also 
provided by the direct supervisor in the Performance Review Form. Two versions of the 
Employee Performance Review Form were created to manipulate two levels of 
competence (high vs. low). For all aspects of work including the overall rating, the 
category of outstanding was checked for the high-competence employee and the category 
of below expectations was checked for the low-competence employee. The other two 
forms, the Employee Training Requirement Form and the Request for Leave of Absence 
Form, were included in the evaluation package to make it more believable and realistic 
for participants because a real year-end evaluation package may not just include one form. 
The two forms were exactly the same across the two levels of high and low competence. 
In the Employee Training Requirement Form, the employee indicated that he or she had 
participated in all the required training, and also his or her additional voluntary training 
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hours had equaled or exceeded twenty hours. In the Request for Leave of Absence Form, 
the employee indicated that he or she did not require leave without pay during this year. 
Signatures required for the last two forms were made exactly the same for both versions 
of the evaluation package and the employee’s signature was made as unidentifiable as 
possible to reduce the influence of a name.                        
Questionnaire Design  
Two versions of the questionnaire were created, one in which participants were asked 
to empathize with the employee (high-empathy condition) and the other in which 
participants were instructed to focus only on the information in the employee’s evaluation 
package (low-empathy condition). For Chinese participants, the questionnaire and 
evaluation package were translated into Chinese by the dissertation researcher, who is a 
native Chinese speaker, and back-translated by another native Chinese speaker. The two 
translators discussed any incongruities in the pre- and post-translated English versions 
and constructed a final Chinese version of the evaluation package and questionnaire.  
The evaluation package was prepared as a separate document from the questionnaire. 
In both cultures, each participant was randomly assigned to read one of the two versions 
of the questionnaire, the high-empathy and the low-empathy conditions, and one of the 
two versions of the evaluation package, one describing a high-competence employee and 
one describing a low-competence employee. This arrangement created four experimental 
conditions: 2 (empathy) × 2 (competence).   
For each condition, participants were first asked to imagine themselves as the 
president of a company who would be distributing year-end bonuses to employees. The 
company was described as a very competitive one, whose success was attributed to a 
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reward system that linked year-end bonuses to performance. This description was used to 
make the equity principle salient for the bonus distribution situation. Participants were 
asked to read one of the two versions of the evaluation package and form an overall 
impression of the employee, who was described as the same sex with the participant. 
They were then instructed to briefly write down their impressions of the employee and of 
the organization to further put them in the imagined situation. Next, two items measured 
the believability and realism of the situation (“How believable is the situation?” and 
“How realistic is the situation?”) and three items measured the perception of competence 
(“How competent is the employee?,” “How qualified is the employee?,” and “What is the 
level of the employee’s ability?”).  
Participants then read an instruction for how to distribute the bonuses. The 
instruction was one of two versions that were used to manipulate the high-empathy and 
low-empathy conditions. The instructions were revised from the work of Stotland, 
Sherman, and Shaver (1971) and Fink (1975). 
High-Empathy Instruction: 
According to research conducted by the Human Resource Department, the best way 
to evaluate an employee is to really understand the employee’s feelings. Before you 
decide what bonus you would give to this employee, please imagine how you 
yourself would feel if you were in the employee’s position. Picture to yourself just 
how you would feel in his or her shoes (You are to keep clearly in mind that you are 
to react as if it were you who are in the package and are being evaluated). 
Concentrate on the way you would feel in that situation. In your mind’s eye, you are 
to visualize how it would feel to you to be the employee in his or her position. 
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Low-Empathy Instruction:  
According to research conducted by the Human Resource Department, the best way 
to evaluate an employee is to focus on the information in the evaluation package. 
Before you decide what bonus you would give to this employee, please decide based 
on exactly what’s in the package. You are to notice anything that is included in the 
package, whatever it is.  
After reading the instructions, participants indicated the amount of bonus they would 
give to the employee as the president of the company by responding to the question: “If 
the year-end bonus for a moderately competent employee in your organization is $1000, 
what bonus would you give to the employee whose evaluation package you have just 
read?” This question served as the dependent variable for the study. Next, two questions 
checked the manipulation of empathy (“How much have you focused on the information 
in the package in your decision?” and “How much have you focused on the feelings of 
the employee in your decision?”). Finally, participants responded to the Personal Belief 
in a Just World Scale (see Appendix B) and the Measure of Empathy as a personality trait 
(see Appendix C), which includes five dimensions: perspective taking, fantasy, empathic 
concern, personal distress, and emotional contagion.      
For all questions other than the estimate of the bonus, participants used magnitude 
scales, in which 100 represented a moderate amount of the variable that they were rating 
(Hamblin, 1974; Lodge, 1981; Shinn, 1974; see also Torgerson, 1958, for fractionation 
methods). For the measure of bonus, participants were asked to indicate the amount of 
bonus they would give to the employee using $1,000 as the yardstick for a moderately 
competent employee.1 Participants could use any non-negative number, with higher 
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numbers representing greater amounts of bonus that was being distributed. At the end of 
the questionnaire, participants provided information about their sex, age, racial or ethnic 
background, nationality, native language, major, year in school, and marital status.     
Data Transformation and Presentation 
To meet statistical assumptions required for analyses within the general linear model, 
all the items were transformed by a power transformation (see Bauer & Fink, 1983; 
Kruskal, 1968). When a measure had one or more outliers, these values were trimmed by 
being recoded to a fixed upper value before further analysis. The transformed variables 
are used in all the analyses that follow.2 The means and standard deviations reported in 
the text are descriptive statistics, whereas the figures present estimated marginal means. 
All statistical tests are two tailed unless stated otherwise.      
Results    
Perception of Manipulations   
Believability and realism. Both American (believable: M = 128.99, SD = 157.71, 
realistic: M = 120.06, SD = 152.64) and Chinese participants (believable: M = 98.92, SD 
= 106.74, realistic: M = 86.58, SD = 80.77) perceived the situations as moderately 
believable and realistic (100 was used in the scale to indicate moderate believability and 
realism).3 No significant difference was found in the perceptions of believability, F(1, 
175) = 2.84, p < .09, η2 = .02, and realism, F(1, 172) = 2.71, p < .10, η2 = .02, between 
U.S. and Chinese participants. For U.S. participants, no significant differences were 
found in the perceptions of believability, F(1, 93) = .01, p < .93, η2 = .01, and realism, 
F(1, 93) = .01, p < .99, η2 = .01, across the two levels of competence. For Chinese 
participants, no significant difference was found in the perception of realism between 
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high and low competence, F(1, 79) = 2.53, p < .12, η2 = .03. However, the 
high-competence condition (M = 4.60, SD = 1.64) was perceived as more believable than 
the low-competence condition (M = 3.54, SD = 2.18) for Chinese participants, F(1, 82) = 
6.21, p < .02, η2 = .07.  
The means and standard deviations for believability and realism by culture and 
competence levels are displayed in Tables 1 and 2, respectively.       
Competence. A principal-components analysis was performed on the three-item 
competence scale. Only one component had an eigenvalue greater than 1. This 
component accounted for 92% of the total variance. The loadings of the three items on 
this extracted principal component were .95, .97, and .96, respectively. The reliability 
coefficient (Cronbach’s α) of the summed competence items was .96. This principal 
component score was used in the subsequent analyses.4 The manipulation check for 
competence showed that the high-competence employee (U.S.: M = .65, SD = .51; China: 
M = .94, SD = .60) was perceived as significantly more competent than the 
low-competence employee (U.S.: M = -.91, SD = .54; China: M = -.61, SD = .80) for 
Americans and Chinese, respectively (U.S.: F[1, 91] = 203.75, p < .001, η2 = .69; China: 
F[1, 82] = 98.57, p < .001, η2 = .55). Therefore, the manipulation of competence was 
successful in both cultural groups.        
Empathy. Two questions served to check the empathy manipulation, measuring how 
much participants had focused on the information in the package and how much they had 
focused on the feelings of the employee in their distribution decision. To assess the extent 
to which participants focused on the employee’s feelings versus information in the 
package, a difference score was created by subtracting the reported information-focused 
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Table 1 
Means and Standard Deviations for Believability by Culture and Levels of Competence in 
Study 1 (N = 179) 
 
                     US              China              Overall      
                    M       SD       M      SD         M      SD  
High Competence    4.54      1.58      4.60ª    1.64       4.57     1.60 
Low Competence    4.57       2.20     3.54ª    2.18       4.08     2.24 
Overall            4.56       1.91     4.04     2.00 
 
ªThe two means were significantly different from each other at p ≤ .05 level, indicating 
that the high-competence condition was perceived as more believable than the 
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Table 2 
Means and Standard Deviations for Realism by Culture and Levels of Competence in 
Study 1 (N = 176) 
 
                      US              China              Overall      
                    M        SD       M      SD         M      SD  
High Competence    4.43      1.96      4.29      1.66       4.37     1.82 
Low Competence     4.43      1.85      3.64     1.97       4.05     1.94 
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score (transformed) from the reported feelings-focused score (transformed). The 
high-empathy participants should have a higher score on this measure than the 
low-empathy participants. U.S. participants reported a higher score on this difference 
measure in the high-empathy condition (M = -1.05, SD = 1.59) than in the low-empathy 
condition (M = -1.97, SD = 2.03), F(1, 91) = 6.26, p < .007 (one tailed), partial η2 = .06. 
However, no significant difference was found for Chinese participants between 
high-empathy (M = .30, SD = 1.25) and low-empathy (M = .12, SD = 1.74) conditions. 
Therefore, the manipulation of empathy was successful for Americans but not for 
Chinese. The reason may be that Chinese reported a high empathy level in the 
low-empathy condition, even higher than the empathy score in the high-empathy 
condition for Americans.   
Trait empathy. A principal-components analysis was performed on the 35 items of 
trait empathy. More than one component with an eigenvalue greater than 1 was extracted 
(see Figure 1). The first principal component accounted for 24% of the total variance. 
The reliability coefficient (Cronbach’s α) of the summed thirty-five items was .90. This 
principal-component score, created by combining the 35 items based on their loadings, 
was used in the subsequent analyses.          
Predicting Distribution of Bonus    
To assess the hypotheses and research question, an analysis of covariance 
(ANCOVA) was conducted, with competence (low vs. high), empathy (low vs. high), 
culture (China vs. U.S.), and sex (male vs. female), as the independent variables, trait 
empathy as the covariate, and the amount of bonus as the dependent variable. Sex was 
entered as an independent variable to control for any effects it may have, by itself or in 
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Figure 1. Scree plot for the principal components extracted from the 35 trait empathy 
items in study 1.  
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interactions with other independent variables, on the size of the bonus. Trait empathy was 
entered as a covariate to control for the main effect it may have on the dependent variable. 
The ANCOVA was statistically significant, F(16, 156) = 15.69, p < .001, R² = .62, 
adjusted R² = .58. The ANCOVA is referred to in the hypothesis tests that follow (see 
Appendix J).  
Competence. Hypothesis 1 stated that for both cultures, a larger bonus is distributed 
to people with greater competence than persons with less competence. Results showed a 
significant effect for competence, F(1, 156) = 119.25, p < .001 (one tailed), partial η² 
= .43, with high-competence employees (M = 15.07, SD = 3.99) receiving larger bonuses 
than low-competence employees (M = 6.56, SD = 4.58). Therefore, Hypothesis 1 was 
supported.    
Empathy. Hypothesis 2 predicted that for both cultures, a larger bonus is distributed 
to people with whom the distributor empathizes than people with whom the distributor 
does not empathize. Results showed a significant effect for empathy, F(1, 156) = 4.16, p 
< .02 (one tailed), partial η² = .03, with employees empathized by the distributor (M = 
11.30, SD = 5.46) receiving larger bonuses than employees not empathized with by the 
distributor (M = 10.13, SD = 6.54). Therefore, Hypothesis 2 was supported.    
Empathy and competence. Hypothesis 3 predicted that empathy interacts with 
competence such that a larger bonus is distributed to low-competence people with whom 
the distributor empathizes than with whom the distributor does not empathize, whereas 
empathy does not increase the size of bonus distributed to high-competence people. The 
ANCOVA showed no significant interaction between empathy and competence, F(1, 156) 
= .92, p < .34, partial η² = .01. Therefore, Hypothesis 3 was not supported.  
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Empathy, competence, and culture. Hypothesis 4 predicted a three-way interaction 
between empathy, competence, and culture such that the effect of empathy on the 
relationship between competence and the size of bonus is greater for Chinese than for 
U.S. Americans. Results showed no significant three-way interaction between 
competence, empathy, and culture, F(1, 156) = .07, p < .79, partial η² = .01. Therefore, 
the fourth hypothesis was not supported.    
The research question asked about the effect that culture, interacting with other 
variables, has on the size of bonus distributed. The ANCOVA resulted in a significant 
interaction between culture and empathy, F(1, 156) = 5.94, p < .02, partial η² = .04. When 
empathy was aroused, the size of bonus distributed by Chinese (M = 11.74, SD = 4.91) 
and U.S. Americans (M = 10.84, SD = 6.00) was similar. When empathy was low, culture 
affected the size of bonus such that Chinese (M = 11.86, SD = 6.11) distributed larger 
bonuses than U.S. Americans (M = 8.80, SD = 6.61), F(1, 90) = 5.14, p < .03, η² = .05 
(see Figure 2). Culture also interacted with competence, F(1, 156) = 11.56, p < .001, 
partial η² = .07. When competence was high, the size of bonus distributed by Chinese (M 
= 15.16, SD = 4.50) and Americans (M = 15.00, SD = 3.55) was not significantly 
different. When competence was low, Chinese (M = 8.73, SD = 4.41) gave larger bonuses 
than Americans (M = 4.57, SD = 3.79), F(1, 90) = 23.75, p < .001, η² = .21 (see Figure 3). 
Table 3 displays the means and standard deviations for the amount of bonus by 
competence, empathy, and culture.   
Discussion 
The first study examined how empathy influenced the use of the equity principle in a 
bonus distribution situation. Competence and empathy were found to affect the 
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Figure 3. Amount of bonus by competence (when low competence was not accompanied 
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Table 3 
Means and Standard Deviations for Amount of Bonus by Competence, Empathy, and Culture in Study 1 (N = 179) 
 
               
                  US                                          China                     
                  
                    Low Empathy           High Empathy            Low Empathy          High Empathy  
 
                    M       SD           M        SD            M        SD          M        SD  
  
High Competence    14.12     3.96         16.07      2.70           15.44     4.47        14.91      4.62 
 
Low Competence    3.49      3.83         5.84       3.39           8.61      5.61         8.85       3.06 
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distribution of bonus in a company: High-competence employees received larger bonuses 
than low-competence employees; employees who were empathized with received larger 
bonuses than employees who were not empathized with by the distributor. However, the 
hypothesized two-way interaction between empathy and competence and three-way 
interaction between empathy, competence, and culture were not significant. As opposed 
to Hypothesis 3, empathy did not increase the amount of bonus assigned to the 
low-competence employees.     
In reviewing participants’ subjective responses concerning their impressions of the 
employee they were evaluating and explanations of their distribution decisions, a 
recurrent question participants raised was why the employee in the low-competence 
condition did poorly on the job. The employee’s low-competence was reported in the 
performance review form as a matter of fact without any explanation, which may have 
explained why empathy did not increase the amount of bonus distributed to the 
low-competence employee. Therefore, in the second study that follows, the 
low-competence condition is further manipulated into a low-competence condition either 
with a positive explanation or a negative explanation to examine whether the two-way or 
three-way interactions hypothesized will be found.   
In this first study, participants read the evaluation package first and were later asked 
to evaluate the employee by either focusing on the information in the package or on the 
feelings of the employee. This arrangement may have weakened the empathy 
manipulation as participants already had an impression of the employee and may have 
formed a judgment of the employee before reading the instruction of the empathy 
manipulation. Therefore, in Study 2, after reading the empathy manipulation instruction, 
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participants are asked again to review the evaluation package according to the instruction 
they had just read. Moreover, in the first study, the high- and low-empathy manipulation 
instructions were not of the same length. The instruction to focus on the information was 
shorter than the instruction to focus on the feelings of the employee. The unequal lengths 
of the instructions can be an alternative explanation for any differences found due to the 
manipulation of empathy. Therefore, in Study 2, the two instructions are equal in length.  
Last but not least, the distribution of bonus was measured with only one item in 
which participants were asked: “If the year-end bonus for a moderately competent 
employee in your organization is $1000, what bonus would you give to the employee 
whose evaluation package you have just read?” Because this item served as the only 
dependent variable in Study 1, there was no way to assess the reliability of the dependent 
measure. Therefore, in Study 2, more than one question is asked to assess the amount of 
bonus participants are willing to give to the employee so that the reliability of the 
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Chapter 3 
Study 2: The Distribution Situation in a Company 
Hypotheses 
In the second study, the distribution of monetary reward was examined based on 
three independent variables: the competence of the receiver (high-competence condition 
vs. each of the three low-competence conditions) and level of empathy with the receiver 
(high vs. low empathy), across two cultural groups, Chinese and U.S. Americans. The 
hypotheses in Study 2 were the same as in Study 1 except that three pairs of comparison 
were made between the high-competence condition and each of the three 
low-competence conditions, resulting in three ANCOVAs. The overall ANCOVA was 
also conducted with competence being a four-level variable. The following hypotheses 
are based on the effects of competence (H1), the role of empathy (H2 and H3), and the 
role of culture (H4 and the RQ).  
H1: For both cultures, a larger bonus is distributed to people with greater competence 
than people with less competence (without explanation, with negative explanation, or 
with positive explanation).   
H2: For both cultures, a larger bonus is distributed to people with whom the 
distributor empathizes than people with whom the distributor does not empathize.    
H3: Empathy interacts with competence such that a larger bonus is distributed to 
low-competence people (without explanation, with negative explanation, or with 
positive explanation) with whom the distributor empathizes than with whom the 
distributor does not empathize, whereas empathy does not increase the size of bonus 
distributed to high-competence people.   
                                                                       50                   
                                    
  
H4: The effect of empathy on the relationship between competence (without 
explanation, with negative explanation, or with positive explanation) and the size of 
bonus distributed is greater for Chinese than for U.S. Americans. 
RQ: Does culture interact with other variables to influence the size of bonus 
distributed?   
Method  
Participants  
Participants (N = 246) were recruited from both China and the U.S. The U.S. 
participants were 144 undergraduates from communication classes at a large public east 
coast university. One U.S. participant did not indicate his or her sex; two participants did 
not indicate their age. Of the 143 participants who indicated sex, sixty-one percent of the 
U.S. participants were female (87 females and 56 males). The average age of the U.S. 
participants was 19.33 years (Mdn = 19.00, SD = 1.21), and the ages ranged from 18 to 
25 years. Sixty-four percent of the participants were Caucasian, 15% were African 
American, 15% were Asian, 1% were Hispanic, and 4% were not in any of the listed 
categories (the total is not equal to 100% due to rounding).      
The Chinese participants were 102 undergraduates from two universities in a 
northeastern city of China. One participant did not indicate his or her age. Fifty-five 
percent of the Chinese participants were female (56 females and 46 males). The average 
age of the participants was 24.09 years (Mdn = 24.00, SD = 1.57), and the ages ranged 
from 20 to 30 years. All participants from China identified their ethnic background as 
Chinese (as opposed to Korean or other possible ethnicities in China).       
Procedure 
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U.S. participants received a small amount of extra course credit for participating in 
the study. Participants came to an assigned location, which was not their regular 
classroom, to read and sign the study’s consent form and complete the questionnaire. An 
alternative class assignment or participation in other studies was offered as an option for 
students who did not want to participate in this study.  
About two-thirds of the Chinese participants did the study as a voluntary class 
activity. They read and signed the study’s consent form and completed the questionnaire 
during regular class time supervised by their instructor. The other participants, who 
voluntarily participated in the study, were asked to complete the consent form and 
questionnaire out of class and return them to their instructor. They were asked not to 
discuss the materials with each other. For both Chinese and U.S. participants, no student 
declined to participate in the study, and questionnaires and consent forms were collected 
separately. The questionnaire took approximately 60 minutes to complete.        
Stimulus Materials 
The year-end evaluation package used in Study 1 was revised for Study 2 (see 
Appendix D) to generate four levels of competence (high competence, low competence 
with no explanation, low competence with positive explanation, and low competence 
with negative explanation). As in the first study, the evaluation package included three 
forms: the Employee Performance Review Form, the Employee Training Requirement 
Form, and the Request for Leave of Absence Without Pay Form. The employee was 
represented by the same ID number used in Study 1 to exclude the influence of a name. 
The dates used in Study 2 were exactly one year later than those in Study 1. They were 
included to make the evaluation package more believable and realistic for participants. In 
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the Employee Performance Review Form, the employee appeared to have been evaluated 
by his or her direct supervisor on ten aspects of work using a three-level rating scale: 
outstanding, meets expectations, and below expectations. The definitions of meets 
expectations for each of the ten work aspects were given and an overall rating for the 
employee was also provided. Four versions of the Employee Performance Review Form 
were created to manipulate four levels of competence. For all aspects of work including 
the overall rating, the category of outstanding was checked for the high-competence 
condition and the category of below expectations was checked for the three 
low-competence conditions. Unlike the first study, the Performance Review Form in the 
second study added a section for additional comments by the direct supervisor. The 
comment section was left blank for two of the four conditions: high competence and low 
competence without explanation. For the condition of low competence with positive 
explanation, the comment section included the sentence: “The employee has, in general, a 
positive attitude toward work. His/her poor performance was mainly due to lack of 
training and skills.” For the condition of low competence with negative explanation, the 
sentence read: “The employee has, in general, a negative attitude toward work. His/her 
poor performance was mainly due to lack of motivation and effort.”   
The other two forms, the Employee Training Requirement Form and the Request for 
Leave of Absence Form, were included in the evaluation package to make it more 
believable and realistic for participants. The two forms were exactly the same across the 
four levels of competence. In the Employee Training Requirement Form, the employee 
indicated that he or she has participated in all the required training. Unlike Study 1, the 
question about whether the employee’s additional voluntary training hours have equaled 
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or exceeded twenty hours was deleted in Study 2 to reduce unclear extraneous 
information. As in Study 1, the employee indicated that he or she did not require leave 
without pay during this year in the Request for Leave of Absence Form. Signatures 
required for the last two forms were made exactly the same for the four versions of the 
evaluation package and the employee’s signature was made as unidentifiable as possible 
to reduce the influence of a name.                                                   
Questionnaire Design   
As in Study 1, two versions of the questionnaire were created, one in which 
participants were asked to empathize with the employee (high-empathy condition) and 
the other in which participants were instructed to focus only on the information in the 
employee’s evaluation package (low-empathy condition). For Chinese participants, the 
questionnaire and evaluation package were translated into Chinese by the dissertation 
researcher, who is a native Chinese speaker, and back-translated by another native 
Chinese speaker. The two translators discussed any incongruities in the pre- and 
post-translated English versions and constructed a final Chinese version of the evaluation 
package and questionnaire.  
The evaluation package was prepared as a separate document from the questionnaire. 
In both cultures, each participant was randomly assigned to read one of the two versions 
of the questionnaire (high-empathy vs. low-empathy conditions) and one of the four 
versions of the evaluation package: high competence, low competence without 
explanation, low competence with positive explanation, and low competence with 
negative explanation. This arrangement created eight different experimental conditions: 2 
(empathy) × 4 (competence).      
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For each condition, participants first were asked to imagine themselves as the 
president of a company who would be distributing year-end bonuses to employees. The 
company was described as very competitive, whose success was attributed to a reward 
system that links year-end bonuses to performance. This description was used to make 
the equity principle salient in the bonus distribution situation in a competitive company 
environment. Participants were asked to read one of the four versions of the evaluation 
package and form an overall impression of the employee who was described as the same 
sex with the participant. They were then instructed to briefly write down their 
impressions of the employee and of the organization to further help them imagine the 
situation.   
Next, two items measured the believability and realism of the imagined situation 
(“How believable is the situation?” and “How realistic is the situation?”). Four items 
served as a check on the effectiveness of the competence manipulation (“How competent 
is the employee?,” “How well has the employee done his or her job?,” “How qualified is 
the employee for his or her job?,” and “What is the level of the employee’s ability?”). 
Two attributional questions were used to check the manipulation of positive and negative 
explanation under low-competence conditions. These questions measured whether 
participants attributed the employee’s poor performance to internal reasons (“To what 
extent do you think the employee’s performance can be attributed to him or her 
personally?”) or external reasons (“To what extent do you think the employee’s 
performance can be attributed to his or her environment?”).   
Participants then read an instruction for how to distribute the bonuses. The 
instruction was one of two versions that were used to manipulate the high-empathy and 
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low-empathy conditions. Unlike Study 1, the two instructions were made relatively the 
same in length in Study 2. The instructions were revised from the work of Stotland, 
Sherman, and Shaver (1971) and Fink (1975).  
High-Empathy Instruction: 
According to research conducted by the Human Resources Department, the best way 
to evaluate an employee is to really understand the employee’s feelings. Before you 
decide what bonus you would give to this employee, please imagine how you 
yourself would feel if you were in the employee’s position. Picture to yourself just 
how you would feel in his or her shoes (You are to keep clearly in mind that you are 
to react as if it were you who are in the package and are being evaluated). 
Concentrate on the way you would feel in that situation. In your mind’s eye, you are 
to visualize how it would feel to you to be the employee in his or her position. Now, 
reread the instruction once again. 
Low-Empathy Instruction:  
According to research conducted by the Human Resources Department, the best way 
to evaluate an employee is to be as objective as possible and focus only on the 
information in the evaluation package. Before you decide what bonus you would 
give to this employee, please decide based on exactly what’s in the package. You are 
to notice any information in the three forms: the Employee Performance Review 
Form, the Employee Training Requirement Form, and the Request for Leave of 
Absence Without Pay Form (You are to keep clearly in mind that you are to base 
your judgment solely on the information in the package). You are to notice anything 
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that is included in the package, whatever it is. Now, reread the instruction once 
again.    
After reading the instructions, participants were asked to reread the evaluation 
package based on the instruction they had just read. Unlike Study 1, four questions 
concerning monetary reward were asked in the second study. Participants indicated the 
amount of bonus they would give to the employee as the president of the company by 
responding to the question: 
If the year-end bonus for a moderately competent employee (i.e., an employee whose 
performance meets expectations in all the categories in the Employee Performance 
Review Form) in your company is $1000, what bonus would you give to the 
employee whose evaluation package you have just read? [You can give the employee 
zero or you can give him/her as much as you want. Remember more money given to 
this employee means less money to be allocated to other employees. Generally, your 
company gives $1000 to a moderately competent employee.]  
The second question was exactly the same as above except that the 
one-thousand-dollar reward was changed to $5,000. Thus, participants had a different 
number indicating a moderate amount in bonus distribution in the second question. The 
third question asked participants what amount of bonus they would give to the employee 
if they had an infinite amount of money to distribute. In this question, no number was 
given indicating a moderate amount. The fourth monetary-reward question refered to 
salary increase or pay raise:     
If the yearly salary increase/pay raise for a moderately competent employee (i.e., an 
employee whose performance meets expectations in all the categories in the 
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Employee Performance Review Form) in your company is 5% of the employee’s 
salary, what salary increase would you give to the employee whose evaluation 
package you have just read? [You can give the employee 0% or you can give him/her 
as much as you want. Remember higher raise given to this employee means lower 
raise given to other employees. Generally, your company gives 5% raise to a 
moderately competent employee.] 
  The four questions provided a reliability check for the measure of monetary 
distribution. To be consistent with Study 1, the first question served as the dependent 
variable for Study 2. To check the manipulation of empathy, besides the two questions 
used in Study 1, eight more questions were used: Two questions asked for participants’ 
experience with the employee’s feelings (“How much did you understand what the 
employee felt in making the decisions?” and “How much did you feel what the employee 
felt in making the decisions?”); six questions asked participants how accurate six 
statements were in describing themselves in making the distribution situation (“My 
judgment of the employee was based only and exclusively on the information in the 
evaluation package,” “I got involved with the employee’s feelings,” “I imagined how I 
would feel if I were in the employee’s position,” “I formed an impression of the 
employee relying solely on the information in the package,” “I put myself in the 
employee’s shoes and felt his or her feelings,” and “I tried to be as objective as 
possible.”). Unlike in the first study, participants were asked to indicate (based on a list of 
emotion adjectives) how much they had experienced and how much they understood the 
emotion that the employee had experienced in the process of reviewing the evaluation 
package and making the distribution decision. These self-reports provided a further test 
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of the effectiveness of the empathy manipulation. Included among the adjectives were 
eight distress adjectives (alarmed, grieved, troubled, distressed, upset, disturbed, worried, 
and perturbed), four sadness adjectives (low-spirited, feeling low, heavyhearted, and sad), 
and six empathy adjectives (sympathetic, soft-hearted, warm, compassionate, tender, and 
moved) used in previous research to measure empathy (see Batson, 1987, 1991; Batson et 
al., 1989; Batson et al., 1988; Fultz, Schaller, & Cialdini, 1988). Finally, participants 
responded to the Personal Belief in a Just World Scale (see Appendix B) and the Measure 
of Trait Empathy (see Appendix C), which includes five dimensions: perspective taking, 
fantasy, empathic concern, personal distress, and emotional contagion.    
For all questions other than the four estimates of monetary reward (three questions 
about the bonus and one question about salary), participants used magnitude scales, in 
which 100 represented a moderate amount of the variable that they were rating (Hamblin, 
1974; Lodge, 1981; Shinn, 1974; see also Torgerson, 1958, for fractionation methods). 
For the three measures of bonus, participants were asked to give either $1,000 or $5,000 
to a moderately competent employee, or they were told they had an infinite amount of 
bonus to distribute without given a moderate amount (see Footnote 1). For the measure of 
salary increase, participants were asked to give 5% salary increase to a moderately 
competent employee. For all the magnitude scales and the four estimates of monetary 
reward, participants could use any non-negative number, with higher numbers 
representing greater amounts of the variable that was being assessed. At the end of the 
questionnaire, participants provided information about their sex, age, racial or ethnic 
background, nationality, native language, major, year in school, and marital status.     
Data Transformation and Presentation  
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To meet statistical assumptions required for analyses within the general linear model, 
all the items were transformed by a power transformation (see Bauer & Fink, 1983; 
Kruskal, 1968). When a measure had one or more outliers, these values were trimmed by 
being recoded to a fixed upper value before further analysis. The transformed variables 
are used in all the analyses that follow.5 The means and standard deviations reported in 
the text are descriptive statistics, whereas the figures present estimated marginal means. 
All statistical tests are two tailed unless stated otherwise.       
Results 
Perception of Manipulations   
Believability and realism. Both American (believable: M = 147.84, SD = 177.36; 
realistic: M = 132.94, SD = 165.98) and Chinese participants (believable: M = 91.38, SD 
= 156.74; realistic: M = 101.62, SD = 201.91) perceived the situations as moderately 
believable and realistic (100 was used in the scale to indicate moderate believability and 
realism).6 U.S. participants perceived the situations as significantly more believable, F(1, 
236) = 25.61, p < .001, η2 = .10, and more realistic, F(1, 235) = 17.96, p < .001, η2 = .07, 
than Chinese participants. For U.S. participants, no significant differences were found in 
the perceptions of believability and realism between the high-competence condition and 
each of the three low-competence conditions. For Chinese participants, the 
high-competence condition was perceived as more believable and realistic than the 
low-competence with negative explanation condition; the high-competence condition was 
also perceived as more believable than the low-competence without explanation 
condition.  
Table 4 reports the results of the statistical tests for believability and realism between 
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the high-competence condition and each of the three low-competence conditions for U.S. 
and Chinese participants, respectively. The means and standard deviations for 
believability and realism by culture and competence levels are displayed in Table 5 and 6, 
respectively. 
Competence. A principal-components analysis was performed on the four-item 
competence scale. Only one principal component had an eigenvalue greater than 1. This 
component accounted for 86% of the total variance. The loadings of the four items on the 
extracted component were .93, .95, .95, and .89, respectively. The reliability coefficient 
(Cronbach’s α) of the sum of the competence items was .95. This principal component 
score was used in the subsequent analyses. The manipulation checks for competence 
were performed between the high-competence and each of the three low-competence 
conditions. Results showed that high-competence employees (U.S.: M = 1.39, SD = .67; 
China: M = 1.15, SD = .71) were perceived as more competent than low-competence 
employees without explanation (U.S.: M = -.61, SD = .46; China: M = -.27, SD = .91), 
low-competence employees with negative explanation (U.S.: M = -.65, SD = .46; China: 
M = -.46, SD = .44), and low-competence employees with positive explanation (U.S.: M 
= -.41, SD = .46; China: M = -.29, SD = .82) for both Americans and Chinese. Therefore, 
the manipulation of competence was successful in both cultural groups.         
Explanation. Two questions served to check the effectiveness of the manipulation of 
positive and negative explanation in low-competence conditions. To assess the extent to 
which participants made internal attributions under the negative-explanation condition 
and external attributions under the positive-explanation condition, a difference score was 
created by subtracting the reported external-attribution score (transformed) from the  
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Table 4 
Results of the Statistical Tests for Believability and Realism Between the High-Competence Condition and Each of the Three 
Low-Competence Conditions for U.S. and Chinese Participants in Study 2   
                                                     U.S.                                   China 
 
            High Competence  
            vs. Low Competence           F(1, 70) = .11, p < .74, η2 = .01           F(1, 52) = 7.39, p < .01, η2 = .12ª                  
            Without Explanation 
 
            High Competence  
Believability  vs. Low Competence           F(1, 70) = .33, p < .57, η2 = .01           F(1, 48) = 5.92, p < .02, η2 = .11b           
            With Negative Explanation 
 
            High Competence  
            vs. Low Competence           F(1, 70) = 1.03, p < .31, η2 = .01          F(1, 50) = 2.67, p < .11, η2 = .05 
            With Positive Explanation 
 
 
            High Competence  
            vs. Low Competence           F(1, 70) = .01, p < .91, η2 = .01           F(1, 53) = 1.86, p < .18, η2 = .03 
            Without Explanation 
 
            High Competence  
Realism     vs. Low Competence            F(1, 70) = .70, p < .41, η2 = .01           F(1, 48) = 6.18, p < .02, η2 = .11b            
            With Negative Explanation 
 
            High Competence  
            vs. Low Competence            F(1, 69) = .18, p < .67, η2 = .01           F(1, 51) = 1.99, p < .16, η2 = .04 
            With Positive Explanation 
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ªThe statistical test here was significant, indicating that the high-competence condition was perceived as more believable than the 
low-competence without explanation condition for Chinese participants.  
bThe statistical tests here were significant, indicating that the high-competence condition was perceived as more believable and 
realistic than the low-competence with negative explanation condition for Chinese participants.     
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Table 5 
Means and Standard Deviations for Believability by Culture and Levels of Competence in 
Study 2 (N = 244) 
 
                           US               China               Overall      
                          M        SD        M      SD          M      SD  
High Competence          4.78       1.50      4.44a(b)   1.71        4.63     1.59            
Low Competence          4.94       2.52      3.14ª     1.82        4.18     2.41 
Without Explanation          
 
Low Competence          4.55       1.79      3.12b     2.13        4.01      2.03 
With Negative Explanation 
 
Low Competence          5.13       1.46      3.29     3.24         4.39     2.48 
With Positive Explanation  
 
Overall                   4.85c      1.86      3.54c     2.31    
 
 
ªThe two means were significantly different from each other at p ≤ .05 level, indicating 
that the high-competence condition was perceived as more believable than the 
low-competence without explanation condition for Chinese participants.  
bThe two means were significantly different from each other at p ≤ .05 level, indicating 
that the high-competence condition was perceived as more believable than the 
low-competence with negative explanation condition for Chinese participants.     
cThe two means were significantly different from each other at p ≤ .05 level, indicating 
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Table 6 
Means and Standard Deviations for Realism by Culture and Levels of Competence in 
Study 2 (N = 243) 
 
                           US               China                Overall      
                          M        SD        M       SD          M      SD  
High Competence           4.64      1.84      4.26a      2.30        4.47    2.05 
Low Competence           4.69      2.17      3.37       2.54        4.14     2.40 
Without Explanation 
 
Low Competence           4.26      1.93      2.71a      2.00        3.69     2.08 
With Negative Explanation 
 
Low Competence           4.82      1.75      3.22       3.04        4.17     2.46 
With Positive Explanation 
 
Overall                   4.60b      1.92      3.45b      2.53    
 
 
ªThe two means were significantly different from each other at p ≤ .05 level, indicating 
that the high-competence condition was perceived as more realistic than the 
low-competence with negative explanation condition for Chinese participants.     
bThe two means were significantly different from each other at p ≤ .05 level, indicating 
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reported internal-attribution score (transformed). The negative-explanation 
low-competence condition should have a higher score on this measure than does the 
positive-explanation low-competence condition. The U.S. participants reported a higher 
score on this difference measure in the negative-explanation low-competence condition 
(M = 1.86, SD = 2.59) than in the positive-explanation low-competence condition (M = 
0.73, SD = 2.23), F(1, 70) = 3.94, p < .026 (one tailed), η2 = .05. However, no significant 
difference was found between the negative-reason low-competence condition (M = 0.38, 
SD = 2.97) and the positive-reason low-competence condition (M = 1.28, SD = 2.86) for 
Chinese participants, F(1, 43) = 1.07, p < .15 (one tailed), η2 = .02. Therefore, the 
manipulation of positive and negative explanations was successful for Americans but not 
for Chinese.   
Empathy. The empathy manipulation was checked in four different ways: (1) Ten 
questions asked the extent to which participants focused on the information in the 
package and on feelings of the employee; (2) participants reported how much they had 
experienced each of the eight distress and four sadness feelings; (3) participants reported 
how much they understood the employee had experienced each of the eight distress and 
four sadness feelings; and (4) participants indicated the extent to which they had 
experienced each of the six empathic feelings.   
To assess the extent to which participants focused on the employee’s feelings versus 
information in the package, a difference score was created by subtracting the four 
reported information-focused scores (transformed) from the six reported feelings-focused 
scores (transformed).7 The high-empathy condition should have a higher score on this 
measure than the low-empathy condition. U.S. participants reported a higher score on this 
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difference measure in the high-empathy condition (M = 1.85, SD = 11.03) than in the 
low-empathy condition (M = -9.84, SD = 13.11), F(1, 134) = 33.54, p < .001 (one tailed), 
partial η2 = .20. No significant difference was found between the two conditions 
(high-empathy: M = 7.16, SD = 9.69; low-empathy: M = 5.26, SD = 9.04) for Chinese 
participants. The reason for the insignificant effect may be that Chinese already reported 
a high empathy level in the low-empathy condition, even higher than the empathy score 
in the high-empathy condition for Americans.    
A principal-components analysis was performed on the twelve distress and sadness 
emotions that participants had felt. Two principal components had an eigenvalue greater 
than 1. The first component had acceptable loadings (≥ .59) on all the twelve items and 
accounted for 59% of the total variance. This principal component score was used in the 
subsequent analyses. The reliability coefficient (Cronbach’s α) for the sum of the twelve 
items was .94. No significant difference on this measure was found between 
high-empathy (China: M = -.35, SD = .83; U.S.: M = .21, SD = 1.06) and low-empathy 
(China: M = -.20, SD = .84; U.S.: M = .19, SD = 1.07) conditions for both Chinese and 
U.S. participants.    
A principal-components analysis was performed on the twelve distress and sadness 
emotions that participants understood the employee had felt. Only one principal 
component had an eigenvalue greater than 1. This component had acceptable loadings 
(≥ .74) on all the twelve items and accounted for 70% of the total variance. This principal 
component score was used in the subsequent analyses. The reliability coefficient 
(Cronbach’s α) of the sum of the twelve items was .96. U.S. participants reported a higher 
score on this measure in the high-empathy condition (M = .21, SD = 1.03) than in the 
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low-empathy condition (M = -.09, SD = 1.02), F(1, 131) = 4.77, p < .02 (one tailed), 
partial η2 = .04. No significant difference was found between the two conditions 
(high-empathy: M = -.08, SD = .90; low-empathy: M = -.09, SD = 1.01) for Chinese 
participants.       
Finally, a principal-components analysis was performed on the six empathic 
emotions that participants felt. Only one principal component had an eigenvalue greater 
than 1. This component had acceptable loadings on the six items and accounted for 71% 
of the total variance. This principal component score was used in the subsequent analyses. 
The reliability coefficient (Cronbach’s α) of the sum of the twelve items was .92. U.S. 
participants reported a higher score on this measure in the high-empathy condition (M 
= .21, SD = 1.10) than in the low-empathy condition (M = -.38, SD = .94), F(1, 136) = 
12.17, p < .001 (one tailed), partial η2 = .08. No significant differences were found 
between the two conditions (high-empathy: M = .22, SD = .95; low-empathy: M = .02, 
SD = .84) for Chinese participants.            
 For all four manipulation measures on empathy, U.S. participants reported higher 
score in the high-empathy condition than in the low-empathy condition on three measures, 
whereas no significant difference was found between the two empathy conditions for the 
four measures for Chinese participants.     
Trait empathy. A principal-components analysis was performed on the 35 items of 
trait empathy. More than one component with an eigenvalue greater than 1 was extracted 
(see Figure 4). The first principal component accounted for 23% of the total variance. 
The reliability coefficient (Cronbach’s α) of the summed thirty-five items was .88. This 
principal component score, created by combining the 35 items based on their loadings,  





















Figure 4. Scree plot for the principal components extracted from the 35 trait empathy 
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was used in the subsequent analyses.  
Dependent Variables: Monetary Reward   
Four questions measured the amounts of bonus and salary increase participants were 
willing to distribute to the employee under evaluation. To be consistent with Study 1, the 
first question served as the dependent variable in the analyses. However, unlike Study 1, 
the other three questions provided a reliability check for the measure of monetary reward. 
The correlations between the first bonus measure and each of the other three measures 
(the second bonus measure, the third bonus measure, and the salary increase measure) 
were .94, .82, and .88, respectively. A principal-components analysis was performed on 
the four items. Only one component had an eigenvalue greater than 1, accounting for 
89% of the total variance. The loadings of the four questions were .97, .97, .91, and .93 
respectively. The reliability coefficient (Cronbach’s α) of the sum of the four items 
was .84. The first question was used in further analyses in Study 2.     
Predicting Distribution of Bonus   
To assess the hypotheses and research question, an overall analysis of covariance 
(ANCOVA) and three separate ANCOVAs were conducted, with competence (high vs. 
each of the three low- competence conditions), empathy (high vs. low), culture (China vs. 
U.S.), and sex (male vs. female), as the independent variables, trait empathy as the 
covariate, and the first measure of the amount of bonus as the dependent variable. Sex 
was entered as an independent variable to control for any effects it may have, by itself or 
in interactions with other independent variables, on the size of the bonus. Trait empathy 
was entered as a covariate to control for the main effect it may have on the dependent 
variable. The three ANCOVAs differed in the two levels of competence entered for 
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analysis. The high-competence condition was compared with the low-competence 
without-reason condition, the low-competence with negative-reason condition, and the 
low-competence with positive-reason condition, respectively, in the three ANCOVAs. 
Therefore, the first ANCOVA was a replication of Study 1. The overall ANCOVA was 
statistically significant, F(32, 204) = 16.31, p < .001, R² = .72, adjusted R² = .68 (see 
Appendix K). All three ANCOVAs were also statistically significant, F(16, 105) = 17.85, 
p < .001, R² = .73, adjusted R² = .69, for the first ANCOVA; F(16, 99) = 29.92, p < .001, 
R² = .83, adjusted R² = .80, for the second ANCOVA; and F(16, 104) = 27.46, p < .001, 
R² = .81, adjusted R² = .78, for the third ANCOVA. The three ANCOVAs are referred to 
in the hypothesis tests that follow (see Appendices L, M, and N).    
Competence. Hypothesis 1 stated that for both cultures, a larger bonus is distributed 
to people with greater competence than people with less competence. All three 
ANCOVAs showed significant effects for competence no matter whether the low 
competence was unexplained, explained with negative reason, or explained with positive 
reason: For the first ANCOVA, F(1, 105) = 239.26, p < .001 (one tailed), partial η² = .70; 
larger bonuses were assigned to the high-competence condition (M = 26.46, SD = 4.59) 
than the low-competence without-reason condition (M = 8.04, SD = 7.85). Therefore, the 
significant effect of competence in Study 1 was replicated. For the second ANCOVA, 
F(1, 99) = 382.80, p < .001 (one tailed), partial η² = .80, larger bonuses were assigned to 
the high-competence condition (M = 26.46, SD = 4.59) than the low-competence with 
negative-reason condition (M = 6.22, SD = 6.56). For the third ANCOVA, F(1, 104) = 
350.64, p < .001 (one tailed), partial η² = .77, larger bonuses were assigned to the 
high-competence condition (M = 26.46, SD = 4.59) than the low-competence with 
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positive-reason condition (M = 8.08, SD = 5.75). Therefore, Hypothesis 1 was supported 
in Study 2.    
Empathy. Hypothesis 2 predicted that for both cultures, a larger bonus is distributed 
to people with whom the distributor empathizes than people with whom the distributor 
does not empathize. Results in the first ANCOVA showed no significant effect for 
empathy, F(1, 105) = 1.40, p < .12 (one tailed), partial η² = .01, and therefore failed to 
replicate the empathy effect in Study 1. The second ANCOVA showed a significant 
effect for empathy, F(1, 99) = 5.69, p < .01 (one tailed), partial η² = .05, with empathized 
employees (M = 17.92, SD = 10.89) receiving larger bonuses than employees not 
empathized with by the distributor (M = 15.89, SD = 12.24). Results in the third 
ANCOVA also showed a significant effect for empathy, F(1, 104) = 3.49, p < .032 (one 
tailed), partial η² = .03, with empathized employees (M = 18.26, SD = 10.14) receiving 
larger bonuses than employees not empathized with by the distributor (M = 17.01, SD = 
11.03). Therefore, Hypothesis 2 was partially supported.    
Empathy and competence. Hypothesis 3 predicted that empathy interacts with 
competence such that a larger bonus is distributed to low-competence people with whom 
the distributor empathizes than with those with whom the distributor does not empathize, 
whereas empathy does not increase the size of bonus distributed to high-competence 
people. The first ANCOVA showed no significant interaction between empathy and 
competence, F(1, 105) = .40, p < .53, partial η² = .01, replicating the non-significant 
result for Hypothesis 3 in Study 1. However, the second ANCOVA resulted in a 
significant interaction between empathy and competence, F(1, 99) = 3.16, p < .04 (one 
tailed), partial η² = .03: When competence was high, empathy did not increase the size of 
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bonus for high-competence people (high-empathy: M = 26.29, SD = 4.91; low-empathy: 
M = 26.63, SD = 4.31), whereas when competence was low but a negative explanation 
was given, high empathy (M = 8.40, SD = 7.39) led to larger bonuses given than did low 
empathy (M = 4.03, SD = 4.80, see Figure 5). The third ANCOVA did not result in a 
significant interaction between culture and empathy, F(1, 104) = 1.38, p < .24, partial η² 
= .01. Therefore, Hypothesis 3 was supported only when the low-competence condition 
was accompanied with a negative explanation.    
Empathy, competence, and culture. Hypothesis 4 predicted a three-way interaction 
between empathy, competence, and culture such that the effect of empathy on the 
relationship between competence and the size of bonus distributed is greater for Chinese 
than for U.S. Americans. The first ANCOVA showed no significant three-way interaction 
between competence, empathy, and culture, F(1, 105) = 1.29, p < .26, partial η² = .01, 
thus replicating the results found in Study 1. However, the ANCOVA with the 
low-competence negative-reason condition showed a statistically significant three-way 
interaction, F(1, 99) = 7.66, p < .007, partial η² = .07 (see Figure 6), and the ANCOVA 
with the low-competence positive-reason condition also showed a significant three-way 
interaction, F(1, 104) = 5.37, p < .022, partial η² = .05 (see Figures 7). The interaction 
between empathy and competence was supported for the Chinese but not for the U.S. 
sample. Hypothesis 4 was supported only when the low-competence condition was 
accompanied by an explanation, regardless of whether it was a positive or negative one.      
Figure 8 shows the interaction between competence, empathy, and culture with all 
four levels of competence indicated on the horizontal axis. Table 7 displays the means 
and standard deviations for the amount of bonus by competence (4 levels), empathy, and  


































































































Figure 6. Amount of bonus by empathy, competence (negative reason), and culture in 
Study 2.  
  


























































Figure 7. Amount of bonus by empathy, competence (positive reason), and culture in 
Study 2.  
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Table 7 
Means and Standard Deviations for Amount of Bonus by Competence, Empathy, and Culture in Study 2 (N = 246) 
 
               
                              US                                         China                     
                  
                                Low Empathy          High Empathy            Low Empathy          High Empathy  
 
                                M       SD          M        SD            M        SD         M        SD  
  
High Competence                 25.59    4.87         27.24     4.01          27.98     3.14         25.16     5.75 
 
Low Competence with pos. reason    5.59     4.63         7.15      5.78          8.47      5.18         12.82     5.44 
 
Low Competence with neg. reason    3.92    4.88          6.37      6.98          4.21      4.89         11.74     7.09 
 
Low Competence without reason     4.83     6.57         7.37      6.53          9.58      8.78         11.72     8.92 
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culture.  
The research question asked the effect that culture, interacting with other variables, 
has on the size of bonus distributed. No significant interactions were found between 
culture and competence or between culture and empathy; therefore, the results for the 
research question in Study 1 were not replicated. No significant interactions were found 
between culture and other variables for the second and third ANCOVAs.    
  Discussion   
As in Study 1, Study 2 investigated how empathy affected the use of the equity 
principle in a bonus distribution situation within a company. Empathy was expected to 
interact with competence such that a greater difference in the size of bonuses distributed 
between high- and low-competence people was expected when empathy was low than 
when empathy was high. This interaction between empathy and competence was also 
expected to be greater for Chinese than for U.S. Americans. Study 2 assessed its 
hypotheses using three ANCOVAs with competence, empathy, and culture as 
independent variables and the amount of bonus assigned to employees as the dependent 
variable. The high-competence condition was compared with each of the three 
low-competence conditions (low competence without reason, low competence with 
negative reason, and low competence with positive reason) in three ANCOVAs. One 
purpose in Study 2 was to see whether results in Study 1 would be replicated. The first 
ANCOVA, with high competence and low competence without reason as the two 
competence levels, replicated Study 1. Moreover, in Study 1, the hypothesized two-way 
interaction between empathy and competence and the hypothesized three-way interaction 
between empathy, competence, and culture were not statistically significant. Study 2 
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examined whether manipulating the low-competence condition into negative- or 
positive-reason conditions would result in these two-way and three-way interactions 
being significant.  
Most of the results in Study 1 were replicated. As found in Study 1, the effect of 
competence was significant, whereas the two-way interaction between empathy and 
competence and the three-way interaction between empathy, competence, and culture 
were not significant. Results of the research question in Study 1 were not replicated: 
Culture was not found to interact with empathy and competence. The robust effect of 
competence found in Study 1 was confirmed in Study 2: A greater bonus was distributed 
to high-competence employees than employees in the unexplained low-competence 
condition. Like study 1, the two-way interaction between empathy and competence and 
the three-way interaction between empathy, competence, and culture were not significant. 
However, in the second and third ANCOVAs in Study 2, where the low-competence 
condition was either explained with a negative reason or with a positive one, most of the 
hypotheses were supported, including the two-way interaction between empathy and 
competence and the three-way interaction between empathy, competence, and culture. In 
the second ANCOVA, when competence was high, empathy did not increase the amount 
of bonus to high-competence employees, whereas when competence was low but a 
negative explanation was given, employees who were empathized with received larger 
bonuses than employees who were not empathized with (see Figure 5). For both the 
second and third ANCOVAs, the three-way interactions between empathy, competence, 
and culture were significant: A greater interaction between empathy and competence was 
found for Chinese than for U.S. Americans such that empathy increased the amount of 
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bonus given to low-competence employees with either a negative or positive explanation 
for Chinese but not for U.S. Americans (see Figures 6, 7, and 8). Therefore, it seemed 
that empathy and culture influenced the use of the equity principle on a company’s bonus 
distribution situation when the low-competence condition was accompanied by an 
explanation, regardless of whether the explanation was positive or negative.    
Finally, competence was found to be a significant predictor in all the ANCOVAs in 
both Studies 1 and 2, indicating that the use of the equity rule was predominant in the 
bonus distribution situation. High-competence employees received larger bonuses than 
low-competence employees regardless of whether an explanation was given or whether 
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Chapter 4 
Study 3: The Distribution Situation in a Charity Organization 
The third study examines the relationship between empathy and need: how empathy 
affects the distribution of an assistance fund in a charity organization, where need is the 
most salient distributive justice principle. Based on the need principle, people in greater 
need should receive more money than people in less need. However, because empathy is 
more congruent with the ethics of care than the ethics of justice, when empathy is aroused, 
more money may be distributed to low-need people, who are likely to be perceived as 
less deserving, based on the ethics of justice, than high-need people. Therefore, it is 
hypothesized in Study 3 that empathy affects the distribution decision based on need such 
that the difference in the amount of money distributed between high- and low-need 
people is greater when empathy is low than when it is high. In other words, empathy 
decreases the money gap between high- and low-need people in terms of the amount of 
money distributed. Moreover, this interaction between empathy and need is expected to 
be greater for Chinese than for U.S. Americans.  
Hypotheses 
In the third study, the distribution of money was examined based on four 
independent variables: the magnitude of need (large vs. small), the urgency of need 
(urgent vs. not urgent), and level of empathy with the receiver (high vs. low empathy), 
across two cultural groups, Chinese and U.S. Americans. The following hypotheses are 
organized based on the effects of need (H1), the role of empathy (H2 and H3), and the 
role of culture (H4 and the RQ).  
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H1: For both cultures, more money is distributed to people with greater need (large 
or urgent need) than people with less need (small or not urgent need).      
H2: For both cultures, more money is distributed to people with whom the distributor 
empathizes than people with whom the distributor does not empathize.     
H3: Empathy interacts with need such that more money is distributed to people in 
less need with whom the distributor empathizes than with whom the distributor does 
not empathize, whereas empathy does not increase the amount of money distributed 
to people in greater need.   
H4: The effect of empathy on the relationship between need and the amount of 
money distributed is greater for Chinese than for U.S. Americans. 
RQ: Does culture interact with other variables to influence the amount of money 
distributed?   
It should be noted that the hypothesized effect of empathy on the need principle in 
Study 3 is similar to the hypothesized effect of empathy on the equity principle in Studies 
1 and 2. In all three studies, more money is expected to be distributed to people in the 
low-competence condition or in less need who are empathized with rather than not 
empathized with, whereas empathy does not increase the amount of money to people of 
high-competence or in greater need. Because the hypothesized effect of empathy on the 
equity principle in Study 2 was brought out only when an explanation was added to the 
low-competence situation, the hypotheses in Study 3 are also tested: (1) without an 
explanation of whether the applicant is responsible for the need, and (2) with an 
explanation that the applicant is not responsible for the need. The expectation was that if 
empathy did not increase the amount of money distributed to persons in less need because 
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the cause of the need was unknown in the without-explanation situation, adding an 
explanation of the cause of the need may help bring out this effect in the with-explanation 
situation.  
Method   
Participants 
Participants (N = 335) were recruited from both China and the U.S. The U.S. 
participants were 191 undergraduates from communication classes at a large public U.S. 
east coast university. Sixty-seven percent of the U.S. participants were female (127 
females and 64 males). The average age of the U.S. participants was 20.15 years (Mdn = 
20.00, SD = 1.87), and the ages ranged from 18 to 29 years. Sixty-four percent of the U.S. 
participants were Caucasian, 14% were African American, 17% were Asian, 4% were 
Hispanic, and 2% were not in any of the listed categories (the total is not equal to 100% 
due to rounding).        
The Chinese participants were 144 undergraduates from two universities, one in a 
northeastern city and the other in a southwestern city of China. One participant did not 
indicate his or her sex. Three participants did not indicate their age. Of the 143 
participants who indicated sex, sixty-nine percent of the Chinese participants were female 
(98 females and 45 males). The average age of the Chinese participants was 21.96 years 
(Mdn = 22.00, SD = 1.98), and the ages ranged from 19 to 32 years. All participants from 
China identified their ethnic background as Chinese (as opposed to Korean or other 
possible ethnicities in China).          
Procedure 
U.S. participants received a small amount of extra course credit for participating in 
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the study. Participants came to an assigned location, which was not their regular 
classroom, to read and sign the study’s consent form and complete the questionnaire. An 
alternative class assignment or participation in other studies was offered as an option for 
students who did not want to participate in this study.  
The Chinese participants did the study as a voluntary class activity. They read and 
signed the study’s consent form and completed the questionnaire during regular class 
time supervised by their instructor. For both Chinese and U.S. participants, no student 
declined to participate in the study, and questionnaires and consent forms were collected 
separately. The questionnaire took approximately 60 minutes to complete.        
Stimulus Materials 
Four charity program application packages (see Appendix E) were created describing 
a person injured in a car accident to generate four types of need defined by the two levels 
of the magnitude of need (large vs. small) and the two levels of the urgency of need 
(urgent vs. not urgent). In the condition in which the cause of the need was not explained, 
the application package included a cover page and the Application for Charity Care 
Assistance Form (Form 1) in which one of the four types of need was indicated in the 
Statement of Reasons for Application section. In the condition in which the cause of the 
need was explained as not due to the applicant, the Accident Data Collection Form (Form 
2) was added to the application package to show that the accident in which the applicant 
was injured was not caused by the applicant. The applicant was represented by an ID 
number in the forms to exclude the influence of a name.  
The cover page introduced the RoadSafety Charity Care Program. RoadSafety was 
described as a charity organization that provides financial assistance to cover the hospital 
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bills of those injured in road accidents. The cover page was the same across all conditions. 
In the Application for Charity Care Assistance Form, the applicant was described as 
married and employed. The applicant was described as married because in the two 
manipulated urgent-need scenarios, the applicant was hospitalized waiting for urgent 
treatment and the application was, therefore, prepared by the applicant’s spouse. The 
applicant was described as employed because unemployment may become another factor 
influencing participants’ judgment of the applicant’s need; also, in the non-responsibility 
condition manipulated in form 2, the applicant was described as driving his or her 
company’s car when the accident occurred. The use of the company’s car in the scenario 
was necessary because Chinese participants may not regard someone who has a private 
car as in need of financial assistance. The applicant was also described as belonging to a 
low-income family, having no medical insurance, and having no assistance from anyone 
or any organization for the payments of hospital bills. These manipulations were 
necessary because of the need to control for extraneous factors that may influence 
participants’ assistance decisions. The name and telephone number of the applicant’s 
employer were given to make the scenarios realistic and believable for participants. In 
part 2 of the Application for Charity Care Assistance Form, a statement of reasons for 
application was provided by applicant or their spouse to manipulate the four types of 
need: the large and urgent need, the large and not urgent need, the small and urgent need, 
and the small and not urgent need. In the large and urgent need condition, the statement 
was written by the spouse of the applicant. The applicant is described as in critical 
condition due to an injury to the spinal column in a serious car accident one week ago 
and is in urgent need of a series of operations to avoid lifetime paralysis. In the small and 
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urgent need condition, the statement was also written by the spouse of the applicant. The 
applicant is described as in stable condition after a car accident one week ago but needs 
to undergo immediately a small operation to treat a bone fracture in one leg. In the large 
and not urgent need condition, the statement was written by the applicant describing a car 
accident one year ago that resulted in the amputation of his or her left leg just above the 
knee. The injured person is applying for financial assistance to be fitted with a prosthetic 
limb. In the small and not urgent need condition, the statement was written by the 
applicant describing a car accident one year ago that resulted in a long and deep cut on 
his or her left leg. The injured person is applying for financial assistance to use skin 
reconstruction to make the scar less perceptible. The four descriptions of need were made 
relatively the same in length. Part 3 of the Application for Charity Care Assistance Form 
is a signature section which is used to make the scenarios look believable and realistic. 
Signatures required of the person making the request if injured were made unidentifiable 
and exactly the same for the two non-urgent need situations, whereas signatures required 
of the person making request if not injured party were made unidentifiable and exactly 
the same for the two urgent need situations in order to reduce the influence of a name.   
In the condition in which the cause of need is not due to the applicant, the Accident 
Data Collection Form (Form 2) was added. In this form, the injured person was described 
as parking his or her company’s car in a safe area on the side of a road when a truck hit it. 
The truck driver later fled the scene and police confirm later that the truck driver was 
responsible for the accident.         
Questionnaire Design  
As in Studies 1 and 2, two versions of the questionnaire were created, one in which 
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participants were asked to empathize with the applicant (high-empathy condition) and the 
other in which participants were instructed to focus only on the information in the 
application package (low-empathy condition). For Chinese participants, the questionnaire 
and application package were translated into Chinese by the dissertation researcher, who 
is a native Chinese speaker, and back-translated by another native Chinese speaker. The 
two translators discussed any incongruities in the pre- and post-translated English 
versions and constructed a final Chinese version of the application package and 
questionnaire.  
The application package was prepared as a separate document from the questionnaire. 
In both cultures, each participant was randomly assigned to read one of the two versions 
of the questionnaire (high-empathy versus low-empathy conditions) and one of the eight 
versions of the application package categorized by the four types of need (large and 
urgent, small and urgent, large and not urgent, and small and not urgent) in one of the two 
situations in which the cause of need is either not explained or is explained as not due to 
the applicant. This arrangement created sixteen different experimental conditions, 2 
(empathy) × 2 (magnitude of need) × 2 (urgency of need) × 2 (responsibility not 
explained vs. without responsibility).   
In the introductory section of the questionnaire, participants in each condition were 
first asked to imagine themselves as the president of RoadSafety, a charity organization 
that provides assistance for victims injured in road accidents in their local community. 
Some statistics were provided to emphasize the seriousness of road accidents in affecting 
people’s lives all over the world and therefore to make salient the importance of road 
safety to participants. Participants were told that the most important service their 
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organization provides is the RoadSafety Charity Care Program, which helps applicants 
pay hospital bills related to road accidents. Participants were then asked to review an 
application package (prepared as a separate document for them) and form an overall 
impression of the applicant (the injured party), who was described as the same sex with 
the participant, before answering further questions in the questionnaire. Participants were 
instructed to briefly write down their impressions of the applicant and of the organization 
to further put them in the imagined situation.  
Next, two items measured the believability and realism of the imagined situation 
(“How believable is the situation?” and “How realistic is the situation?”). Six items 
served as a check on the effectiveness of the manipulation of the magnitude of need 
(“How much money is the injured party in need of?,” “What is the level of the injured 
party’s financial difficulty?,” “How great is the financial need of the injured party?,” 
“How much financial support is the injured party in need of?,” “How much is the injured 
party in need of money?,” and “What is the level of the injured party’s financial 
well-being?”). Two questions were used to check the manipulation of the urgency of need 
(“How urgent is the financial need of the injured party?” and “How pressing is the 
financial need of the injured party?”). Another three questions were used to check the 
manipulation of the cause of the need, that is, how responsible the applicant is perceived 
for the accident (“How responsible was the injured party for the accident?,” “To what 
extent was the injured party at fault in the accident?,” and “How accountable should the 
injured party be held for the accident?”).     
Participants then read an instruction for how to allocate assistance money to 
applicants. The instruction was one of two versions used to manipulate the high-empathy 
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and low-empathy conditions. The two instructions were made relatively the same in 
length. The instructions were revised from the work of Stotland, Sherman, and Shaver 
(1971) and Fink (1975).  
High-Empathy Instruction: 
According to research conducted by charity organizations, the best way to judge and 
allocate money to people in need is to really understand the injured party’s feelings. 
Before you decide what amount of money you would give to this injured party, 
please imagine how you yourself would feel if you were in this person’s position. 
Picture to yourself just how you would feel in his or her shoes (You are to keep 
clearly in mind that you are to react as if it were you who are in the package and are 
being evaluated). Concentrate on the way you would feel in that situation. In your 
mind’s eye, you are to visualize how it would feel to you to be the injured party in his 
or her position. Now, reread the instruction once again. 
Low-Empathy Instruction:  
According to research conducted by charity organizations, the best way to judge and 
allocate money to people in need is to be as objective as possible and focus only on 
the information in the application package. Before you decide what amount of money 
you would give to this injured party, please decide based on exactly what’s in the 
package. You are to notice any information in the included forms: the Application 
For Charity Care Assistance Form, and other relevant forms included in the package 
(You are to keep clearly in mind that you are to base your judgment solely on the 
information in the package). You are to notice anything that is included in the 
package, whatever it is. Now, reread the instruction once again.  
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After reading the instruction, participants were asked to reread the application 
package based on the instructions they had just read. Next, two questions concerning 
distribution of money were asked. Participants indicated the amount of money they 
would give to the applicant as the president of the charity organization by responding to 
the question:  
What amount of money would you give to this injured party whose application 
package you have just read? [You can give the person zero or you can give him/her 
as much as you want. Remember you don’t need to pay the medical bill in full for the 
applicant. More money given to this applicant means less money to be allocated to 
future applicants. Generally, your organization gives $1000 to an applicant who has a 
moderate need.]  
The second question asked participants the amount of money that they would give to 
the injured party if they now had an infinite amount of money to distribute to applicants. 
In this question, no number was given indicating a moderate amount and participants 
were told that they can give the injured party zero or they can give him or her as much as 
they want.   
 The two questions provided a reliability check for the measure of monetary 
distribution. To be consistent with Studies 1 and 2, the first question served as the 
dependent variable for Study 3. To check the manipulation of empathy, the same ten 
questions as in Study 2 were revised to measure whether participants in Study 3 focused 
on the information (“To what extent did you focus on the information in the package in 
making the decisions?,” “My judgment of the injured party was based only and 
exclusively on the information in the application package,” “I formed an impression of 
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the injured party relying solely on the information in the package,” and “I tried to be as 
objectively as possible.”) or feelings of the employee (“To what extent did you focus on 
the feelings of the injured party in making the decisions?,” “How much do you think that 
you understood what the injured party felt in making the decisions?,” “How much do you 
think that you felt what the injured party felt in making the decisions?,” “I got involved 
with the injured party’s feelings,” “I imagined how I would feel if I were in the injured 
party’s position,” and “I put myself in the injured party’s shoes and felt his or her 
feelings.”) in the process of making the distribution decision. As in Study 2, the empathy 
manipulation check also involved a list of emotion adjectives. Participants were asked to 
indicate how much they had experienced each emotion and how much the injured party 
had experienced each emotion in the process of reviewing the application package and 
making the distribution decision. These self-reports provided a further test of the 
effectiveness of the empathy manipulation. Included among the adjectives were eight 
distress adjectives (alarmed, grieved, troubled, distressed, upset, disturbed, worried, and 
perturbed), four sadness adjectives (low-spirited, feeling low, heavyhearted, and sad), 
and six empathy adjectives (sympathetic, soft-hearted, warm, compassionate, tender, and 
moved) used in previous research to measure empathy (see Batson, 1987, 1991; Batson et 
al., 1989; Batson et al., 1988; Fultz, Schaller, & Cialdini, 1988). Finally, participants 
responded to the Personal Belief in a Just World Scale (see Appendix B) and the Measure 
of Trait Empathy (see Appendix C), which includes five dimensions: perspective taking, 
fantasy, empathic concern, personal distress, and emotional contagion.     
For all questions other than the two estimates of the distribution of money, 
participants used magnitude scales, in which 100 represented a moderate amount of the 
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variable that they were rating (Hamblin, 1974; Lodge, 1981; Shinn, 1974; see also 
Torgerson, 1958, for fractionation methods). For the two measures of the amount of 
money distributed, participants were asked to give $1,000 to an applicant who has a 
moderate need, or they were told they had an infinite amount of money to distribute 
without being given a moderate amount (see Footnote 1). For all the magnitude scales 
and the two estimates of money, participants could use any non-negative number, with 
higher numbers representing greater amounts of the variable that was being assessed. At 
the end of the questionnaire, participants provided information about their sex, age, racial 
or ethnic background, nationality, native language, major, year in school, and marital 
status.    
Data Transformation and Presentation  
To meet statistical assumptions required for analyses within the general linear model, 
all the items were transformed by a power transformation (see Bauer & Fink, 1983; 
Kruskal, 1968). When a measure had one or more outliers, these values were trimmed by 
being recoded to a fixed upper value before further analysis. The transformed variables 
are used in all the analyses that follow.8 The means and standard deviations reported in 
the text are descriptive statistics, whereas the figures present estimated marginal means. 
All statistical tests are two tailed unless stated otherwise.     
Results 
Perception of Manipulations   
Believability and realism. American participants (believable: M = 243.83, SD = 
257.16; realistic: M = 235.07, SD = 256.61) perceived the situations as highly believable 
and realistic. Chinese participants (believable: M = 117.50, SD = 99.47; realistic: M = 
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143.33, SD = 181.76) perceived the situations as moderately believable and realistic (100 
was used in the scale to indicate moderate believability and realism).9 U.S. participants 
perceived the situations as significantly more believable, F(1, 326) = 48.60, p < .001, η2 
= .13, and realistic, F(1, 324) = 29.08, p < .001, η2 = .08, than Chinese participants. For 
U.S. participants, no significant differences were found in the perceptions of believability 
and realism between the two levels of the magnitude of need (large vs. small) and the two 
levels of the urgency of need (urgent vs. not urgent). For Chinese participants, no 
significant differences were found in the perception of believability and realism between 
the two levels of the urgency of need and in the perception of realism between the two 
levels of the magnitude of need. However, Chinese participants perceived that the 
large-need situations were more believable than the small-need situations.  
Table 8 reports the results of the statistical tests for believability and realism between 
the two levels of the magnitude of need and of the urgency of need for U.S. and Chinese 
participants, respectively. The means and standard deviations for believability and 
realism by culture and need levels are found in Tables 9 and 10, respectively.   
 Need. A principal-components analysis was performed on the six-item scale for the 
magnitude of need. Two principal components had eigenvalues greater than 1. The last 
item (i.e., “What is the level of the injured party’s financial well-being?”) had a low 
loading (.163) on the first component and was deleted from the scale. Only one principal 
component with an eigenvalue greater than 1 was extracted from the remaining five items. 
This component accounted for 72% of the total variance. The loadings of the five items 
on the extracted component were .77, .77, .89, .89, and .91, respectively. The reliability 
coefficient (Cronbach’s α) of the summed five items for the magnitude of need scale 
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Table 8 
Results of the Statistical Tests for Believability and Realism Between the Two Levels of the Magnitude of Need and of the Urgency of 
Need for U.S. and Chinese Participants in Study 3   
                                                     U.S.                                     China 
                   
            Magnitude of Need              F(1, 187) = .98, p < .32, η2 = .01           F(1, 139) = 5.48, p < .02, η2 = .04a   
Believability                                        
            Urgency of Need               F(1, 187) = .88, p < .35, η2 = .01            F(1, 139) = .19, p < .66, η2 = .01   
           
            Magnitude of Need             F(1, 187) = .12, p < .73, η2 = .01            F(1, 137) = .94, p < .33, η2 = .01   
Realism                                        
            Urgency of Need               F(1, 187) = 2.83, p < .09, η2 = .02           F(1, 137) = .05, p < .83, η2 = .01   
           
 
ªThe statistical test here was significant, indicating that the large-need condition was perceived as more believable than the small-need 
condition for Chinese participants.  
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Table 9 
Means and Standard Deviations for Believability by Culture and Levels of Need in Study 
3 (N = 334) 
 
                         US               China               Overall      
                        M        SD        M      SD         M      SD  
Small Need              5.24       1.35     3.98a    1.54        4.69c     1.56            
Large Need              5.46      1.61      4.51ª    1.10        5.06c     1.49 
          
 
Not-Urgent Need         5.25       1.54     4.29     1.34        4.83      1.53 
 
 
Urgent Need             5.45      1.43      4.20     1.38        4.92     1.54 
 
Overall                 5.35b      1.49     4.24b     1.36    
 
 
ªThe two means were significantly different from each other at p ≤ .05 level, indicating 
that the big-need condition was perceived as more believable than the small-need 
condition for Chinese participants.  
bThe two means were significantly different from each other at p ≤ .05 level, indicating 
that overall U.S. participants perceived the situations as more believable than Chinese 
participants.     
cThe two means were significantly different from each other at p ≤ .05 level, indicating 
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Table 10 
Means and Standard Deviations for Realism by Culture and Levels of Need in Study 3 (N 
= 332) 
 
                         US               China               Overall      
                        M        SD        M      SD          M      SD  
Small Need              5.23      1.40      4.19     1.49        4.79      1.53            
Large Need              5.31      1.58      4.47     1.81        4.96      1.73 
          
 
Not-Urgent Need         5.09      1.37      4.30     1.51         4.75     1.48 
 
 
Urgent Need             5.45      1.58      4.36     1.81         4.99     1.76 
 
Overall                 5.27a      1.49     4.33a     1.66    
 
 
ªThe two means were significantly different from each other at p ≤ .05 level, indicating 
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was .90. This principal component score was used in the subsequent analyses.  
A principal-components analysis was performed on the two-item scale for the 
urgency of need. One principal component had an eigenvalue greater than 1. This 
component accounted for 90% of the total variance. The loadings of the two items on the 
extracted component were .95 and .95. The reliability coefficient (Cronbach’s α) of the 
sum of the two items for the urgency of need scale was .89. This principal component 
score was used in the subsequent analyses.   
The manipulation checks for need were performed between the two levels of the 
magnitude of need and the two levels of the urgency of need. Results showed that the 
large-need applicant (U.S.: M = .39, SD = .91; China: M = .24, SD = .92) was perceived 
as having larger need than the small-need applicant (U.S.: M = -.35, SD = .85; China: M 
= -.31, SD = 1.12), and the urgent-need applicant (U.S.: M = .46, SD = .84; China: M 
= .35, SD = .95) was perceived as having more urgent need than the not-urgent-need 
applicant (U.S.: M = -.58, SD = .88; China: M = -.23, SD = .96) for both Americans and 
Chinese. However, results also showed that the large-need applicant (U.S.: M = .38, SD 
= .90; China: M = .34, SD = .89) was perceived as having more urgent need than the 
small-need applicant (U.S.: M = -.49, SD = .91; China: M = -.23, SD = 1.02), and the 
urgent-need applicant (U.S.: M = .34, SD = .93; China: M = .13, SD = 1.03) was 
perceived as having larger need than the not-urgent-need applicant (U.S.: M = -.31, SD 
= .87; China: M = -.20, SD = 1.07) for both American and Chinese participants. These 
results suggest that participants did not regard the magnitude and urgency as two 
independent dimensions of need. Therefore, need was re-categorized as a three-level 
variable: High need (representing the large-and-urgent need condition), moderate need 
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(representing the large-and-not-urgent need condition and the small-and-urgent need 
condition), and low need (representing the small-and-not-urgent need condition). To 
check whether the three levels of need differed in terms of participants’ perceptions, the 
original six-item magnitude-of-need scale and two-item urgency-of-need scale were 
combined. After dropping the last item (“What is the level of the injured party’s financial 
well-being?”) of the magnitude-of-need scale because of its low loading (.142), the 
remaining seven items loaded on only one principal component, which accounted for 
70% of the total variance. The loadings of the seven items on the extracted component 
were .75, .73, .88, .87, .91, .83, and .87, respectively. The reliability coefficient 
(Cronbach’s α) of the summed seven items was .93. This principal component score was 
used as the manipulation check of the newly created need variable with three levels.         
 For U.S. participants, a linear effect with polynomial contrast for the three levels of 
need was found, p < .001. The high-need condition (M = .81, SD = .99) was perceived as 
having greater need than the moderate-need condition (M = -.02, SD = .61, F[1, 142] = 
37.94, p < .001, η2 = .21), which was in turn perceived as having greater need than the 
low-need condition (M = -.83, SD = .87, F[1, 137] = 40.48, p < .001, η2 = .23). For 
Chinese participants, a linear effect with polynomial contrast for the three levels of need 
was also found, p < .001. The high-need condition (M = .56, SD = .93) was perceived as 
having greater need than the moderate-need condition (M = -.06, SD = .90, F[1, 105] = 
10.94, p < .001, η2 = .09), which was in turn perceived as having greater need than the 
low-need condition (M = -.47, SD = 1.18, F[1, 105] = 3.98, p < .049, η2 = .04). Therefore, 
the perception of need differed as expected due to the restructuring of the conditions 
across the three levels of the newly created need variable in each of the two cultures.  
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Responsibility. Three questions served to check the effectiveness of the manipulation 
of the cause of need: how responsible the applicant is perceived to be for the accident. 
Applicants in conditions where the accident was explained as caused by a truck driver 
should be perceived as less responsible than applicants in conditions where the 
responsibility was left unexplained. A principal-components analysis was performed on 
the three-item responsibility scale. One principal component had an eigenvalue greater 
than 1. This component accounted for 84% of the total variance. The loadings of the three 
items on the extracted component were .87, .94, and .94 respectively. The reliability 
coefficient (Cronbach’s α) of the summed three items was .90. This principal component 
score was used in the manipulation tests. For the U.S. participants, applicants in the 
no-responsibility condition (M = -1.02, SD = .67) were perceived as less responsible than 
applicants in the no-explanation condition (M = .38, SD = .81), F(1, 179) = 130.77, p 
< .001, partial η2 = .42. For Chinese participants, applicants in the no-responsibility 
condition (M = -.14, SD = .93) were also perceived as less responsible than applicants in 
the no-explanation condition (M = .71, SD = .57), F(1, 136) = 39.63, p < .001, partial η2 
= .23. Therefore, the two situations with or without an explanation of the cause of the 
accident differed in both cultures in terms of participants’ perceptions of responsibility.      
Empathy. The empathy manipulation was checked in four different ways: (1) Ten 
questions asked the extent to which participants focused on the information in the 
package and on feelings of the applicant; (2) participants reported how much they had 
experienced each of the eight distress and four sadness feelings; (3) participants also 
reported how much they understood the applicant had experienced each of the eight 
distress and four sadness feelings; and (4) participants indicated the extent to which they 
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had experienced each of the six empathic feelings.   
To assess the extent to which participants focused on the applicant’s feelings versus 
information in the package, a difference score was created by subtracting the four 
reported information-focused scores (transformed) from the six reported feelings-focused 
scores (transformed). The high-empathy condition should have a higher score on this 
measure than the low-empathy condition. U.S. participants reported a higher score on this 
difference measure in the high-empathy condition (M = 7.70, SD = 9.52) than in the 
low-empathy condition (M = 4.81, SD = 11.43), F(1, 158) = 4.52, p < .035, partial η2 
= .03. Chinese participants also reported a higher score on this difference measure in the 
high-empathy condition (M = 10.40, SD = 7.34) than in the low-empathy condition (M = 
8.77, SD = 7.86), F(1, 107) = 6.05, p < .016, partial η2 = .05. Therefore, the manipulation 
of empathy using the difference score was successful for both cultures.   
A principal-components analysis was performed on the twelve distress and sadness 
emotions that participants had felt. One principal component had an eigenvalue greater 
than 1. The component had acceptable loadings (≥ .64) on all the twelve items and 
accounted for 53% of the total variance. This principal component score was used in the 
subsequent analyses. The reliability coefficient (Cronbach’s α) of the sum of the twelve 
items was .92. No significant difference was found between the two conditions 
(high-empathy: M = .10, SD = 1.00; low-empathy: M = .02, SD = 1.07) for U.S. 
participants. However, Chinese participants reported a higher score on this measure in the 
high-empathy condition (M = .06, SD = 1.07) than in the low-empathy condition (M = 
-.22, SD = .81), F(1, 111) = 4.87, p < .029, partial η2 = .04. Therefore, the manipulation 
of empathy by this measure was successful for only the Chinese participants.              
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A principal-components analysis was performed on the twelve distress and sadness 
emotions that participants understood the applicant had felt. Only one principal 
component had an eigenvalue greater than 1. The component had acceptable loadings 
(≥ .70) on all the twelve items and accounted for 63% of the total variance. This principal 
component score was used in the subsequent analyses. The reliability coefficient 
(Cronbach’s α) of the summed twelve items was .94. U.S. participants reported a higher 
score on this measure in the high-empathy condition (M = .30, SD = 1.09) than in the 
low-empathy condition (M = -.01, SD = .90), F(1, 155) = 7.33, p < .008, partial η2 = .05. 
No significant difference was found between the two conditions (high-empathy: M = -.26, 
SD = .92; low-empathy: M = -.12, SD = 1.00) for Chinese participants. Therefore, the 
manipulation of empathy by this measure was successful for only the U.S. participants.               
Finally, a principal-components analysis was performed on the six empathic 
emotions that participants felt. Only one principal component had an eigenvalue greater 
than 1. The component had acceptable loadings on the six items (≥ .79) and accounted for 
70% of the total variance. This principal component score was used in the subsequent 
analyses. The reliability coefficient (Cronbach’s α) of the summed twelve items was .91. 
U.S. participants reported a higher score on this measure in the high-empathy condition 
(M = .15, SD = 1.09) than in the low-empathy condition (M = -.08, SD = 1.10), F(1, 158) 
= 4.03, p < .046, partial η2 = .03. No significant difference was found between the two 
conditions (high-empathy: M = -.03, SD = .79; low-empathy: M = -.06, SD = .94) for 
Chinese participants. Therefore, the manipulation of empathy by this measure was 
successful for only the U.S. participants.   
Trait empathy. A principal-components analysis was performed on the 35 items of 
  102             
  
trait empathy. More than one component with an eigenvalue greater than 1 was extracted 
(see Figure 9). The first principal component accounted for 20% of the total variance. 
The reliability coefficient (Cronbach’s α) of the summed thirty-five items was .87. This 
principal component score, created by combining the 35 items based on their loadings, 
was used in the subsequent analyses.   
Dependent Variables: Monetary Reward 
Two questions measured the amounts of money participants were willing to 
distribute to the applicant. In the first question, participants were told to give $1,000 to an 
applicant in moderate need. In the second question, participants were told that they had 
an infinite amount of money to distribute and were not given a moderate amount. To be 
consistent with Studies 1 and 2, the first question served as the dependent variable. 
However, the correlation between the first and second questions can be used to provide 
some kind of reliability check for the dependent variable. The correlation between the 
two transformed questions was .56 (p < .001).    
Predicting Distribution of Assistance Money 
To assess the linear effect of need (with three levels) and its interactions with other 
independent variables, two regression models with need, empathy, culture, sex, and all 
two-way and three-way linear interactions between them plus trait empathy as 
independent variables and the first measure of the amount of money distributed as the 
dependent variable were analyzed, one in the situation in which the cause of the accident 
was unexplained and one in the other situation in which the cause of the accident was 
explained as not due to the applicant.10 Sex was entered as an independent variable to 
control for any effects it may have, by itself or in interactions with other independent  




















Figure 9. Scree plot for the principal components extracted from the 35 trait empathy 
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variables, on the size of the bonus. Trait empathy was entered as an independent variable 
to control for the main effect it may have on the dependent variable.  
For purposes of the regression analyses, the four predictors (need, empathy, culture 
and sex) were contrast coded with the means of the contrast codes made to equal zero. 
Interaction effects were created as the products of these contrast codes.11 All two-way and 
three-way linear interactions were included in the regression models. The trait empathy 
variable, being a continuous variable, was added without being entered into interactions 
with other variables. For the no-explanation situation, the regression model was 
statistically significant: F(15, 162) = 4.02, p < .001, R² = .27, adjusted R² = .20. For the 
no-responsibility situation, the regression was also statistically significant: F(15, 129) = 
5.95, p < .001, R² = .41, adjusted R² = .34. These two regression analyses are referred to 
in the hypothesis tests that follow (see Appendices O and P).   
Need. Hypothesis 1 stated that for both cultures, more money is distributed to people 
with greater need than people with less need. For the no-explanation situation, a 
statistically significant linear effect of need was found, B = 15.11, β = .47, t(162) = 6.77, 
p < .001, partial η² = .22, with applicants in the high-need condition (M = 26.67, SD = 
8.57) receiving the greatest amount of money, followed by those in the medium-need 
conditions (M = 21.15, SD = 6.74), and those in the low-need condition receiving the 
least amount of money (M = 15.17, SD = 9.95). For the no-responsibility situation, a 
statistically significant linear effect of need was also found, B = 17.24, β = .50, t(129) = 
7.27, p < .001, partial η² = .29, with applicants in the high-need condition (M = 28.87, SD 
= 7.23) receiving the greatest amount of money, followed by those in the medium-need 
conditions (M = 21.61, SD = 7.68), and those in the low-need condition receiving the 
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least amount of money (M = 15.45, SD = 9.91). Therefore, Hypothesis 1 was supported in 
study 3.    
Empathy. Hypothesis 2 predicted that for both cultures, more money is distributed to 
people with whom the distributor empathizes than people with whom the distributor does 
not empathize. For the no-explanation situation, the regression resulted in a statistically 
significant effect for empathy, B = 3.25, β = .13, t(162) = 1.86, p < .03 (one tailed), 
partial η² = .02, in which applicants empathized with (M = 21.83, SD = 8.96) received 
more money than those not empathized with (M = 20.09, SD = 9.05). No significant 
effect for empathy was found for the no-responsibility situation, B = 1.71, β = .06, t(129) 
= .92, p < .18 (one tailed), partial η² = .01. Therefore, Hypothesis 2 was supported only 
for the no-explanation situation.        
Empathy and need. Hypothesis 3 predicted that empathy interacts with need such that 
more money is distributed to people in less need who are empathized with than not 
empathized with by the distributor, whereas empathy does not increase the amount of 
money distributed to people in greater need. No significant interactions were found for 
either the no-explanation, B = 7.58, β = .08, t(162) = 1.19, p < .24, partial η² = .01, or 
no-responsibility situations, B = -5.03, β = -.05, t(129) = -.75, p < .46, partial η² = .01. 
Therefore, Hypothesis 3 was not supported.    
Empathy, need, and culture. Hypothesis 4 predicted a three-way interaction between 
empathy, need, and culture such that the effect of empathy on the relationship between 
need and the amount of money distributed is greater for Chinese than for U.S. Americans. 
No significant three-way interaction was found for the no-explanation condition, B = 
-13.64, β = -.06, t(162) = -.88, p < .38, partial η² = .01; however, the regression in the 
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no-responsibility condition resulted in a statistically significant three-way interaction 
between empathy, need, and culture, B = -50.10, β = -.21, t(129) = -2.99, p < .003, partial 
η² = .06 (see Figure 10). For U.S. Americans, empathy did not change the amount of 
money given to low-need applicants (Low empathy: M = 15.07, SD = 3.41; High 
empathy: M = 10.98, SD = 9.35), to medium-need applicants (Low empathy: M = 23.31, 
SD = 7.13; High empathy: M = 22.12, SD = 8.94), or to high-need applicants (Low 
empathy: M = 28.30, SD = 8.68; High empathy: M = 28.90, SD = 7.58). However, for 
Chinese participants, empathy increased the amount of money given to low-need 
applicants (Low empathy: M = 13.66, SD = 11.99; High empathy: M = 23.73, SD = 8.42) 
compared with the amount of money distributed to medium-need applicants (Low 
empathy: M = 18.64, SD = 5.74; High empathy: M = 21.60, SD = 8.16) and to high-need 
applicants (Low empathy: M = 30.83, SD = 6.91; High empathy: M = 27.63, SD = 5.57).              
The research question asked if culture interacted with other variables to affect the 
amount of money distributed. No significant interactions between culture and other 
variables were found for the no-explanation situation. However, the regression for the 
no-responsibility situation resulted in a significant interaction between culture and 
empathy, B = 9.67, β = .15, t(129) = 2.15, p < .034, partial η² = .03 (see Figure 11). When 
empathy is low, U.S. Americans (M = 23.24, SD = 8.23) distributed a greater amount of 
money to applicants than Chinese (M = 20.44, SD = 10.03), whereas when empathy is 
high, Chinese (M = 23.64, SD = 7.84) gave a greater amount of money to applicants than 
U.S. Americans (M = 21.35, SD = 10.76).      
Table 11 and 12 display the means and standard deviations for the amount of money 
by need, empathy, and culture in the no-explanation and no-responsibility situations.  





























































Figure 10. Amount of money by empathy, need and culture in Study 3.  
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Table 11 
Means and Standard Deviations for Amount of Money by Need, Empathy, and Culture in the No-Explanation Situation in Study 3 (N = 
184) 
 
               
                      US                                         China                     
                  
                       Low Empathy           High Empathy            Low Empathy          High Empathy  
 
                      M         SD         M         SD           M         SD         M         SD  
  
High Need            25.03      10.95       30.63       6.51         25.49       7.58        25.09      7.15 
 
Moderate Need        19.02      5.03        21.62       6.04         21.00       7.96        23.57      7.80 
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Table 12 
Means and Standard Deviations for Amount of Money by Need, Empathy, and Culture in the No-Responsibility Situation in Study 3 (N 
= 149)            
 
               
                      US                                         China                     
                  
                       Low Empathy           High Empathy            Low Empathy          High Empathy  
 
                      M         SD        M         SD           M         SD         M         SD  
  
High Need            28.30      8.68       28.90       7.58         30.83       6.91        27.63       5.57 
 
Moderate Need        23.31      7.13       22.12       8.94         18.64       5.74        21.60       8.16 
 
Low Need            15.07      3.41       10.98       9.35         13.66       11.99       23.73       8.42 
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Discussion   
Study 3 examined how empathy affected the use of the need principle in the 
distribution of assistance money situation in a charity organization, where need is the 
most salient distributive principle. Empathy was expected to interact with need such that 
greater difference in amounts of money distributed between high- and low-need people 
was expected when empathy was low than when empathy was high. This interaction 
between empathy and need was also expected to be greater for Chinese than for U.S. 
Americans.  
Study 3 is different from Studies 1 and 2 in that the previous studies investigated 
the use of the equity distributive principle, whereas Study 3 examined the use of the need 
distributive principle. The use of the equity principle emphasizes that the amount of 
money distributed be proportional to the contribution made, that is, higher bonuses 
should be given to those with higher competence and making greater contributions, as in 
Studies 1 and 2. The need principle does not require that beneficiaries make contributions 
at all as long as a legitimate need is demonstrated. However, the use of the need principle 
is similar to the use of the equity principle in that the amount of money distributed to the 
person in need should be proportional to the magnitude of the need, that is, more money 
should be given to those with greater need (having larger or more urgent need). Therefore, 
in a situation in which equity is the most salient distributive principle, persons with a 
higher contribution (competence) should receive a higher monetary reward, which was 
supported in Studies 1 and 2. In the same light, in a situation where need is the most 
salient distributive principle, as in Study 3, it was also supported that persons with the 
greatest need receive the most money, followed by those with medium need receiving 
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smaller amounts of money, and those with the least need receiving the least money. The 
effect of competence and need on the amount of money distributed were quite strong in 
these studies.  
Results in Study 3 showed no significant interaction between empathy and need. 
However, a significant three-way interaction was found between empathy, need, and 
culture when the accident was explained as not caused by the applicant. Similar to the 
three-way interaction between empathy, competence, and culture in Study 2, in which 
empathy increased the amount of money given to low-competence but not 
high-competence people for Chinese but not for U.S. Americans, the three-way 
interaction in Study 3 also demonstrated that empathy increased the amount of money 
given to low-need but not high-need people for Chinese but not for U.S. Americans. It 
seems that when empathy is aroused, the gap in the amount of money given to low-need 
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Chapter 5 
Study 4: The Distribution Situation in a University 
The fourth study examined the relationship between empathy and the two distributive 
justice principles: need and equity. The research question asks how empathy affects the 
distribution of scholarship money in a university. The hypothetical scholarship program 
accepts both need-based and merit-based applications, therefore making both need and 
equity salient distributive justice principles in this situation. In Study 4, participants are 
asked to divide a certain amount of money between two applicants, one with need and the 
other with merit, rather than judging only one person as in Studies 1 to 3. In Study 4, 
empathy is expected to lead to the preference of the need principle over the equity 
principle. In other words, when empathy is aroused, more money will be allocated to the 
applicant with need than the applicant with merit. Moreover, this effect is expected to be 
greater for Chinese than for U.S. Americans.    
Hypotheses 
The fourth study examined the distribution of money across the two levels of 
empathy (high vs. low empathy) and two cultural groups, Chinese and U.S. Americans. 
The following hypotheses are organized based on the effect of empathy (H1) and the role 
of culture (H2 and the RQ).   
H1: More money is distributed to the person with need and less money distributed to 
the person with merit when empathy is aroused than when empathy is not aroused.  
H2: The effect of empathy on the relationship between need and merit is greater for 
Chinese than for U.S. Americans.  
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RQ: Does culture interact with other variables to influence the amount of money 
distributed?    
Method   
Participants 
Participants (N = 262) were recruited from both China and the U.S. The U.S. 
participants were 144 undergraduates from communication classes at a large public U.S. 
east coast university. Sixty-two percent of the U.S. participants were female (89 females 
and 55 males). The average age of the U.S. participants was 19.78 years (Mdn = 20.00, 
SD = 1.96), and the ages ranged from 18 to 39 years. Sixty percent of the participants 
were Caucasian, 17% were African American, 15% were Asian, 4% were Hispanic, 1% 
were Native American, and 4% were not in any of the listed categories (the total is not 
equal to 100% due to rounding).          
The Chinese participants were 118 undergraduates from a university in a 
southwestern city of China. One participant did not indicate his or her sex, age, and race. 
Another participant did not indicate his or her age. Of the 117 participants who indicated 
sex, fifty-six percent of the Chinese participants were female (66 females and 51 males). 
The average age of the Chinese participants was 20.66 years (Mdn = 20.00, SD = 1.87), 
and the ages ranged from 18 to 35 years. All participants from China identified their 
ethnic background as Chinese (as opposed to Korean or other possible ethnicities in 
China).         
Procedure  
U.S. Participants received a small amount of extra course credit for participating in 
the study. Participants came to an assigned location, which was not their regular 
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classroom, to read and sign the study’s consent form and complete the questionnaire. An 
alternative class assignment or participation in other studies was offered as an option for 
students who did not want to participate in this study.  
The Chinese participants did the study as a voluntary activity. They read and signed 
the study’s consent form and completed the questionnaire outside of their regular 
classroom and returned the study materials to their instructor. For both Chinese and U.S. 
participants, no student declined to participate in the study, and questionnaires and 
consent forms were collected separately. The questionnaire took approximately 60 
minutes to complete.        
Stimulus Materials 
Four scholarship program application packages (see Appendix F) were created to 
describe four types of applicants: high performance, high need, medium performance, 
and medium need. For each applicant, the application package included a cover page and 
the Applicant Information Form. The applicant is represented by an ID number on the 
forms to exclude the influence of a name.   
The cover page introduced the hypothetical Dean’s Scholarship Program. The Dean’s 
Scholarship was described as a program that accepts both need-based and merit-based 
applications and is awarded every semester to current students who have demonstrated 
financial need or outstanding academic performance. The cover page also described the 
basic requirements for need-based and merit-based application. The cover page was the 
same across all conditions. In the first part of the Applicant Information Form, the 
applicant, identified by an applicant ID and a University ID, was described as a current 
full-time student. For each of the two need-based applications, the applicant had chosen 
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the need-based application option and completed part 2 of the form in which the applicant 
indicated that his or her family income qualified him or her for this scholarship and then 
gave reasons for the application. The two types of need, high and medium, were created 
by varying the reasons given for the application. The applicant, whose application was 
based on need, also indicated that he or she had not applied for or received any other 
need-based scholarships. For each of the two merit-based applications, the applicant 
chose the merit-based application option and then completed part 3 of the form in which 
the applicant gave his or her GPA and reasons for the application. The two types of 
academic performance, high and medium, were created by varying the value of GPA and 
the reasons given for the application. The applicant, whose application was based on 
academic performance, also indicated that he or she had not applied for or received any 
other merit-based scholarships.  
In the high-need condition, the applicant was described as belonging to a low-income 
family with an unemployed father still trying to find a job. Because the father was the 
sole bread-winner in the family, and there were other children who needed support, the 
family could no longer support the applicant financially for his or her college education. 
In the medium-need condition, the applicant was described as belonging to a 
middle-income family and thus ineligible for many federal financial aid programs. The 
applicant was experiencing financial difficulties because his or her parents did not help 
pay for college as much as they should. In the high-performance condition, the applicant 
was described as having a 4.0 GPA and achieving As in all classes. The applicant was 
also described as a member of the honors program in his or her department, receiving a 
university medal, and serving on several university-wide committees. In the 
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medium-performance condition, the applicant was described as having a 3.5 GPA and 
achieving As and Bs in all classes. The applicant explained his or her goals, activities, 
and abilities without giving much evidence of achievements. The four descriptions of 
reasons for the scholarship were made relatively the same in length. Part 4 of the 
Applicant Information Form was a signature section that was used to make the scenarios 
look believable and realistic. The signature was made unidentifiable and exactly the same 
for the four situations in order to reduce the influence of a name.    
Questionnaire Design  
As in Study 3, two versions of the questionnaire were created, one in which 
participants were asked to empathize with the applicant (high-empathy conditions) and 
one in which participants were instructed to focus only on the information in the 
application package (low-empathy conditions). For Chinese participants, the 
questionnaire and application package were translated into Chinese by the dissertation 
researcher, who is a native Chinese speaker, and back-translated by another native 
Chinese speaker. The two translators discussed any incongruities in the pre- and 
post-translated English versions and constructed a final Chinese version of the 
application package and questionnaire.  
The application package was prepared as a separate document from the questionnaire. 
In both cultures, each participant was randomly assigned to read one of the two versions 
of the questionnaire, the high-empathy or the low-empathy condition. Participants were 
also randomly assigned to read two applications, one of the two need-based applications 
and one of the two merit-based applications, with either the need-based or the 
merit-based application being the first one they read. This arrangement created sixteen 
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different experimental conditions: 2 (empathy) × 2 (need-based) × 2 (merit-based) × 2 
(order).   
In the introductory section of the questionnaire, participants in each condition were 
first asked to imagine themselves as the chairperson of the Dean’s Scholarship Program 
in a university. Participants were also told that the Dean’s Scholarship was established as 
a program that accepts both need-based and merit-based applications, which had helped 
many students from low- and middle-income families to address their financial needs as 
well as rewarded students with outstanding academic performance. The basic 
requirements for need-based and merit-based applications were then described. These 
descriptions were used to make need and equity both salient principles in the distribution 
situation. Participants were then asked to review two applications (prepared as a separate 
document from the questionnaire) in the order they were presented. Participants were told 
that the first applicant referred to the student whose application package they read first 
and the second applicant referred to the second student application they read. They were 
asked to form an overall impression of each of the two applicants, who were described as 
the same sex with the participant, before answering additional questions in the 
questionnaire. Participants were instructed to briefly write down their impressions of each 
of the two applicants to further put them in the imagined situation.  
Next, two items measured the believability and realism of the imagined situation 
(“How believable is the situation?,” and “How realistic is the situation?”). Five items 
served as a manipulation check for the magnitude of need for the first applicant (“How 
great is the financial need of the first applicant?,” “How much is the first applicant in 
need of money?,” “What is the level of the first applicant’s financial difficulty?,” “How 
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much financial support is the first applicant in need of?,” and “What is the level of the 
first applicant’s financial well-being?”). Four questions were used to check the 
manipulation of the performance of the first applicant (“How well did the first applicant 
perform academically?,” “How academically competent is the first applicant?,” “How 
academically accomplished is the first applicant?,” and “What is the level of the first 
applicant’s academic ability?”). The same nine questions measuring need and 
performance were asked about the second applicant.      
Participants then read an instruction for how to allocate scholarship money to 
applicants. The instruction was one of two versions that were used to manipulate the 
high-empathy and low-empathy conditions. The two instructions were made relatively 
the same in length. The instructions were revised from the work of Stotland, Sherman, 
and Shaver (1971) and Fink (1975).  
High-Empathy Instruction:  
According to research conducted by universities, the best way to judge and allocate 
scholarship money to students is to really understand their feelings. Before you 
decide how to divide scholarship money between these two student applicants, please 
follow the instructions below and imagine how you yourself would feel if you were 
in each student’s position.  
First, picture to yourself just how you would feel in the first student’s shoes (You are 
to keep clearly in mind that you are to react as if it were you who are in the first 
application package and are being evaluated). Concentrate on the way you would feel 
in that situation. In your mind’s eye, you are to visualize how it would feel to you to 
be the first student in his or her position.  
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Now, picture to yourself just how you would feel in the second student’s shoes (You 
are to keep clearly in mind that you are to react as if it were you who are in the 
second application package and are being evaluated). Concentrate on the way you 
would feel in that situation. In your mind’s eye, you are to visualize how it would 
feel to you to be the second student in his or her position.  
Reread the instructions once again. 
Low-Empathy Instruction:  
According to research conducted by universities, the best way to judge and allocate 
scholarship money to students is to be as objective as possible and focus only on the 
information in the application packages. Before you decide how to divide scholarship 
money between these two student applicants, please follow the instructions below 
and decide based on exactly what’s in each student’s application package.  
First, you are to notice any information in the first student’s file: the Applicant 
Information Form, and other relevant forms, if any, included in the first package 
(You are to keep clearly in mind that you are to base your judgment solely on the 
information in the first application package). You are to remain objective and notice 
anything that is included in the first package, whatever it is.  
Now, you are to notice any information in the second student’s file: the Applicant 
Information Form, and other relevant forms, if any, included in the second package 
(You are to keep clearly in mind that you are to base your judgment solely on the 
information in the second application package). You are to remain objective and 
notice anything that is included in the second package, whatever it is.  
Reread the instructions once again.    
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After reading the instructions, participants were asked to reread the two application 
packages based on the instructions they had just read. Next, three questions concerning 
distribution of scholarship money were asked in which participants indicated the amount 
of money that they would give to each of the two applicants. For the first question, 
participants were told that they had $1,000 to divide between the two applicants:   
Based on your judgment, what amount of money would you give to each of the two 
applicants if you had $1000 scholarship money to divide between them? [You can 
divide the $1000 in whatever way you want: give any amount of money or zero to 
any of the two applicants as long as the total amount is equal to $1000. More money 
given to one of them means less money for the other. Please make sure the two 
numbers add up to 1000.]   
The second question asked participants what amount of money they would give to 
each of the two applicants if they had $5,000 to divide between them. For the third 
question, participants distributed money based on applicants’ need or academic 
performance without having to divide money between them:  
Now, imagine you don’t have to divide money between the two applicants. You can 
give each of the two applicants zero or you can give each of them as much as you 
want. Remember more money given to them means less money to be allocated to 
future applicants. Generally, the Dean’s Scholarship Program gives $1000 to a 
student who has a moderate financial need or a student who is moderately 
accomplished in academic performance. What amount of money would you give to 
each of the two applicants based on your judgment?  
  122             
  
 The three questions provided a reliability check for the measure of monetary 
distribution for Study 4. Next, to check the manipulation of empathy, the same ten 
questions as used in Studies 2 and 3 were revised to measure whether participants in 
Study 4 focused on the information (“To what extent did you focus on the information in 
the two packages in making the decisions?,” “My judgment of the two applicants was 
based only and exclusively on the information in the application packages,” “I formed an 
impression of the two applicants relying solely on the information in the packages,” and 
“I tried to be as objectively as possible.”) or feelings of the applicants (“To what extent 
did you focus on the feelings of the two applicants in making the decisions?,” “How 
much did you understand what the two applicants felt in making the decisions?,” “How 
much did you feel what the two applicants felt in making the decisions?,” “I got involved 
with the two applicants’ feelings,” “I imagined how I would feel if I were in the two 
applicants’ positions,” and “I put myself in the two applicants’ shoes and felt their 
feelings.”) in the process of making the distribution decision. The empathy manipulation 
check also involved a list of emotion adjectives that participants used to indicate how 
much they had experienced each emotion in the process of reviewing the application 
packages and making the distribution decision. These self-reports provided a further test 
of the effectiveness of the empathy manipulation. Included among the adjectives were 
eight distress adjectives (alarmed, grieved, troubled, distressed, upset, disturbed, worried, 
and perturbed), four sadness adjectives (low-spirited, feeling low, heavyhearted, and sad), 
and six empathy adjectives (sympathetic, soft-hearted, warm, compassionate, tender, and 
moved) used in previous research to measure empathy (see Batson, 1987, 1991, Batson et 
al., 1989; Batson et al., 1988; Fultz et al., 1988). Finally, participants responded to the 
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Personal Belief in a Just World Scale (see Appendix B) and the Measure of Trait 
Empathy (see Appendix C), which includes five dimensions: perspective taking, fantasy, 
empathic concern, personal distress, and emotional contagion.    
For all questions other than the three estimates of the distribution of money, 
participants used magnitude scales, in which 100 represented a moderate amount of the 
variable that they were rating (Hamblin, 1974; Lodge, 1981; Shinn, 1974; see also 
Torgerson, 1958, for fractionation methods). For the first two measures of the amount of 
money distributed, participants were asked to divide $1,000 or $5,000 between the two 
applicants; for the third measure, participants were asked to indicate the amount of 
money they would give to the two applicants separately using $1,000 as the yardstick for 
an applicant who has moderate need or moderate academic performance (see Footnote 1). 
For all the magnitude scales and the three estimates of provision of money, participants 
could use any non-negative number, with higher numbers representing greater amounts of 
the variable that was being assessed. At the end of the questionnaire, participants 
provided information about their sex, age, racial or ethnic background, nationality, native 
language, major, year in school, and marital status.      
Data Transformation and Presentation  
To meet statistical assumptions required for analyses within the general linear model, 
all the items were transformed by a power transformation (see Bauer & Fink, 1983; 
Kruskal, 1968). When a measure had one or more outliers, these values were trimmed by 
being recoded to a fixed upper value before further analysis. The transformed variables 
are used in all the analyses that follow.12 The means and standard deviations reported in 
the text are descriptive statistics, whereas the figures present estimated marginal means. 
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All statistical tests are two tailed unless stated otherwise.        
Results 
Perception of Manipulations   
Believability and realism. American participants (believable: M = 280.41, SD = 
262.80; realistic: M = 286.44, SD = 264.80) perceived the situation as highly believable 
and realistic. Chinese participants (believable: M = 147.27, SD = 174.68; realistic: M = 
156.07, SD = 187.99) perceived the situation as moderately believable and realistic (100 
was used in the scale to indicate moderate believability and realism).13 U.S. participants 
perceived the situation as significantly more believable (M = 5.98, SD = 1.63) and 
realistic (M = 6.03, SD = 1.61) than did Chinese participants (believability: M = 4.76, SD 
= 1.48; realism: M = 4.74, SD = 1.70): believability, F(1, 260) = 39.48, p < .001, η2 = .13; 
realism, F(1, 259) = 39.03, p < .001, η2 = .13.    
Need. A principal-components analysis was performed on the five-item need scale 
for the first applicant. One principal component had an eigenvalue greater than 1. 
However, the last item (i.e., “What is the level of the first applicant’s financial 
well-being?”) had a low loading (.207) on this component and was therefore deleted from 
the scale. Only one principal component with an eigenvalue greater than 1 was extracted 
from the remaining four items. This component accounted for 80% of the total variance. 
The loadings of the four items on the extracted component were .86, .91, .91, and .90, 
respectively. The reliability coefficient (Cronbach’s α) of the summed four items for the 
need scale was .92. This principal component score was used in the subsequent analyses 
for the first applicant. Because the same questions were asked for the second applicant, a 
principal-components analysis was performed on the five-item need scale for the second 
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applicant. One principal component had an eigenvalue greater than 1. However, the last 
item (i.e., “What is the level of the first applicant’s financial well-being?”) had a low 
loading (.263) on this component and was therefore deleted from the scale. Only one 
principal component with an eigenvalue greater than 1 was extracted from the remaining 
four items. This component accounted for 85% of the total variance. The loadings of the 
four items on the extracted component were .92, .93, .90, and .92, respectively. The 
reliability coefficient (Cronbach’s α) of the summed four items for the need scale was .94. 
This principal component score was used in the subsequent analyses for the second 
applicant.   
Each participant in the study rated two applicants, one need-based and the other 
merit-based. The two applicants were presented to participants in two different orders: 
some participants read the applicant applying for a need-based scholarship first and the 
others read the applicant applying for the merit-based scholarship first. Therefore, some 
scores in the two need components derived above for the first and second applicants were 
ratings about the need of an academically accomplished applicant. To check the 
manipulation of need, only the need ratings for the high-need applicant were compared 
with the need ratings for the medium-need applicant.         
The manipulation check for need was performed between the two levels of need. 
Results showed that the high-need applicant (U.S.: M = 1.01, SD = .75; China: M = .56, 
SD = .67) was perceived as having significantly higher need than the medium-need 
applicant (U.S.: M = .34, SD = .62; China: M = .29, SD = .85) for U.S. participants, F(1, 
142) = 33.62, p < .001, partial η² = .19, and for Chinese participants, F(1, 116) = 3.61, p 
< .03 (one tailed), partial η² = .03. Therefore, the manipulation of need was successful for 
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participants from both cultures.  
Performance. A principal-components analysis was performed on the four-item 
performance scale for the first applicant. One principal component had an eigenvalue 
greater than 1. This component accounted for 84% of the total variance. The loadings of 
the four items on the extracted component were .90, .92, .94, and .91, respectively. The 
reliability coefficient (Cronbach’s α) of the sum of the four items for the performance 
scale was .94. This principal component score was used in the subsequent analyses for 
the first applicant. Because the same questions were asked for the second applicant, a 
principal-components analysis was performed on the four-item performance scale for the 
second applicant. One principal component had an eigenvalue greater than 1. This 
component accounted for 89% of the total variance. The loadings of the four items on the 
extracted component were .94, .94, .96, and .94, respectively. The reliability coefficient 
(Cronbach’s α) of the sum of the four items for the need scale was .96. This principal 
component score was used in the subsequent analyses for the second applicant.   
In the current study, each participant rated two applicants, one with high or low need 
and the other with high or low academic performance. The two applicants were presented 
to participants in two different orders: Some participants read the applicant requesting a 
need-based scholarship first and the others read the applicant requesting the merit-based 
scholarship first. Therefore, some scores in the two performance components derived 
above for the first and second applicants were ratings about the performance of an 
applicant with need. To check the manipulation of performance, only the performance 
ratings for the high-performance applicant were compared with the performance ratings 
for the medium-performance applicant.  
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The manipulation check for performance was conducted between the two levels of 
performance. Results showed that for U.S. participants, the high-performance applicant 
(M = .85, SD = .94) was perceived as having higher academic performance than the 
medium-performance applicant (U.S.: M = .17, SD = .64), F(1, 133) = 23.98, p < .001, 
partial η² = .15. However, for Chinese participants, no significant difference was found 
between the perception of high-performance (M = .43, SD = .90) and low-performance 
applicant (M = .25, SD = 1.00). Therefore, the manipulation of performance was 
successful for the U.S. participants but not for the Chinese participants.    
Empathy. The empathy manipulation was checked in three different ways: (1) Ten 
questions asked the extent to which participants focused on the information in the 
package and on feelings of the applicants, (2) participants reported how much they had 
experienced each of the eight distress and four sadness feelings, and (3) participants 
indicated the extent to which they had experienced each of the six empathic feelings.   
To assess the extent to which participants focused on the applicant’s feelings versus 
information in the package, a difference score was created by subtracting the four 
reported information-focused scores (transformed) from the six reported feelings-focused 
scores (transformed). The high-empathy condition should have a higher score on this 
measure than does the low-empathy condition. U.S. participants reported a higher score 
on this difference measure in the high-empathy condition (M = 10.09, SD = 9.72) than in 
the low-empathy condition (M = 5.70, SD = 9.59), F(1, 142) = 7.42, p < .004 (one tailed), 
partial η2 = .05. However, Chinese participants did not report significantly different 
scores between the low-empathy condition (M = 10.53, SD = 8.09) and the high-empathy 
condition (M = 11.86, SD = 8.88), F(1, 116) = .73, p < .20 (one tailed), partial η2 = .01. 
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Therefore, the manipulation of empathy using the difference score was successful for 
only the U.S. participants.    
A principal-components analysis was performed on the twelve distress and sadness 
emotions that participants had felt. Two principal components had an eigenvalue greater 
than 1. The first component had acceptable loadings (≥ .59) on all the twelve items and 
accounted for 46% of the total variance. This principal component score was used in the 
subsequent analyses. The reliability coefficient (Cronbach’s α) of the sum of the twelve 
items was .89. The test of manipulation check using this measure showed that 
participants in the high-empathy condition (U.S.: M = .18, SD = 1.01; China: M = .20, SD 
= 1.01) reported a higher component score than those in the low-empathy condition (U.S.: 
M = -.17, SD = .97; China: M = -.20, SD = .97), for U.S. participants, F(1, 142) = 4.70, p 
< .032, partial η² = .03, and for Chinese participants, F(1, 115) = 4.77, p < .031, partial η² 
= .04. Therefore, the manipulation of empathy using this measure was successful for both 
cultures.   
Finally, a principal-components analysis was performed on the six empathic 
emotions that participants felt. Only one principal component had an eigenvalue greater 
than 1. This component had acceptable loadings on the six items (≥ .68) and accounted 
for 60% of the total variance. This principal component score was used in the subsequent 
analyses. The reliability coefficient (Cronbach’s α) of the sum of the twelve items 
was .86. U.S. participants reported a higher score on this measure in the high-empathy 
condition (M = .04, SD = .96) than in the low-empathy condition (M = -.27, SD = 1.11), 
F(1, 142) = 3.22, p < .04 (one tailed), partial η2 = .02. No significant difference was 
found between the high- (M = .26, SD = .83) and low-empathy (M = .01, SD = 1.01) 
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conditions for Chinese participants, F(1, 115) = 2.17, p < .07 (one tailed), partial η2 = .02. 
Therefore, the manipulation of empathy by this measure was successful for only the U.S. 
participants.       
Trait empathy. A principal-components analysis was performed on the 35 items of 
trait empathy. More than one component with an eigenvalue greater than 1 was extracted 
(see Figure 12). The first principal component accounted for 23% of the total variance. 
The reliability coefficient (Cronbach’s α) of the summed thirty-five items was .89. This 
principal component score, created by combining the 35 items based on their loadings, 
was used in the subsequent analyses.     
Dependent Variables: Difference Score in Monetary Reward  
Three questions measured the amounts of money participants were willing to 
distribute to the first and second applicants, respectively. In the first question, participants 
were told to divide $1,000 between the two applicants; the second question asked 
participants to divide $5,000 between the two applicants; and the third question instructed 
participants to indicate the amount of money they would give to the two applicants 
separately without having to divide a certain amount of money between them using 
$1,000 as the yardstick for an applicant who has moderate need or moderate academic 
performance. If for a participant the total amount of money distributed was not equal to 
1,000 for the first question or 5,000 for the second question, the two values for that 
question were counted as invalid and deleted from the final analyses. The dependent 
variable was created by subtracting the total amount of money participants gave to the 
merit-based scholarship applicant in the first and second questions from the total amount 
of money participants gave to the need-based scholarship applicant in these two  






















Figure 12. Scree plot for the principal components extracted from the 35 trait empathy 
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questions. A higher value of this dependent variable indicated more money being 
distributed to the need-based applicant. Another difference score was also created by 
subtracting the amount of money (transformed) participants gave to the merit-based 
applicant from the amount (transformed) distributed to the need-based scholarship 
applicant for the third question. A higher value of this variable also indicated more 
money distributed to the need-based scholarship applicant. This second difference score 
provided a reliability check for the dependent variable. The correlation between the two 
difference scores is .76 (p < .001).     
Predicting the Distribution of Scholarship Money 
To assess the two hypotheses and the research question, an analysis of covariance 
(ANCOVA) was conducted, with empathy (high vs. low), culture (China vs. U.S.), and 
sex of participant (male vs. female), as the independent variables, with trait empathy as 
the covariate, and the difference score derived above as the dependent variable. Sex was 
entered as an independent variable to control for any effects it may have, by itself or in 
interactions with other independent variables, on the size of the bonus. Trait empathy was 
entered as a covariate to control for the main effect it may have on the dependent variable. 
Order (i.e., the applicant in need being the first or second applicant in the application 
package) was tested and did not have an effect on the dependent variable, and therefore 
was not included in the model. The ANCOVA model was statistically significant, F(8, 
232) = 2.78, p < .006, R² = .09, adjusted R² = .06. The ANCOVA is referred to in the 
hypothesis tests that follow (see Appendix Q).  
Empathy. Hypothesis 1 predicted that more money is distributed to the applicant with 
need and less money is distributed to the applicant with merit when empathy is aroused 
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than when empathy is not aroused. Because the dependent variable is a difference score 
derived from subtracting the amount given to the accomplished applicant from the 
amount given to the needy applicant, Hypothesis 1 is supported if a higher value of this 
variable is associated with a higher value of empathy (i.e., if there is a main effect of 
empathy on the dependent variable). The ANCOVA did not result in a significant effect 
of empathy, F(1, 232) = .03, p < .86, partial η2 = .01. Therefore, Hypothesis 1 was not 
supported.   
Empathy and culture. Hypothesis 2 predicted that the effect of empathy on the 
relationship between need and merit as predicted in Hypothesis 1 is greater for Chinese 
than for U.S. Americans. This hypothesis tested whether there is an interaction between 
empathy and culture on the dependent variable. The ANCOVA resulted in a significant 
interaction between culture and empathy, F(1, 232) = 3.44, p < .03 (one tailed), partial η2 
= .02 (see Figure 13). The difference between the amount given to the applicant applying 
for a need-based scholarship and the applicant requesting a merit-based scholarship was 
relatively the same for Chinese and U.S. participants when empathy was not aroused (i.e., 
they both gave more money to the need-based scholarship applicant; U.S.: M = 1042.86, 
SD = 2456.97; China: M = 403.57, SD = 2461.78). When empathy was aroused, the 
difference was greater for U.S. Americans than for Chinese, such that U.S. participants 
gave more to the need-based applicant, whereas Chinese participants gave less money to 
the need-based applicant (U.S.: M = 1493.94, SD = 2016.69; China: M = 5.89, SD = 
2111.35). Therefore, the relationship proposed in the second hypothesis was significant 
but in an opposite direction than predicted; Hypothesis 2 was not supported.  
The research question asked whether culture interacted with other variables to 
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influence the amount of money distributed. No significant interactions were found 
between culture and other variables.  
Table 13 displays the means and standard deviations for the difference score in 
monetary reward by empathy and culture.  
Discussion 
Study 4 examined how empathy influenced the use of the need and equity 
distributive principles when the two principles were both salient in scholarship situation 
in a university. Empathy was expected to affect the amount of money distributed between 
need-based applicants and merit-based applicants such that when empathy is aroused, 
more money is distributed to applicants with need and less money is distributed to 
applicants with merit than when empathy is not aroused. This effect of empathy was 
expected to be greater for Chinese than for U.S. Americans. Study 4 is different from 
Studies 1 to 3 in that participants in Study 4 judged and compared two applicants and 
divided a certain amount of money between them instead of distributing money only to 
one person as in the previous studies. Therefore, Study 4 did not test the effect of 
empathy on the use of one particular distributive principle but rather tested the effect of 
empathy on the use of need and equity principles against each other.  
In Study 4, participants were randomly assigned to read the need-based applicants 
first or the merit-based applicants first in order to test the effect of order on the results. 
Because order did not have an effect on the dependent variable, it was not included in the 
final reporting of the results. Moreover, four different combinations were created by 
crossing the two levels of need (high vs. medium) and the two levels of performance 
(high vs. medium) manipulated in application packages in Study 4. Participants’  
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Table 13 
Means and Standard Deviations for Difference Score in Monetary Reward by Empathy and Culture in Study 4 (N = 248)             
 
               
               US                                                 China                     
                  
         Low Empathy              High Empathy                 Low Empathy            High Empathy  
 
      M            SD          M            SD            M             SD       M            SD  
  






                                                                 136                
                                   
  
responses were analyzed across the four combinations to ensure that the explanation of 
results was not limited to a certain level of need or performance.   
Results in Study 4 showed no significant effect of empathy on the distribution of 
money between the need-based applicant and the merit-based applicant. However, this 
effect of empathy was found to differ significantly between the two cultures. When 
empathy was not aroused, U.S. participants distributed more money ($1,042.86) to the 
need-based applicant than to the merit-based applicant; when empathy was aroused, they 
distributed even more money ($1,493.94) to the need-based applicant compared to the 
merit-based applicant. For Chinese participants, when empathy was not aroused, they 
also distributed more money ($403.57) to the need-based applicant than to the 
merit-based applicant; when empathy was aroused, they distributed only $5.89 more to 
the applicant applying for a need-based scholarship compared to the applicant applying 
for a merit-based scholarship, thus assigning less to the need-based applicant than in the 
low-empathy condition. This result was opposite to the prediction that Chinese are more 
affected by empathy such that greater amount of money is distributed to the need-based 
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Chapter 6  
Overall Discussion 
 This chapter consists of four parts. The first part provides a summary of this 
dissertation research. The second part summarizes and interprets the results and discusses 
the implications of the research. Limitations and future directions of the studies are 
included in the third part. The last part of the chapter explains the theoretical and 
methodological significance of the research and ends with a conclusion.  
Summary of the Research  
The research question addressed in this dissertation is the following: How does 
empathy influence the use of the distributive justice principles of need and equity, and 
how does culture affect this process? Empathy was proposed as a mechanism that 
explained the cultural differences in the use of distributive justice principles. Four studies 
were conducted to examine the role of empathy in explaining these cultural differences 
with the first two studies focusing on how empathy affected the equity principle, the third 
study on how empathy influenced the need principle, and the fourth study on how 
empathy affected the choice between equity and need.  
The distribution situations used in the four studies can be categorized into three types: 
an equity-dominant situation in which equity is the most salient distributive principle 
such as the bonus distribution situation in a company used in Studies 1 and 2, a 
need-dominant situation in which need is the most salient distributive principle such as 
the assistance-fund distribution situation in a charity organization in Study 3, and a 
mixed-principle situation in which both equity and need are salient distributive principles 
such as the need- and merit-based scholarship distribution situation in a university used in 
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Study 4.  
In all four studies, participants were asked to assume the role of a high-status person 
and make an evaluation and distribution decision. They were instructed to imagine 
themselves as the president of a company distributing a bonus to an employee (Studies 1 
and 2), the president of a charity organization allocating assistance funds to an applicant 
(Study 3), or the chairperson of a scholarship committee assigning a scholarship based on 
a merit-based application and a need-based application (Study 4). An evaluation or 
application package was prepared separately from a questionnaire for each participant. 
The name of the person being evaluated was not identified in either the questionnaire or 
the package to eliminate the influence of a name. In the evaluation or application package, 
an ID number was used to represent the person being judged, who was referred to as the 
employee or the applicant in the questionnaire. The person under evaluation was 
described as of the same sex as the participant.  
The four studies used similar procedures. Participants first read the introduction of 
the company, the charity organization, or the scholarship program before reading the 
evaluation or application package. Then participants responded to questions measuring 
the believability and realism of the situation and questions checking the manipulations in 
the package, such as the levels of competence or need. Participants were then randomly 
assigned to one of the two conditions of empathy by reading an instruction about how to 
distribute money. The high-empathy instruction asked participants to focus on the 
feelings of the person they judged and the low-empathy instruction asked them to focus 
only on the information in the package. This empathy induction was followed by the 
distribution questions and questions checking the empathy manipulation. Finally, 
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participants responded to questions from the trait empathy scale as well as demographic 
questions.  
Data were collected from both China and the U.S. for each of the four studies. In 
total, participants were 1,022 undergraduate students from both countries (N1 = 179; N2 = 
246; N3 = 335; N4 = 262). For Chinese participants, the questionnaires and packages were 
translated into Chinese and back-translated into English to ensure equivalence in meaning. 
The situations in the four studies were rated as moderately to highly believable and 
realistic by both Chinese and U.S. participants.               
Results showed that empathy acted in line with the ethics of caring and benefited 
those who may otherwise be perceived as not deserving under the ethics of justice. 
Culture was found to be a significant moderator in this process. A summary and 
interpretation of the results is provided in the following section.   
Summary and Interpretation of Results 
Equity  
 In the equity-dominant company situation, greater competence demonstrated by an 
employee was used to indicate greater contribution made by the employee to the 
company, and therefore was expected to lead to larger bonuses distributed to the 
employee based on the equity principle. When empathy was aroused, however, the 
low-competence employee may not be judged as harshly and strictly as when empathy 
was not aroused. Therefore, empathy was expected to increase the bonus distributed to 
low-competence employees to a greater extent than the bonus to high-competence 
employees, resulting in a predicted two-way interaction between empathy and 
competence. This interaction between empathy and competence was expected to be 
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moderated by culture: When empathy was aroused, Chinese were expected to give a 
larger bonus than U.S. Americans to low-competence employees.   
The effect of competence was supported in both Studies 1 and 2, showing that for 
both cultures larger bonuses were distributed to employees with greater competence. The 
large effect sizes (Study 1: partial η12 = .43; Study 2: partial η22 = .70, partial η32 = .80, 
partial η42 = .77) revealed strong effects of competence, indicating that competence was a 
primary predictor of bonus distribution in a company and that equity was the dominant 
principle used in the company situation in both cultures.  
The effect of empathy was largely supported when the high-competence condition 
was contrasted with the low-competence-without-reason condition in Study 1 and with 
the low-competence with either a negative or positive condition in Study 2. The effect of 
empathy demonstrated that for both cultures, larger bonuses were distributed to 
employees with whom the distributor empathized than employees with whom the 
distributor did not empathize. Given the relatively weak manipulation of empathy, an 
instruction in the high-empathy condition asking participants to simply focus on the 
feelings of the employee, this result was surprising. A between-subjects design was used 
in Studies 1 and 2: Each participant only evaluated one employee and was asked to 
distribute bonuses on the criterion that a moderately competent employee would receive 
$1,000. The empathy effect showed that when their feelings were aroused, participants 
gave bonuses to employees more than under the low-empathy condition. Therefore, 
empathy seems to be more congruent with the ethics of care than the ethics of justice in 
that it raised the size of bonuses above what was warranted by one’s competence level.   
The two-way interaction between competence and empathy was only significant 
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when the high-competence condition was contrasted with the 
low-competence-with-negative-reason condition. The interpretation of the two-way 
interaction needs to be modified in view of the three-way interaction between 
competence, empathy, and culture. A significant three-way interaction was found when 
the low-competence condition was accompanied with either a positive or negative reason, 
indicating that the two-way interaction was significant only in the Chinese but not the 
U.S. sample. Empathy did affect the use of the equity principle, but only for the Chinese 
participants. When the low competence of an employee was not explained, empathy did 
not help a low-competence employee. However, when the low competence was explained 
by either a positive or negative reason, empathy increased the amount of money 
distributed to the low-competence employee and decreased the amount of bonus money 
given to the high-competence employee by Chinese; whereas for U.S. Americans, 
empathy increased the amount of money to low- and high-competence employees to the 
same degree (see Figures 6 and 7). 
The finding that empathy could benefit low-competence more than high-competence 
employees further confirmed that empathy acted in line with the ethics of care rather than 
the ethics of justice. The ethics of justice, emphasizing impartiality, emphasizes that 
individuals should be judged by their contributions or merits. On the contrary, the ethics 
of care, emphasizing particularity, cultivates individuals’ ability to care for others 
regardless of their merit. If the amount of bonus distributed to low-competence 
employees under the low-empathy condition was the amount they deserved, the increase 
under the high-empathy condition may be regarded as unjust based on the ethics of 
justice, especially when this increase narrowed the bonus gap between low-competence 
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and high-competence employees. 
The reason that empathy acted to the advantage of low-competence rather than 
high-competence employees may be that participants were more likely to feel negative 
rather than positive feelings when imagining how a low-competence person felt, which 
may have motivated them to try to alleviate the person of these negative feelings. It is 
also possible that participants were concerned that the effort of a low-competence 
employee was more likely to go unrewarded than that of a high-competence employee. 
Hoffman (2000) tried to link empathy with effort or competence. He argued that empathy 
may be directly related to effort-based justice because observers can readily empathize 
with negative feelings brought about by unrewarded effort, but empathy may only be 
indirectly related to competence because the empathy-effort link can extend to 
competence only when competence is perceived as requiring efforts. In Study 2, the 
low-competence employee may be perceived as having already made effort, which 
allowed empathy to work in his or her favor. This speculation can explain why in both 
Studies 1 and 2, when the low-competence condition was not accompanied by a reason, 
empathy did not act to the advantage of the low-competence employees. However, this 
speculation can not explain why empathy still benefited low-competence employees 
when a negative reason was offered. Specifically, in the evaluation package, the negative 
reason was: “The employee has, in general, a negative attitude toward work. His/her poor 
performance was mainly due to lack of motivation and effort.” In contrast, the positive 
reason was the following: “The employee has, in general, a positive attitude toward work. 
His/her poor performance was mainly due to lack of training and skills.” The employee 
was clearly described as lacking effort in the negative-reason condition. That empathy 
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still benefited the low-competence employee with a negative reason may be explained by 
a similar phenomenon in persuasion. Research on compliance gaining and persuasion has 
confirmed the phenomenon of mindless or automatic compliance, which suggests that 
people are more likely to comply with a request if a reason is also offered, even if the 
reason makes no sense (Cialdini, 2001; Langer, Blank, & Chanowiz, 1978). The mere 
presence of a reason may be sufficient for empathy to work in favor of the 
low-competence employee.  
The significant moderating effect of culture was demonstrated by empathy’s 
differential effects on the principle of equity in the two cultural groups: Empathy 
narrowed the bonus difference between low- and high-competence employees for the 
Chinese participants, but maintained the difference for U.S. Americans. Given the 
between-subjects design, it is surprising that empathy increased the size of the bonus for 
low- and high-competence employees to the same degree for U.S. Americans. In a 
merit-based society such as the U.S., the principle of equity, which requires that rewards 
distributed to a person be proportional to his or her contribution, may be too deep-rooted, 
especially in a competitive company situation, to allow disproportional bonuses to low- 
and high-competence employees. It is also surprising that empathy seems to equalize the 
amount of money given to the low- and high-competence employees for the Chinese by 
decreasing the amount of the bonus given to the high-competence employee and 
increasing the amount of the bonus given to the low-competence employee. The 
imagined positive emotions of the high-competence employee may have caused the 
Chinese participants to decrease the bonus because the employee was already in a 
positive mood and maybe some money could be spared to enhance the mood of the 
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low-competence employee.  
Need  
   In the need-dominant charity situation, greater need demonstrated by an applicant was 
expected to lead to a greater amount of assistance money distributed to the applicant. 
When empathy was aroused, however, the low-need applicant may be judged as more 
deserving of the rewards than when empathy was not aroused. Therefore, empathy was 
expected to increase the amount of assistance money distributed to low-need applicants to 
a greater extent than the amount of money distributed to high-need applicants, resulting 
in a two-way interaction between empathy and need. This interaction between empathy 
and need was expected to be moderated by culture: When empathy was aroused, Chinese 
gave even more assistance money than U.S. Americans to low-need applicants. 
The effect of need was supported in both the no-explanation and no-responsibility 
situations in Study 3, showing that for both cultures more money was distributed to 
applicants with greater need. The effect sizes (no-explanation: η12 = .22; no-responsibility: 
η22 = .29) revealed relatively strong effects of need, indicating that need was an important 
predictor in assistance-fund distribution in a charity organization and that need was the 
dominant principle used in the situation for both cultures.  
The two-way interaction between need and empathy was not significant in either the 
no-explanation or the no-responsibility situation. A significant three-way interaction was 
found in the no-responsibility situation. Empathy influenced the use of the need principle 
but only for the Chinese participants. When the cause of the need was not explained, 
empathy did not act in favor of low-need applicants. However, when the cause of the 
need was explained as not due to the applicant, empathy increased the amount of money 
                                                                 145                
                                   
  
given to low-need applicants to a greater extent than the amount of money distributed to 
medium- and high-need applicants for Chinese. For U.S. Americans, empathy did not 
much change the amount of money given to low-, medium-, and high-need applicants 
(see Figure 10). The finding that empathy benefited low-need more than high-need 
applicants showed that empathy was more congruent with the ethics of care rather than 
the ethics of justice. The ethics of care cultivates individuals’ ability to care for others 
regardless of their merit and therefore may encourage help to any need, small or large. 
On the other hand, the ethics of justice, emphasizing merit, may facilitate the 
differentiation of need to ensure that those who really need help get it. Empathy, working 
in concert with the ethics of care, narrowed the money gap between the low- and 
high-need applicants by increasing money to the low-need applicant more than to the 
high-need applicant, which may be perceived as unjust based on the ethics of justice. And 
this effect of empathy was only observed in the Chinese sample.   
Empathy acted to the advantage of low-need rather than high-need applicants 
perhaps because people, aroused by empathy, were concerned that low need was more 
likely to go unnoticed and unrewarded than high need. This concern was apparently only 
shared among Chinese as empathy tended to equalized the amount of money given to 
low- and high-need applicants for Chinese: Empathy increased the amount of money to 
the low-need applicant to a greater extent than to the moderate-need applicant although 
decreasing the amount of money to the high-need applicant. For U.S. Americans, 
empathy did not much change the amount of money distributed to each party, only 
slightly decreasing the amount of money to low- and moderate-need applicants although 
increasing to a small degree the amount of money to the high-need applicant. It seems 
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that the ethics of justice is so well-established in the U.S. that empathy could not change 
the use of the equity rule.   
Equity and Need 
In the mixed-principle scholarship situation, need-based applications were judged 
against merit-based applications, leading to the conflict between the need and equity 
principles. In this situation, the applicant with need may arouse more negative emotions 
than the applicant with merit when empathy was aroused. Therefore, empathy was 
expected to increase the amount of money given to the need-based applicant and decrease 
the amount of money given to the merit-based applicant when a fixed amount of money 
was divided between them. This effect of empathy was expected to be moderated by 
culture: When empathy was aroused, Chinese were expected to give more money than 
U.S. Americans to applicants with need.  
Results from Study 4 did not confirm these predictions. When empathy was aroused, 
the American participants gave more money to applicants with need and less money to 
applicants with merit than when empathy was not aroused. This effect was in an opposite 
direction for the Chinese participants. When empathy was aroused, the Chinese 
participants gave more money to merit-based applicants and less money to need-based 
applicants than when empathy was not aroused, resulting in almost an equal amount of 
money given to each of the two types of applicants (see Figure 11). Like the effect of 
empathy on the need and equity principles for Chinese in Studies 2 and 3, empathy in 
Study 4 seems to again equalize the amounts of money distributed to need-based 
applicants and merit-based applicants for the Chinese.   
The reason that the Chinese empathized more with those with merit than those with 
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need may be that Chinese found the need situations less believable than the merit 
situations. Preliminary analyses of some subjective responses showed that Chinese 
participants were suspicious of the need situations. The two need situations, especially 
the moderate-need situation describing a middle-class student who couldn’t pay tuition 
because of ineligibility for federal financial aid programs and unsupportive parents, were 
created more in line with situations in the U.S. rather than in China. This explained why 
Chinese participants found the situations only moderately believable and realistic, 
whereas U.S. participants found the situations highly believable and realistic. However, 
because participants were not asked to rate the merit situations separately from the need 
situations, there is no way of knowing whether Chinese regarded the merit situations 
more believable and realistic than the need situations. It is also possible that the findings 
do reflect how people in different cultures are treated when empathy is aroused: U.S. 
Americans switched their attention from those with merit to those with need, while 
Chinese did the opposite.                
Limitations and Future Directions 
 Study 4 did not result in the predicted effect of empathy for Chinese. In Study 4, 
participants were given two people to judge and they divided a certain amount of money 
between them as opposed to the previous studies (Studies 1, 2, and 3) in which 
participants judged only one person. The process of empathizing with both applicants 
may be difficult for participants. Future research may need to investigate the 
mixed-principle situation using a between-subjects design and further test the effect of 
empathy in this situation.  
 Empathy was manipulated by asking participants to either focus on the information 
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in the packages or focus on the feelings of the persons they judged. The manipulation 
check for empathy was more successful for Americans than for Chinese. Perhaps the 
Chinese were influenced by the feelings of the people they judged even when they were 
told to only focus on the packet information. Overall, Chinese reported higher level of 
trait empathy than U.S. Americans. One of the manipulation checks on empathy across 
all four studies was a difference score created by subtracting reported 
information-focused scores (transformed) from reported feelings-focused scores 
(transformed). For all four studies, when the influences of all other variables (i.e., 
manipulated competence or need, manipulated empathy, and sex) were controlled, culture 
still had a significant effect on the difference score such that Chinese reported that they 
focused more on feelings rather than information as compared to U.S. Americans (Study 
1: F[1, 162] = 37.21, p < .001, partial η2 = .19; Study 2: F[1, 210] = 48.90, p < .001, 
partial η2 = .19; Study 3: F[1, 304] = 6.76, p < .01, partial η2 = .02; Study 4: F[1, 253] = 
10.91, p < .001, partial η2 = .04). For each of the four studies, the degree of focusing on 
feelings rather than information for Chinese in the low-empathy condition was even 
higher than that for Americans in the high-empathy condition (Study 1: U.S. high 
empathy, M = -1.04, SD = 1.59; China low empathy, M = .12, SD = 1.74; Study 2: U.S. 
high empathy, M = 1.85, SD = 11.03; China low empathy, M = 5.26, SD = 9.04; Study 3: 
U.S. high empathy, M = 7.70, SD = 9.52; China low empathy, M = 8.77, SD = 7.86; 
Study 4: U.S. high empathy, M = 10.09, SD = 9.72; China low empathy, M = 10.53, SD = 
8.09). Moreover, in Studies 1, 2, and 4, the Chinese participants had significantly higher 
trait empathy than U.S. Americans. These effects indicated that the Chinese participants 
generally had a high trait empathy level and, compared to U.S. Americans, maintained a 
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relatively high level of empathy even when asked not to empathize. This trend raised the 
question whether the use of empathy in the Chinese society is a norm compared with the 
U.S. society. People in the merit-based U.S. society may choose to restrict the influence 
of emotions in their moral judgment, whereas people in the Chinese society with an 
affect-based moral tradition may allow emotions to influence their moral judgment. 
Future research needs to confirm the cultural differences in empathy and examine the 
extent to which emotions are allowed to influence moral judgment across different 
situations and cultures.     
 The manipulation of empathy in the studies was made by instructing participants to 
read the evaluation or self-description of the person they judged while trying to focus on 
his or her feelings. This empathy induction was relatively weak because the empathized 
person was not described as a family member or a close friend, not even someone 
participants had seen or interacted with before. If relational closeness had been used in 
the induction, empathy would have been stronger due to empathy’s familiarity bias, 
which refers to individuals being more likely to empathize with those they are familiar 
with than those they are not familiar with (Hoffman, 2000). The empathy manipulation 
used in the current study is also less strong than putting participants in a situation in 
which they interact in some way with the persons they will judge because then empathy 
may be vulnerable to a here-and-now bias, which suggests that people may be more 
likely to empathize with those who are present in the immediate situation than with those 
who are absent (Hoffman, 2000). Therefore, the effect of empathy may be more 
prominent if empathy is manipulated in face-to-face interactions. Future studies need to 
look into the possibilities of using other ways to manipulate empathy beyond simply 
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using instructions in questionnaires.   
 The current studies focused on the effect of empathy on distributive justice principles 
and cultural influences in this process. There are other factors that may also influence this 
process such as relationship between the distributor and the beneficiary. Leung and Bond 
(1984) argued that equality was not always the choice in collectivistic cultures, in fact, 
the relational closeness between distributors and recipients affected the distribution 
principle that would be preferred. They used collectivism as the explanatory variable to 
show that people from China used the equity principle with out-group members whereas 
with in-group members they used a generosity rule, relying on the equity principle when 
their own input was low and the equality principle when their own input was high. 
Moreover, because this distinction between in-group and out-group members was greater 
in some East Asian countries such as China, Korea, and Japan than in some Western 
countries such as the U.S., the relationship between distributors and recipients may 
influence, by itself or in interactions with culture, the distributive decisions. Relational 
closeness may also influence empathy because aside from the here-and-now bias, 
empathy also has a familiarity bias in which individuals are more likely to empathize 
with those they are familiar with than those they are not familiar with (Hoffman, 2000). 
Hoffman (2000) pointed out three types of familiarity bias: in-group bias, friendship bias, 
and similarity bias, arguing that people are likely to empathize with their in-group 
members, friends, and those who are similar to them. Therefore, given cultural 
differences in empathy, the relational closeness between the distributor and the 
beneficiary may interact with empathy and culture in affecting the distributive decisions. 
The current research only examined distribution situations when relationship between 
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distributors and recipients was not close. Future research needs to investigate the possible 
complex interactions between relational closeness, empathy, and culture and their effects 
on the distribution decisions.  
In all the four studies, U.S. participants received a small amount of extra course 
credit for their participation. These U.S. participants came from communication classes in 
a research pool at a large public east coast university. They could choose to participate in 
other studies to earn extra course credits or not to participate in studies for the research 
pool. However, Chinese participants volunteered to participate either as an in-class or 
outside-class activity without receiving any incentives. The differential recruitment 
methods for Chinese and U.S. participants raised the question of comparability between 
results from the two cultural groups. The effects of incentives have been a topic for 
debate for researchers for a long time (e.g., Boring, 1929; Schultz, 1969; van Dijk, 
Sonnemans, & van Winden, 1998). Tomporowski, Simpson, and Hager (1993) assessed 
three methods of recruiting participants for laboratory cognitive tests of attention and 
memory in a series of studies. In their studies, students who received either monetary or 
course-credit incentives were compared with students whose participation was a course 
requirement. Results showed that monetary incentives led to slight, but significant, 
improvements in test performance, whereas students with course-credit incentives did not 
perform better than students whose participation was a course requirement. Tomporowski, 
Simpson, and Hager’s (1993) research echoed some of the research findings that 
monetary incentives led to recruiting participants with different personality attributes 
(Burns, 1974) and participation characteristics (Maughan & Higbee, 1981). Thus, it 
seems that course-credit incentives, different from monetary incentives, did not provide a 
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different level of motivation from the no-incentive method. However, because little 
evidence exists on the effects of incentives in cross-cultural research, future research 
comparing cultural differences should aim to use consistent participant recruitment 
methods across cultural groups.  
In all four studies, convenience student samples were used. Using college students as 
participants raises issues of generalizability, which is particularly true in these studies, 
because students were asked to imagine themselves in situations in which they assumed 
the roles of the president or chairperson of a company, a charity organization, or a 
scholarship program in a university. They were asked to make distribution decisions in 
these situations. However, students rarely take these roles and therefore may not 
experience the same kind and degree of concern that actual presidents and chairpersons 
experience when they are making distributive decisions. Another issue is that the students 
in this research were reporting how much money they would like to distribute on paper if 
they were in the imagined situation. They were not really distributing money to others. 
Thus, students may not have taken the task seriously. Therefore, future research should 
replicate these studies in other populations such as in samples using actual decision 
makers or in laboratory experiments in which students make real distribution decisions 
which have consequences for others.  
One advantage of using student samples is that students generally are in the same age 
group so that any differences that may be due to age can be controlled for. In three of the 
four studies (studies 1, 3, and 4), Chinese and U.S. participants were in the same age 
group (with an age difference less than 2 years). But, in study 2, the age difference 
between Chinese and U.S. participants was around 4 years. Therefore, an alternative 
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analysis was performed for each of the three ANCOVAs in study 2: Age was entered as 
an additional covariate to test the possible effects it may have on hypothesized 
relationships. Results showed that age was not a significant predictor, nor did it alter any 
of the significant or non-significant results of the original analyses.    
In all four studies, the American sample included a small percentage of participants 
who identified themselves as Asian Americans (Study 1: 15%; Study 2: 15%; Study 3: 
17%; Study 4: 15%). It is possible that these Asian American participants may act more 
like Chinese than U.S. Americans. Two alternative analyses were performed for each of 
the four studies: one in which data from all Asian American participants were deleted; the 
other in which data from all Asian American participants were counted as from the 
Chinese sample. When these data were deleted, most results remained the same except 
that the effect of empathy became insignificant in the third ANCOVA in Study 2 and in 
Study 3 as well, and that the two-way interaction between culture and empathy became 
marginally significant in Study 4. When these data were regarded as from the Chinese 
sample, most results remained the same except that the two-way interaction between 
culture and empathy became insignificant in Study 4. In conclusion, the small percentage 
of Asian Americans did not significantly affect the results because the most important 
results, the three-way interactions between competence (need), empathy and culture 
remained significant in both Studies 2 and 3.        
Theoretical and Methodological Significance of the Research  
Methodological Contributions 
 The current dissertation research developed scenarios that are very similar to actual 
decision making situations. Instead of reading a paragraph describing a person’s 
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competence or need level, participants judged the person’s competence or need level for 
themselves by reading an evaluation or application package that was made as similar to 
forms from the workplace as possible. This procedure allowed participants to imagine 
themselves as the high-status person who was about to make an important decision. 
Although face-to-face evaluations in an interview were not used in this research, the 
evaluation-form format allowed for experimental controls so that the crucial variables 
were isolated for the study. Moreover, evaluation based on forms rather than face-to-face 
interactions is prevalent in organizations.  
    The current research used a series of studies to test its hypotheses. To ensure 
comparability, these studies were made as similar as possible: For the questionnaire, the 
same order of types of questions was used in each study, the same scales were used for 
the same variables, and the same manipulation of empathy was used; for the evaluation or 
application package, great care was taken to make it look realistic such as by including a 
cover page and a signature page. This arrangement ensured consistency between studies 
and allowed for comparison between them.     
Theoretical Contributions 
 Contribution to cross-cultural research. Gudykunst (2002; Gudykunst & Lee, 2002) 
argued that cross-cultural studies of communication should be theory based and that 
doing atheoretical research was unwarranted given the state of theorizing in the field. In 
building cross-cultural theories, finding cultural differences in specific aspects of 
behavior should only be regarded as the first step. We cannot stop at this stage if building 
cross-cultural theories is the goal. It is important to ask what it is about culture that leads 
to these behavioral differences. The discovery of the underlying mechanisms that can 
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explain the cultural differences found in specific behaviors should be the goal in doing 
theory-based cross-cultural research.  
 The current research makes a contribution to cross-cultural theory building in two 
aspects. First, the research connects two cross-cultural research findings: Cultural 
differences have been found in research on caring versus justice dilemmas and also in 
research on the use of distributive justice principles.     
The ethics of caring and justice are both important human motives. In a caring versus 
justice dilemma, the ethics of caring, emphasizing particularity, cultivates individuals’ 
ability to care for others regardless of their merit, whereas the ethics of justice, 
emphasizing universality, emphasizes judgments based on individuals’ merit. The ethics 
of caring and justice may conflict in a distribution situation where the care for others 
contradicts the desire to distribute resources based on merit. The use of the distributive 
justice principles of equity and need has not been examined before in terms of the caring 
versus justice framework. The principles of equity and need require that a greater amount 
of resources be given to those who make a greater contribution or have a greater need. 
However, if enough care is directed toward those who make a lesser contribution or have 
a lesser need, the ethics of care may lead to more resources being distributed to them than 
is justified by the ethics of justice. Moreover, when a distribution situation involves 
comparing those with merit and those with need, the ethics of care may be more 
congruent with the need rather than the equity principle. Given the connection between 
the two areas, it is not surprising that differences between some Asian cultures and the 
U.S. culture have been found both in the choice between the ethics of care and of justice 
(e.g., Dien, 1982; Ma, 1997; Miller, 1994; Miller & Bersoff, 1992; Miller, Bersoff, & 
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Harwood, 1990; Miller & Luthar, 1989; Ohbuchi, Fukushima, & Tedeschi, 1999) and in 
the choice between the distributive justice principles (e.g., Leung 1988, 1997). Therefore, 
it is important to look into the process that contributes to these cultural differences, and 
this dissertation did so.    
  The current research also makes a contribution to cross-cultural theory building by 
providing a different underlying mechanism to explain cultural differences from the 
cultural dimension of individualism-collectivism (Hofstede, 2001; Triandis, 1994). The 
problems associated with individualism-collectivism and self construal (Fiske, 2002; 
Levin et al., 2003; Mastumoto, 1999; Oyserman, Coon, & Kemmelmeier, 2002; Park & 
Levine, 1999) may be partly due to the fact that they have been overused in cross-cultural 
and intercultural research. Although individualism-collectivism and self construal were 
useful in explaining some cultural differences, the scope of phenomena they were used to 
explain may be too broad to allow sufficient precision and insight into specific cultural 
differences found in diverse fields. Therefore, it is important to find other moderators and 
mediators which are closely related to specific behaviours to help explain the observed 
cultural differences.  
 The current research proposes empathy as a possible explanation for cultural 
differences in the conflict between care and justice as reflected in the use of the need and 
equity distributive principles: People in some Asian cultures have been found to prefer 
the ethics of care over the ethics of justice as compared to people in the U.S. (Miller, 
1994; Miller & Bersoff, 1992; Miller, Bersoff, & Harwood, 1990; Miller & Luthar, 1989; 
Ohbuchi, Fukushima, & Tedeschi, 1999; Simpson, 1974). Empathy was chosen in this 
research as a possible mechanism to explain cultural differences in justice because 
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empathy has been found to influence justice and to differ across cultures: Empathy has 
been found to facilitate caring at the cost of principles of justice (Batson, Klein, 
Highberger, & Shaw, 1995) and people in some Asian cultures have been found to have 
greater empathic reactions than people in some western cultures (Enz, Zoll, & Xu, 2006; 
Kobayashi & Trommsdorff, 1993; Trommsdorff, 1995). The high level of empathy may 
have made it more likely for people in the Asian cultures to choose the ethics of caring 
than the ethics of justice.  
 Contribution to the relationship between empathy and justice. The theoretical 
relationship between empathy and justice has long been speculated on by researchers 
(e.g., Hoffman, 2000; Rawls, 1971). In his influential theory of justice, Rawls (1971) 
argued against the importance of empathy for distributive justice. Rawlsian justice is “a 
merit-based justice constrained by ‘need’” (Hoffman, 2000, p. 231). Rawls advocates the 
distribution of goods and services based on merit, which is supposed to increase goods 
and services for all, especially “the least advantaged members of society” (Rawls, 1971, p. 
15). Although merit-based distribution can stimulate productivity, merit itself does not 
justify unequal distribution because merit-based advantages may be due to heredity or 
class and therefore be undeserved. Rawlsian justice allows for merit-based inequalities 
only when they function to the greatest benefit of the least disadvantaged members in 
society. Rawls discarded the role of empathy because his tools of analysis, the “original 
position of equality” and the “veil of ignorance,” seemed to have made empathy 
unnecessary. In Rawls’s hypothetical original position of equality, participants, being 
rational and self-interested, are asked to choose justice principles to advance their own 
interests and attain the highest gain for themselves under the constraints that they do not 
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know their position in the society they are constructing, such as their race, gender, class, 
social status, religion, assets, or abilities. Rawls assumes that rational and self-interested 
people, understanding the possibility of occupying any position in the new society, will 
protect their welfare by choosing the justice principles that rule out extremely miserable 
and uncomfortable life conditions. By relying on the guiding principles of rationality and 
self-interest, Rawls rejects the role of empathy.  
 Hoffman (2000) disagreed with Rawls in terms of the role of empathy for distributive 
justice. He questioned whether people with merit-based advantages, being aware of their 
positions in life without the constraint of the veil of ignorance, would abide by Rawls’s 
justice principles, which were designed to benefit the least advantaged in society. 
Hoffman (2000) argued that Rawls’s abstract idea could not prevent people with 
merit-based advantages from acting out of self-interest and ignoring the needs of the least 
advantaged. He believed that empathy could be a motive powerful enough to operate 
against self-interest and benefit those vulnerable. Empathy has been found to benefit 
victims including those least advantaged in society according to Rawls’s definition 
(Hoffman, 2000). More specifically, Hoffman (2000) speculated about how empathy 
would influence distributive justice: “Empathy thus seems congruent with justice 
principles – directly congruent with need, and to some extent effort, and circuitously with 
productivity and competence” (Hoffman, 2000, p. 230). Empathy’s contribution to need 
can be demonstrated by people’s empathic reactions to those who need basic necessities 
of life; empathy may be related to effort-based justice because observers can readily 
empathize with negative feelings brought about by unrewarded effort; but empathy may 
be indirectly associated to productivity or competence because the empathy-effort link 
                                                                 159                
                                   
  
can extend to productivity and competence when they are perceived as requiring efforts 
(Hoffman, 2000).  
 However, Hoffman did not speculate how empathy influences the distributive 
principle of need when people empathize with those in greater versus lesser need, nor did 
he theorize how empathy affects the principle of equity when those with greater versus 
lesser merit are empathized with. Moreover, Hoffman’s theorizing about the relation 
between empathy and distributive justice remained speculative and has not been subject 
to empirical tests. Therefore, the current dissertation research makes a contribution by 
providing an empirical test of the supposed relation between empathy and distributive 
justice. Results of the current research showed that empathy rewarded those with 
low-competence, whether this level of competence was explained with either a negative 
or positive reason, more than those with high-competence (Study 2). Perhaps, as 
Hoffman predicted, empathy can be linked to unrewarded effort; thus, people are 
concerned that the effort of a person described as having low-competence is more likely 
to go unrewarded than that of a high-competence person. For the principle of need, 
results showed that empathy rewarded those with low need more than those with high 
need (Study 3), perhaps because participants were concerned that low need was more 
likely to go unnoticed and unrewarded than high need. However, the effects of empathy 
on the principles of equity and need were only found for Chinese and not for U.S. 
Americans. Thus, Hoffman’s theorizing has neglected the influence of culture on the 
relation between empathy and justice.  
Hoffman (2000) also theorized that empathy would be more congruent with need 
than with productivity or competence. Empathy was found to be correlated positively 
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with a preference for need-based justice and negatively with a preference for 
productivity-based justice (Montada, Schmitt, & Dalbert, 1986). Hoffman also found that 
high-empathy people preferred need-based justice because they believed 
productivity-based distribution harmed the disadvantaged (Hoffman, 2000). The current 
dissertation research found that empathizing participants chose to reward a student with 
need more than a student with merit but only in the U.S. sample. For Chinese, empathy 
led to a preference of equity over need principles (Study 4). Again, the dissertation 
research indicates the importance of cultural influences on the relationship between 
empathy and distributive justice.  
In two experiments conducted by Batson, Klein, Highberger, and Shaw (1995), 
participants were asked to make allocation decisions that affected the welfare of others. 
They found that a person for whom empathy was felt received preferential treatment and 
was put above the interests of those equally deserving or even more deserving of the 
preferential treatment. They concluded that empathy-induced partiality could lead one to 
act in a way that violates the moral principle of justice. That study seemed to have 
confirmed that empathy could increase sensitivity to and therefore benefit those with 
lesser need. Batson et al (1995) claimed:  
Apparently, empathy did not lead participants to adopt a general principle of justice 
based on need, as Hoffman (1989) predicted; .… Rather than producing a general 
sensitivity to the needs of all, empathy increased sensitivity to the need of the 
individual who was the target of empathy. (p. 1050)  
 However, the authors did not show what would happen if empathy also was targeted 
at those in greater need. Specifically, they failed to demonstrate the extent to which 
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empathy would benefit those with greater and lesser need. The current dissertation 
research has shown that empathy influenced the general distributive justice of need in 
that it benefited those in lesser need to a larger degree than those in greater need but only 
for Chinese; for Americans, empathy benefited those in greater and lesser need to the 
same degree.  
 In summary, the current research has made a contribution to the relation between 
empathy and justice, specifically distributive justice. It provides a broader theoretical 
framework for examining how empathy affects the general distributive principles of need 
and equity individually and when these principles come into conflict; it also tested a 
proposed theoretical framework. More importantly, the current research indicates the 
importance of examining the role of culture in the relationship between empathy and 
justice because results from the research clearly demonstrated cultural differences in this 
regard, which were largely ignored in the theorizing and testing by previous researchers.  
 Contribution to the relationship between culture and justice. Justice is “the first 
virtue of social institutions, as truth is of systems of thought” (Rawls, 1971, p. 3). The 
concept of justice has been under intense theoretical and empirical investigation by 
researchers across a variety of fields. However, the theories of justice have been largely 
developed and tested in Western contexts. As globalization increases and social 
institutions and organizations strive to operate in a global arena, culture-bound research 
regarding a concept as important as justice could limit both the validity and utility of 
justice research. The important moral value of justice, regarded as the social glue that 
makes society possible, has been shown to differ across cultures. The current research 
makes a contribution by providing some explanation for the cultural differences in the 
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use of justice principles.  
 Understanding the causes of cultural differences in important moral values is the first 
step toward a resolution of the conflicts that may result from these differences. 
Rationality is a distinct characteristic of Western civilization. The painstaking efforts by 
moral rationalists such as Kant and Rawls to exclude emotions from their moral and 
justice frameworks reflect this emphasis on rationality and reason as the guiding 
principles of moral judgment. The largely merit-based U.S. society has been strongly 
influenced by this tradition. On the other hand, rationality has never been a distinct 
feature of the Chinese philosophical tradition. Confucian moral philosophy placed 
compassion at the heart of benevolence (Mencius, 320 BCE/1970). The current research 
showed that empathy has a great influence on Chinese moral judgment: People who are 
judged as less deserving in a strict sense of justice benefit more, relative to those who are 
more deserving, when empathy is aroused. It is no less surprising that empathy has no 
effect on the differentiated distribution pattern prevalent in the merit-based U.S. society. 
It is true that an American may be shocked at a Chinese distributor’s “injustice” in 
rewarding those who do not really deserve the rewards, whereas a Chinese may be 
alarmed at an American distributor’s “lack of consideration” for those who have needs. 
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Footnotes 
1For the measure of bonus, Chinese participants were asked to indicate the amount of 
bonus they would give to the employee using 1,000 yuan (the Chinese currency) as the 
yardstick for a moderately competent employee. One question in study 1 tested whether 
Chinese and U.S. participants would regard the amount of 1,000 in their own currency to 
be the moderate amount of bonus in a company. The question asked participants to 
estimate the range (give a low-end and a high-end number) of a typical year-end bonus 
for an employee (such as someone they had read in the package) within a company. The 
data were untrimmed and untransformed. Results showed that the U.S. participants’ 
estimates (median: from $750 to $2,000; mean: from $4,385.21 to $24,514.63) were 
similar to the Chinese participants’ estimates (median: 1,000 yuan to 5,000 yuan; mean: 
4,602.38 yuan to 13,595.24 yuan) especially for the low-end numbers. An ANOVA with 
culture as the independent variable and the low-end numbers as the dependent variable 
showed a non-significant effect of culture, F(1, 176) = .01, p < .94, η2 = .01, indicating 
that Chinese and U.S. American participants estimated in their respective currencies 
relatively the same low-end amount of money for a typical year-end bonus. Thus, even 
though different currencies were used, the numbers seem to be on a same scale and can 
be compared.  
2The raw data were trimmed to exclude the influence of outliers. The trimmed data 
were exponentiated to a power for each variable in Study 1. The items for the 
manipulation check of believability, realism, competence, and empathy, and for the trait 
empathy scale, were all trimmed to a top number of 1,000; the dependent variable, the 
bonus item, was trimmed to 5,000. The two items for believability and realism and the 
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three items for competence were raised to the 0.34 power; the two items for the empathy 
manipulation check were raised to the 0.30 power; the thirty-five items of the trait 
empathy scale were raised to the 0.32 power; and the bonus item was raised to the 0.35 
power, respectively.   
3Trimmed data without transformation were used to calculate the means and standard 
deviations for believability and realism reported here. Transformed data were used in the 
statistical tests related to believability and realism and in calculating the means and 
standard deviations displayed in Tables 1 and 2.     
4All the scales used in the four studies in this dissertation were subject to the data 
reduction method of the principal-components analysis. For a specific scale, the first 
component was extracted to represent the scale items. In most cases, the first component 
was the only component with an eigenvalue greater than 1. This principal-component 
score, a product of combining the scale items based on their loadings on this component, 
was used in subsequent analyses.  
5The raw data were trimmed to exclude the influence of outliers. The trimmed data 
were exponentiated to a power for each variable in Study 2. The items for the 
manipulation check of competence, explanation, and empathy (including the emotions), 
and for the trait empathy scale, were all trimmed to a maximum of 1,000; the dependent 
variable, the bonus item, was trimmed to 3,000. The two items for believability and 
realism, the four items for competence, and the two items for explanation were all raised 
to the 0.34 power; the items for the empathy manipulation check (including the emotions) 
were raised to the 0.33 power; the thirty-five items of the trait empathy scale were raised 
to the 0.31 power; and the bonus item was raised to the 0.43 power, respectively.  
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6Trimmed data without transformation were used to calculate the means and standard 
deviations for believability and realism reported here. Transformed data were used in the 
statistical tests related to believability and realism and in calculating the means and 
standard deviations displayed in Tables 4 and 5.    
7The difference score was calculated by the formula (the variables were all 
transformed): (feeling1 + feeling2 + feeling3 + feeling4 + feeling5 + feeling6) – (info1 + 
info2 + info3 + info4).  
8The raw data were trimmed to exclude the influence of outliers. The trimmed data 
were exponentiated to a power for each variable in Study 3. The items for the 
manipulation check of believability, realism, need, and empathy (including the emotions), 
and for the trait empathy scale, were all trimmed to a maximum of 1,000; the dependent 
variable, the assistance money item, was trimmed to 5,000. The two items for 
believability and realism, and the eight items for need were raised to the 0.32 power; the 
items for the empathy manipulation check were raised to the 0.33 power; the emotion 
items were raised to the 0.35 power; the thirty-five items of the trait empathy scale were 
raised to the 0.35 power; and the assistance money item was raised to the 0.43 power, 
respectively.  
9Trimmed data without transformation were used to calculate the means and standard 
deviations for believability and realism reported here. Transformed data were used in the 
statistical tests related to believability and realism and in calculating the means and 
standard deviations displayed in Tables 7 and 8.      
10Regression analyses were used here because the analyses of covariance would not 
produce the appropriate interactions between the linear effect of need and other 
                                                                 166                
                                   
  
independent variables.  
11To obtain the linear effect of need and its interactions with the other independent 
variables, need, with three levels, was coded as one variable with coding of -.404 (low), 0 
(medium), and .380 (high) representing the linear effect. Empathy was coded as -.354 
(low) and .348 (high); culture was coded as -.354 (U.S. Americans) and .470 (Chinese); 
and sex was coded as -.354 (male) and .172 (female), respectively. Variables representing 
all linear two-way and three-way interactions between these independent variables were 
created as products using these codes.   
12The raw data were trimmed to exclude the influence of outliers. The trimmed data 
were exponentiated to a power for each variable in Study 4. The items for the 
manipulation check of believability, realism, need, performance, and empathy were 
trimmed to a maximum of 1,000; the emotion items and the items for the trait empathy 
scale were trimmed to a maximum of 500. The two items for believability and realism, 
the five items for need, and the four items for performance were raised to the 0.33 power; 
the items for the empathy manipulation check were raised to the 0.35 power; the emotion 
items were raised to the 0.01 power; and the thirty-five items of the trait empathy scale 
were raised to the 0.44 power, respectively.  
13Trimmed data without transformation were used to calculate the means and 
standard deviations for believability and realism reported here. Transformed data were 
used in the statistical tests related to believability and realism and in calculating the 
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EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE REVIEW 
[In different versions, employee competence will be manipulated as follows: a highly competent 
employee will be indicated by checking “outstanding” in every category, and a low-competence 
employee will be indicated by checking “below expectations” in every category.] 
 
Employee ID number:  025                   Direct Supervisor:    Terry Hoffman 
Period Covering:  01/01/2006-12/31/2006      Date of Review:   12/15/2006 
 
 
OVERALL RATING SCALE: 
 
 
Outstanding Exemplary performance in all areas of the job. 
Meets Expectations Good performance. Consistently meets standards and established performance 
expectations in important areas of the job.  
Below Expectations Performance falls below expectations in many areas of the job. Substantial improvement 
                  critical. 
 
1. CUSTOMER SERVICE 
Definition of "Meets Expectations": Understanding the needs of internal and external 
customers; making special effort to be responsive in meeting their needs and in building 
customer satisfaction. 
 




X     
  
2. COOPERATION AND TEAMWORK 
Definition of "Meets Expectations": Putting the group's success ahead of personal goals; 
sharing information and resources with others; giving timely response to requests made by 
others; promoting teamwork; exhibiting positive attitudes during times of change; taking on 
new tasks with enthusiasm and energy. 
 




X     
 
3. COMMUNICATION SKILLS 
Definition of "Meets Expectations": Speaking clearly, concisely, and using words easily 
understood;exchanging ideas with others; listening to understand meaning or oral material; 
writing reports, memos, letters, etc.; using appropriate style, format, spelling, and grammar; 
writing in a clear, concise and appropriate manner. 
 




X      
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4. ATTENDANCE AND PUNCTUALITY 
Definition of "Meets Expectations": Coming to work regularly without excessive absences; 
maintaining assigned work schedules. 
 




X     
 
5. QUALITY OF WORK 
Definition of "Meets Expectations": Completing work thoroughly, accurately, neatly, and 
according to specifications; producing output with minimal errors. 
 




X     
 
6. QUANTITY OF WORK 
Definition of "Meets Expectations": Consistently producing a high volume of acceptable 
work; producing services or output quickly and efficiently. 
 




X     
 
7. JOB KNOWLEDGE 
Definition of "Meets Expectations": Understanding job procedures, policies, and 
responsibilities; keeping up-to-date technically; acting as a resource person on whom others 
rely for assistance. 
  




X     
 
8. CREATIVITY AND INITIATIVE 
Definition of "Meets Expectations": Contributing creative ideas to projects in teamwork; 
assuming greater responsibility; monitoring projects independently.  
 




X     
 
9. RESPONSIBILITY AND DEPENDABILITY 
Definition of "Meets Expectations": Following through projects; adhering to time frames; 
responding appropriately to instructions and procedures.  
 




X      
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10. ADAPTABILITY AND JUDGMENT 
Definition of "Meets Expectations": Adjusting to any change in duties quickly; accepting new 
ideas and approaches to work; responding appropriately to constructive criticism and 
suggestions; thinking logically; analyzing problems effectively; exhibiting timely and decisive 
action.  
 




X     
 
11. OVERALL RATING 
 
The supervisor must assign an overall rating to the employee's cumulative performance throughout 




Outstanding Exemplary performance in all areas of the job. 
Meets Expectations Good performance. Consistently meets standards and established performance 
expectations in important areas of the job.  
Below Expectations Performance falls below expectations in many areas of the job. Substantial improvement 
                  critical. 
 
























                                                                 170                







Employee Training Requirement Form 
   
1. Employee ID number  _________025________ 
2. Direct Supervisor  ______Terry Hoffman________ 
3. Period Covering: ______01/01/2006-12/31/2006________ 
4. Have you participated in all the required training during this period?  
Yes       No  
5. Do you estimate your additional voluntary training hours equal or exceed 20 hours? 






Employee__________________________________________   Date ___________ 
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Employee ID number _________025________ 
  
Specify Reason for Leave Without Pay (Illness, Study, Personal Reason, or Other 
Reason) 
 






Beginning and Ending Dates of LWOP: ______N/A________ 
 
Employee Signature: ___________________ 
 
Recommendation of Supervisor:  
Approved   []               Disapproved   [] 
Date: ____________________  Signature: __________________ 
 
Action of Director of Human Resources:  
Approved   []               Disapproved   [] 
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Appendix B: Personal Belief in a Just World Scale 
1. I believe that, by and large, I deserve what happens to me. 
2. I am usually treated fairly. 
3. I believe that I usually get what I deserve. 
4. Overall, events in my life are just. 
5. In my life injustice is the exception rather than the rule. 
6. I believe that most of the things that happen in my life are fair. 
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Appendix C: Measure of Trait Empathy 
Perspective Taking Dimension 
1. I sometimes find it difficult to see things from the “other guy’s” point of view. 
2. I try to look at everybody’s side of disagreement before I make a decision. 
3. I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look from 
their perspective.  
4. If I’m sure I’m right about something, I don’t waste much time listening to other 
people’s arguments. 
5. I believe that there are two sides to every question and try to look at them both. 
6. When I’m upset at someone, I usually try to “put myself in his shoes” for a while. 
7. Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if I were in their place.  
 
Fantasy Dimension 
1. I daydream and fantasize, with some regularity, about things that might happen to me.  
2. I really get involved with the feelings of the characters in a novel.  
3. I am usually objective when I watch a movie or play, and I don’t often get completely 
caught up in it.  
4. Becoming extremely involved in a good book or movie is somewhat rare for me.  
5. After seeing a play or movie, I have felt as though I were one of the characters. 
6. When I watch a good movie, I can very easily put myself in the place of a leading 
character. 
7. When I am reading an interesting story or novel, I imagine how I would feel if the 
events in the story were happening to me. 
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Empathic Concern Dimension 
1. I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me.  
2. Sometimes I don’t feel very sorry for other people when they are having problems.  
3. When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective towards them.  
4. Other people’s misfortunes do not usually disturb me a great deal.  
5. When I see someone being treated unfairly, I sometimes don’t feel very much pity for 
them. 
6. I am often quite touched by things that I see happen. 
7. I would describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted person. 
 
Personal Distress Dimension: 
1. In emergency situations, I feel apprehensive and ill at ease.  
2. I sometimes feel helpless when I am in the middle of a very emotional situation.  
3. When I see someone get hurt, I tend to remain calm. 
4. Being in a tense emotional situation scares me.  
5. I am usually pretty effective in dealing with emergencies. 
6. I tend to lose control during emergencies. 
7. When I see someone who badly needs help in an emergency, I go to pieces. 
 
Emotional Contagion Dimension: 
1. I often find that I can remain cool in spite of the excitement around me.  
2. I tend to lose control when I am bringing bad news to people. 
3. I tend to remain calm even though those around me worry. 
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4. I cannot continue to feel O.K. if people around me are depressed. 
5. I don’t get upset just because a friend is acting upset. 
6. I become nervous if others around me are nervous. 
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Appendix D  
 
 
EMPLOYEE PERFORMANCE REVIEW 
[In different versions, employee competence will be manipulated as follows: a highly competent 
employee will be indicated by checking “outstanding” in every category, and a low-competence 
employee will be indicated by checking “below expectations” in every category.] 
 
Employee ID number:  025                   Direct Supervisor:    Terry Hoffman 
Period Covering:  01/01/2007-12/31/2007      Date of Review:   12/15/2007 
 
 
OVERALL RATING SCALE: 
 
 
Outstanding Exemplary performance in all areas of the job. 
Meets Expectations Good performance. Consistently meets standards and established performance 
expectations in important areas of the job.  
Below Expectations Performance falls below expectations in many areas of the job. Substantial improvement  
                  critical. 
 
1. CUSTOMER SERVICE 
Definition of "Meets Expectations": Understanding the needs of internal and external 
customers; making special effort to be responsive in meeting their needs and in building 
customer satisfaction. 
 




X     
  
2. COOPERATION AND TEAMWORK 
Definition of "Meets Expectations": Putting the group's success ahead of personal goals; 
sharing information and resources with others; giving timely response to requests made by 
others; promoting teamwork; exhibiting positive attitudes during times of change; taking on new 
tasks with enthusiasm and energy. 
 




X     
 
3. COMMUNICATION SKILLS 
Definition of "Meets Expectations": Speaking clearly, concisely, and using words easily 
understood;exchanging ideas with others; listening to understand meaning or oral material; 
writing reports, memos, letters, etc.; using appropriate style, format, spelling, and grammar; 
writing in a clear, concise and appropriate manner. 
 




X      
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4. ATTENDANCE AND PUNCTUALITY 
Definition of "Meets Expectations": Coming to work regularly without excessive absences; 
maintaining assigned work schedules. 
 




X     
 
5. QUALITY OF WORK 
Definition of "Meets Expectations": Completing work thoroughly, accurately, neatly, and 
according to specifications; producing output with minimal errors. 
 




X     
 
6. QUANTITY OF WORK 
Definition of "Meets Expectations": Consistently producing a high volume of acceptable work; 
producing services or output quickly and efficiently. 
 




X     
 
7. JOB KNOWLEDGE 
Definition of "Meets Expectations": Understanding job procedures, policies, and 
responsibilities; keeping up-to-date technically; acting as a resource person on whom others rely 
for assistance. 
  




X     
 
8. CREATIVITY AND INITIATIVE 
Definition of "Meets Expectations": Contributing creative ideas to projects in teamwork; 
assuming greater responsibility; monitoring projects independently.  
 




X     
 
9. RESPONSIBILITY AND DEPENDABILITY 
Definition of "Meets Expectations": Following through projects; adhering to time frames; 
responding appropriately to instructions and procedures.  
 




X      
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10. ADAPTABILITY AND JUDGMENT 
Definition of "Meets Expectations": Adjusting to any change in duties quickly; accepting 
new ideas and approaches to work; responding appropriately to constructive criticism and 
suggestions; thinking logically; analyzing problems effectively; exhibiting timely and decisive 
action.  
 




X     
 
11. OVERALL RATING 
 
The supervisor must assign an overall rating to the employee's cumulative performance throughout 




Outstanding Exemplary performance in all areas of the job. 
Meets Expectations Good performance.  Consistently meets standards and established performance 
expectations in important areas of the job.  
Below Expectations Performance falls below expectations in many areas of the job. Substantial improvement  
                  critical. 
 











Additional Comments by the Employee’s Direct Supervisor (if any):  
 
[In the high-competence condition, the comment box will be left blank. In the low-competence 
conditions, the comment box will be used to manipulate three conditions: For low competence 
without explanation, the comment box will be left blank; for low competence with negative 
explanation, the comment will read: “The employee has, in general, a negative attitude toward 
work. His/her poor performance was mainly due to lack of motivation and effort;” for low 
competence with positive explanation, the comment will read: “The employee has, in general, a 
positive attitude toward work. His/her poor performance was mainly due to lack of training and 
skills.”]    
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Employee Training Requirement Form 
   
   1. Employee ID number  _________025________ 
2. Direct Supervisor  ______Terry Hoffman________ 
3. Period Covering: ______01/01/2007-12/31/2007________ 
4. Have you participated in all the required training during this period?  





Employee___________________________________________   Date ___________ 
 



















                                                                 180                











Employee ID number _________025________ 
  
Specify Reason for Leave Without Pay (Illness, Study, Personal Reason, or Other 
Reason) 
 






Beginning and Ending Dates of LWOP: ______Not Applicable________ 
 
Employee Signature: ___________________ 
 
Recommendation of Supervisor:  
Approved   []               Disapproved   [] 
Date: ____________________  Signature: __________________ 
 
Action of Director of Human Resources:  
Approved   []               Disapproved   [] 




*Employees normally apply for LWOP after they have used up their Leave of Absence With 
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ROADSAFETY CHARITY CARE PROGRAM 
 
 
Dear Applicant:  
 
Attached you will find the RoadSafety Charity Care Program Application.  
 
Completion of this application will help us consider your request of financial assistance 
for your hospital bills or expected hospital charges related to road accidents.  
 
We understand your desire for privacy. Accordingly, except for verification purposes, the 
information included in your application will be treated as confidential information. It will 
only be shared within RoadSafety on a need to know basis.  
 
Please complete each item on the application. If you need additional space for any 
explanations, please utilize the back of the application.  
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ROADSAFETY CHARITY CARE PROGRAM  
APPLICATION FOR CHARITY CARE ASSISTANCE-Form 1 
 
Part 1: Injured Party Information 
 











Are you employed?               Yes         No     
 
Do you have medical insurance?     Yes         No  
    
 
Do you belong to the low-income family category based on RoadSafety’s criteria (information regarding 
the low-income family category can be found in the program materials)?    
 
Yes         No     
 
 
Is anyone or any organization assisting you with payment or expected payment of your hospital bills 
(including hospital programs, physicians, other charities, employer, friends, etc.)?   Yes    No  
          Who is assisting you?                   __________________ 
          How much assistance are you receiving?    __________________ 
 
Name of Employer: ___Terry Hoffman_____    Telephone #: ___301-228-2371____ 
Part 2: Statement of Reasons for Application  
 
Date of Accident:  08/03/2007 
Please describe below your reasons for applying for RoadSafety Charity Care Assistance:  
 
I am writing to apply for the RoadSafety Charity Care Assistance on behalf of my spouse who 
was seriously injured last week in a car accident. The doctors explained that my spouse was in a 
critical condition due to an injury to the spinal column and was in urgent need of a series of 
operations to avoid lifetime paralysis. However, we are not insured and have no other means to 
pay for the medical bills. I know RoadSafety aims to care for victims injured in car accidents in 
the community. We are asking for your help. Please consider our application. [big and urgent 
need condition] 
   
[In the other three conditions, the reasons will be described respectively as the following] 
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I am writing to apply for the RoadSafety Charity Care Assistance on behalf of my spouse who 
was injured last week in a car accident. The doctors explained that my spouse was in a stable 
condition but needed immediately to undergo a small operation to treat bone fractures in one 
leg. However, we are not insured and have no other means to pay for the medical bills. I know 
RoadSafety aims to care for victims injured in car accidents in the community. We are asking 
for your help. Please consider our application. [small and urgent need condition] 
 
 
I am writing to apply for the RoadSafety Charity Care Assistance. I was injured one year ago in 
a car accident that resulted in the amputation of my left leg just above the knee. Losing one leg 
made my life difficult, but I have learned to work through those difficulties. I now want to be 
fitted with a prosthetic limb so that I can make the most of my life. However, I am not insured 
and have no other means to pay for the medical bills. I know RoadSafety aims to care for 
victims injured in car accidents in the community. I am asking for your help. Please consider 
my application. [big and not urgent need condition] 
 
 
I am writing to apply for the RoadSafety Charity Care Assistance. I was injured one year ago in 
a car accident which resulted in a long and deep cut on my left leg. After treatment, a long and 
large scar remained on the leg. There were times when I had to deal with others’ surprising 
looks when they saw my scar. I now want to use skin reconstruction to make the scar less 
perceptible. However, I am not insured and have no other means to pay for the medical bills. I 
know RoadSafety aims to care for victims injured in car accidents in the community. I am 
asking for your help. Please consider my application. [small and not urgent need condition] 
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Part 3: Signature  
 
 
I understand that RoadSafety may verify the information contained in this application and hereby 
authorize RoadSafety to contact my employer and other authorities to certify the information provided. I 
am aware that this information will be used to determine my eligibility for and magnitude of charity 
assistance and that the falsification of information in this application may result in denial of charity care 
assistance.   
 
 
____________________________________________                    _____________ 
Signature of  Person Making Request, If Injured Party                    Date 
 
 
_______________________________________________                 _____________ 
Signature of  Person Making Request, If Not Injured Party                 Date 
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ROADSAFETY CHARITY CARE PROGRAM  
ACCIDENT DATA COLLECTION FORM*-Form 2 
 
Applicant ID #: RCC524     Staff ID #: 025    Date: 08/08/2007 
 
The following description is based on the police report about the accident involving the injured party in the 
above application:  
 
 
The injured party was driving his/her company’s car when the accident occurred. It was a hit and 
run. Witnesses described that the injured party was parking his/her car in a safe area on the side of 
the road when a truck lost control and hit it. The truck driver fled the scene afterwards. Police later 




*The staff of RoadSafety Charity Care Program regularly collects information from the police department 
about accidents reported in the application form.    
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DEAN’S SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM APPLICATION  
 
  
Dear Applicant:  
 
Attached you will find the Dean’s Scholarship Program Application.  
 
The Dean’s Scholarship was established as a program that accepts both need-based and 
merit-based applications. Therefore, the scholarship is awarded every semester to current 
students who have demonstrated financial need or those who have demonstrated outstanding 
academic performance.  
 
As applicant, you need to indicate at the beginning which type of application you are 
submitting, need-based or merit-based. For need-based application, you are requested to 
have your FAFSA (Free Application for Federal Student Aid) and EFC (Expected Family 
Contribution) information on file with the university. For merit-based application, your 
current GPA should be 3.5 or higher on a 4.0 scale.  
 
We understand your desire for privacy. Accordingly, except for verification purposes, the 
information included in your application will be treated as confidential information.  
 
Please complete each item on the application. If you need additional space for any 
explanations, please utilize the back of the application.  
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DEAN’S SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM APPLICATION 
APPLICANT INFORMATION 
 
Part 1: Personal Information 
 
Applicant ID #: DSP524 University ID #: 109306478 
Are you currently enrolled as a full-time student?                Yes         No     
 
Please check the type of application you are submitting: [The first applicant will choose one of the 
choices, the second applicant will choose the other in the two applications.]  
 
Need-Based         If you check this, please go to Part 2.  
             
Merit-Based         If you check this, please go to Part 3.               
 
Part 2: Need-Based Application 
 
Do your family income (provided in your FAFSA file) and EFC (Expected Family Contribution) 
qualify you for this scholarship based on the program criteria (information regarding the criteria can be 
found in the program materials)?   
 
Yes         No       
 
Statement of Reasons for Application:  
 
I am writing to apply for the Dean’s Scholarship based on my financial need. I am experiencing 
financial difficulties because my father, the sole bread-earner in the family, was laid off and is still 
trying to find a job. We were a low-income small-asset family even before his unemployment. My 
mother does not work and stays at home taking care of my little sisters. My brother and I are both in 
college. Due to this situation, my parents can no longer support me financially and my part-time job 
can not cover all the expenses. Being the first-generation college student in my family, I have been 
determined to complete my college education. I need the scholarship to help me overcome present 
financial difficulties.  [high-need condition] 
 
[In the other need-based application condition, the reason will be described as the following:] 
 
I am writing to apply for the Dean’s Scholarship based on my financial need. I am experiencing 
financial difficulties now. My family was categorized as a middle-income family. Therefore, I was not 
eligible for many federal financial aid programs, which set a maximum amount for the Expected 
Family Contribution (EFC). My family income made my EFC greater than the maximum amount. 
Although I am the only child of my parents, my parents don’t help pay for college as much as they 
should. My part-time job can not cover all the expenses I have. I know this scholarship also helps 
people in my situation. I am quite committed to my college education. I need the scholarship to help 
me overcome present financial difficulties.  [medium-need condition] 
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Have you applied or received other need-based scholarship(s)?   Yes         No  
 
  If yes, which scholarship(s) and how much will you receive? _________________     
Part 3: Merit-Based Application  
 
What is your GPA?    __________ 




Have you applied or received other merit-based scholarship(s)?   Yes         No  
  
If yes, which scholarship(s) and how much will you receive? _________________ 
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Part 4: Signature  
 
 
By submitting this form, I certify that the information contained in this application is correct. I also 
understand that my FAFSA and EFC information or my transcript on file will be reviewed as part of 
the application process. I am aware that the Dean’s Scholarship Program staff may verify the 
information provided on this application and hereby authorize the staff to contact other authorities to 
certify the information provided. I understand that this information will be used to determine my 
eligibility for and the magnitude of the scholarship and that the falsification of information in this 




______________________________________                            _____________ 
Student’s Signature                                                   Date 
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DEAN’S SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM APPLICATION  
 
  
Dear Applicant:  
 
Attached you will find the Dean’s Scholarship Program Application.  
 
The Dean’s Scholarship was established as a program that accepts both need-based and 
merit-based applications. Therefore, the scholarship is awarded every semester to current 
students who have demonstrated financial need or those who have demonstrated outstanding 
academic performance.  
 
As applicant, you need to indicate at the beginning which type of application you are 
submitting, need-based or merit-based. For need-based application, you are requested to have 
your FAFSA (Free Application for Federal Student Aid) and EFC (Expected Family 
Contribution) information on file with the university. For merit-based application, your 
current GPA should be 3.5 or higher on a 4.0 scale.  
 
We understand your desire for privacy. Accordingly, except for verification purposes, the 
information included in your application will be treated as confidential information.  
 
Please complete each item on the application. If you need additional space for any 
explanations, please utilize the back of the application.  
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DEAN’S SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM APPLICATION 
APPLICANT INFORMATION 
Part 1: Personal Information 
 
Applicant ID #: DSP525 University ID #: 106098378 
Are you currently enrolled as a full-time student?                Yes         No     
 
Please check the type of application you are submitting: [The first applicant will choose one of the 
choices, the second applicant will choose the other in the two applications.]  
 
Need-Based        If you check this, please go to Part 2.  
             
Merit-Based       If you check this, please go to Part 3.               
 
Part 2: Need-Based Application 
 
Do your family income (provided in your FAFSA file) and EFC (Expected Family Contribution) 
qualify you for this scholarship based on the program criteria (information regarding the criteria can be 
found in the program materials)?   
 
Yes        No           
 
Statement of Reasons for Application:  
 
 
Have you applied or received other need-based scholarship(s)?   Yes         No    
 
  If yes, which scholarship(s) and how much will you receive? _________________     
 
Part 3: Merit-Based Application  
 
What is your GPA?    ____4.0______[in the high-performance condition, this is 4.0; in the 
medium-performance condition, this is 3.5 ] 
Statement of Reasons for Application:  
 
I am writing to apply for the Dean’s Scholarship based on my academic performance. Since I entered 
this university, I achieved As in all the classes I have taken. I was admitted into the Honors Program in 
my department and have since maintained an outstanding record in the program. I also received a very 
competitive award, the University Medal for excellent undergraduate research involvement, last 
semester. In addition, I have been actively involved in service promoting academic excellence among 
undergraduates. I have served on several university-wide committees, including the Provost’s 
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Advisory Committee for Undergraduate Research. I hope my performance will qualify me for this 
scholarship. [high-performance condition] 
 
[In the other merit-based application condition, the reason will be described as the following:] 
 
I am writing to apply for the Dean’s Scholarship based on my academic performance. I have strived 
for academic excellence since I came to this university. I have been strongly motivated by my desire to 
learn. My commitment to academic excellence was demonstrated in my mastery of the subject matter 
under study, the improvement of my critical thinking abilities, and very good grades. My grades are all 
As and Bs. I also strived to develop my leadership skills in group projects and activities. I took every 
chance to work with faculty members on research projects to develop my research abilities. I hope my 
performance will qualify me for this scholarship. [medium-performance condition] 
 
Have you applied or received other merit-based scholarship(s)?   Yes         No  
  
If yes, which scholarship(s) and how much will you receive? _________________ 
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Part 4: Signature  
 
 
By submitting this form, I certify that the information contained in this application is correct. I also 
understand that my FAFSA and EFC information or my transcript on file will be reviewed as part of 
the application process. I am aware that the Dean’s Scholarship Program staff may verify the 
information provided on this application and hereby authorize the staff to contact other authorities to 
certify the information provided. I understand that this information will be used to determine my 
eligibility for and the magnitude of the scholarship and that the falsification of information in this 




______________________________________                              _____________ 
Student’s Signature                                                     Date 
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                            雇员业绩评估表 
 
雇员身份号： 025                       部门领导：   李文 














优秀  合格  不合格 







          
优秀  合格  不合格 
    √ 






优秀  合格  不合格 





优秀  合格  不合格 
    √  
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优秀  合格  不合格 





优秀  合格  不合格 





         
优秀  合格  不合格 




         
优秀  合格  不合格 




        
优秀  合格  不合格 
    √ 




          
优秀  合格  不合格 
    √  
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优秀  合格  不合格 
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6. 雇员身份号：  _________025________ 
7. 部门领导：  ______李文________ 
8. 评估时段：______2007-01-01——2007-12-31________ 
9. 在此评估时段你是否已经完成了所有要求的培训？  
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同意  [√]                不同意  [  ] 
日期： ____________________  签名： __________________ 
 
人力资源部领导的决定：  
同意  [√]                不同意  [  ] 
日期： ____________________  签名：__________________ 
 
  
*雇员通常在他们用完带薪休假的天数后申请无薪休假。                      
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帐号: H-263-783-619  
 
      婚姻状况： 
 
√     已婚 
    未婚 
    离异 
    丧偶 





你有工作吗？              有 √          无     
 
你有医疗保险吗？          有           无 √    
 










其它慈善机构，雇主，朋友，等等）？          有          无 √  
 










申请日期：2007.8.3      
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_________________________________________               _____________ 
申请人签名（如果是受伤者）             日期 
 
 
_________________________________________               ____________ 
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学生证号: 109306478  
 





生活困难助学金  √       如果你标明这项，请看第二部分。 
学业优秀奖学金        如果你标明这项，请看第三部分。  






    
是 √         否      
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你已申请或接受了其它的生活困难助学金吗？        有          没有  √    
 














你已申请或接受了其它的学业优秀奖学金吗？        有          没有    
 
如果有，是什么奖学金，数目是多少？  __________________  
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___________________________________                  _____________ 
          学生签名                                 日期 
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申请人身份号: DSP525 学生证号: 106098378  




生活困难助学金         如果你标明这项，请看第二部分。 
学业优秀奖学金  √        如果你标明这项，请看第三部分。   




    
是           否      








你已申请或接受了其它的生活困难助学金吗？        有          没有     
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你已申请或接受了其它的学业优秀奖学金吗？        有          没有  √ 
 
如果有，是什么奖学金，数目是多少？  __________________  
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___________________________________                  _____________ 
          学生签名                                 日期 
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ªThe table is the SPSS output for the ANCOVA with competence, empathy, culture, and 
sex as the independent variables, trait empathy as the covariate, and the amount of bonus 
as the dependent variable in study 1.  












Corrected Modelb 3919.313 16 244.957 15.687 .000 .617
Intercept 11429.378 1 11429.378 731.920 .000 .824
Trait Empathy .002 1 .002 .000 .992 .000
Competence 1862.152 1 1862.152 119.249 .000 .433
Empathy 64.883 1 64.883 4.155 .043 .026
Culture 47.858 1 47.858 3.065 .082 .019
Sex .376 1 .376 .024 .877 .000
Competence * Empathy  14.404 1 14.404 .922 .338 .006
Competence * Culture 180.478 1 180.478 11.558 .001 .069
Empathy * Culture  92.813 1 92.813 5.944 .016 .037
Competence * Empathy * 
Culture  1.142 1 1.142 .073 .787 .000
Competence * Sex .874 1 .874 .056 .813 .000
Empathy * Sex 5.835 1 5.835 .374 .542 .002
Competence * Empathy * 
Sex .255 1 .255 .016 .899 .000
Culture * Sex 14.011 1 14.011 .897 .345 .006
Competence * Culture * 
Sex 69.837 1 69.837 4.472 .036 .028
Empathy * Culture * Sex  35.806 1 35.806 2.293 .132 .014
Competence * Empathy * 
Culture * Sex  31.262 1 31.262 2.002 .159 .013
Error 2436.036 156 15.616  
Total 26026.789 173  
Corrected Total 6355.349 172  
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Corrected Modelb 18244.074 32 570.127 16.313 .000 .719
Intercept 32683.612 1 32683.612 935.187 .000 .821
Trait Empathy 8.210 1 8.210 .235 .628 .001
Competence 13926.848 3 4642.283 132.831 .000 .661
Empathy  333.771 1 333.771 9.550 .002 .045
Culture  578.999 1 578.999 16.567 .000 .075
Sex  29.115 1 29.115 .833 .362 .004
Competence * Empathy  88.728 3 29.576 .846 .470 .012
Competence * Culture  88.701 3 29.567 .846 .470 .012
Empathy * Culture  6.482 1 6.482 .185 .667 .001
Competence * Empathy * 
Culture  258.161 3 86.054 2.462 .064 .035
Competence * Sex  345.779 3 115.260 3.298 .021 .046
Empathy * Sex  10.960 1 10.960 .314 .576 .002
Competence * Empathy * 
Sex  15.659 3 5.220 .149 .930 .002
Culture * Sex  25.623 1 25.623 .733 .393 .004
Competence * Culture * 
Sex  139.554 3 46.518 1.331 .265 .019
Empathy * Culture * Sex  .216 1 .216 .006 .937 .000
Competence * Empathy * 
Culture * Sex  102.864 3 34.288 .981 .403 .014
Error 7129.547 204 34.949  
Total 61573.718 237  
Corrected Total 25373.621 236  
 
ªThe table is the SPSS output for the overall ANCOVA with competence (4 levels), 
empathy, culture, and sex as the independent variables, trait empathy as the covariate, 
and the amount of bonus as the dependent variable in study 2.  
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Corrected Modelb 10853.280 16 678.330 17.851 .000 .731
Intercept 31771.748 1 31771.748 836.116 .000 .888
Trait Empathy 22.012 1 22.012 .579 .448 .005
Competence 9091.799 1 9091.799 239.263 .000 .695
Empathy 53.002 1 53.002 1.395 .240 .013
Culture  197.296 1 197.296 5.192 .025 .047
Sex  204.249 1 204.249 5.375 .022 .049
Competence * Empathy  15.253 1 15.253 .401 .528 .004
Competence * Culture  73.623 1 73.623 1.937 .167 .018
Empathy * Culture  61.478 1 61.478 1.618 .206 .015
Competence * Empathy * 
culture  49.051 1 49.051 1.291 .258 .012
Competence * Sex  103.603 1 103.603 2.726 .102 .025
Empathy * Sex  17.890 1 17.890 .471 .494 .004
Competence * Empathy * 
Sex  2.405 1 2.405 .063 .802 .001
Culture * Sex  7.636 1 7.636 .201 .655 .002
Competence * Culture * 
Sex  5.113 1 5.113 .135 .714 .001
Empathy * Culture * Sex  18.807 1 18.807 .495 .483 .005
Competence * Empathy * 
Culture * Sex  52.974 1 52.974 1.394 .240 .013
Error 3989.916 105 37.999  
Total 51433.825 122  
Corrected Total 14843.196 121  
 
ªThe table is the SPSS output for the first ANCOVA with competence (high competence 
vs. low competence without explanation), empathy, culture, and sex as the independent 
variables, trait empathy as the covariate, and the amount of bonus as the dependent 
variable in study 2.  




                                                                 215                













Corrected Modelb 12790.047 16 799.378 29.919 .000 .829
Intercept 27780.945 1 27780.945 1039.775 .000 .913
Trait Empathy  36.674 1 36.674 1.373 .244 .014
Competence 10227.720 1 10227.720 382.799 .000 .795
Empathy  152.027 1 152.027 5.690 .019 .054
Culture  114.633 1 114.633 4.290 .041 .042
Sex  7.301 1 7.301 .273 .602 .003
Competence * Empathy  84.457 1 84.457 3.161 .078 .031
Competence * Culture  37.287 1 37.287 1.396 .240 .014
Empathy * Culture  .161 1 .161 .006 .938 .000
Competence * Empathy * 
Culture  204.589 1 204.589 7.657 .007 .072
Competence * Sex  44.763 1 44.763 1.675 .199 .017
Empathy * Sex  17.129 1 17.129 .641 .425 .006
Competence * Empathy * 
Sex  2.287 1 2.287 .086 .770 .001
Culture * Sex  54.199 1 54.199 2.029 .158 .020
Competence * Culture * 
Sex  52.514 1 52.514 1.965 .164 .019
Empathy * Culture * Sex  6.472 1 6.472 .242 .624 .002
Competence * Empathy * 
Culture * Sex  72.023 1 72.023 2.696 .104 .027
Error 2645.104 99 26.718  
Total 47818.344 116  
Corrected Total 15435.152 115  
 
ªThe table is the SPSS output for the second ANCOVA with competence (high 
competence vs. low competence with negative explanation), empathy, culture, and sex as 
the independent variables, trait empathy as the covariate, and the amount of bonus as the 
dependent variable in study 2.  
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Corrected Modelb 10728.974 16 670.561 27.456 .000 .809
Intercept 33331.482 1 33331.482 1364.754 .000 .929
Trait Empathy 11.536 1 11.536 .472 .493 .005
Competence  8563.806 1 8563.806 350.644 .000 .771
Empathy 85.331 1 85.331 3.494 .064 .033
Culture  173.887 1 173.887 7.120 .009 .064
Sex .082 1 .082 .003 .954 .000
Competence * Empathy  33.694 1 33.694 1.380 .243 .013
Competence * Culture  58.137 1 58.137 2.380 .126 .022
Empathy * Culture  13.567 1 13.567 .555 .458 .005
Competence * Empathy * 
Culture  131.163 1 131.163 5.370 .022 .049
Competence * Sex  20.465 1 20.465 .838 .362 .008
Empathy * Sex  3.303 1 3.303 .135 .714 .001
Competence * Empathy * 
Sex  16.149 1 16.149 .661 .418 .006
Culture * Sex  11.658 1 11.658 .477 .491 .005
Competence * Culture * 
Sex  16.322 1 16.322 .668 .416 .006
Empathy * Culture * Sex  22.807 1 22.807 .934 .336 .009
Competence * Empathy * 
Culture * Sex  48.234 1 48.234 1.975 .163 .019
Error 2539.999 104 24.423  
Total 49414.558 121  
Corrected Total 13268.973 120  
 
ªThe table is the SPSS output for the third ANCOVA with competence (high competence 
vs. low competence with positive explanation), empathy, culture, and sex as the 
independent variables, trait empathy as the covariate, and the amount of bonus as the 
dependent variable in study 2.  
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Coefficients t Sig. 
    B Std. Error Beta     
1 (Constant) 21.641 .647 33.444 .000
  Need 17.240 2.370 .503 7.274 .000
  Empathy 1.705 1.852 .063 .920 .359
  Culture -.815 1.619 -.035 -.504 .615
  Sex  5.487 2.708 .138 2.027 .045
  Need * Empathy  -5.029 6.751 -.052 -.745 .458
  Need * Culture  -4.338 5.806 -.051 -.747 .456
  Need * Sex  -11.368 9.474 -.083 -1.200 .232
  Empathy * Culture  9.674 4.509 .146 2.145 .034
  Empathy * Sex  -10.629 7.703 -.094 -1.380 .170
  Culture * Sex  7.562 6.693 .078 1.130 .261
  Need * Empathy * 
Culture  -50.097 16.772 -.209 -2.987 .003
  Need * Empathy * 
Sex  3.235 27.533 .008 .117 .907
  Need * Culture * 
Sex  -6.477 23.661 -.019 -.274 .785
  Empathy * Culture 
* Sex  -18.080 18.962 -.065 -.954 .342
  Trait Empathy 
1.703 .795 .157 2.141 .034
 
ªThe table is the SPSS output for the regression model with need, empathy, culture, sex, 
and all two-way and three-way linear interactions between them plus trait empathy as 
independent variables and the amount of assistance-money distributed as the dependent 
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Coefficients t Sig. 
    B Std. Error Beta     
1 (Constant) 21.226 .611  34.727 .000
  Need 15.114 2.234 .467 6.765 .000
  Empathy  3.253 1.752 .127 1.856 .065
  Culture  .895 1.504 .041 .595 .553
  Sex  2.505 2.411 .071 1.039 .300
  Need * Empathy  7.583 6.374 .082 1.190 .236
  Need * Culture  -7.258 5.500 -.091 -1.320 .189
  Need * Sex  -14.771 8.716 -.117 -1.695 .092
  Empathy * Culture  -.957 4.281 -.015 -.224 .823
  Empathy * Sex  .727 6.866 .007 .106 .916
  Culture * Sex  6.477 5.910 .075 1.096 .275
  Need * Empathy * Culture -13.638 15.549 -.060 -.877 .382
  Need * Empathy * Sex  -4.269 24.852 -.012 -.172 .864
  Need * Culture * Sex  -10.141 21.371 -.033 -.475 .636
  Empathy * Culture * Sex  -1.401 16.880 -.006 -.083 .934
   Trait Empathy  -.081 .570 -.010 -.142 .887
 
ªThe table is the SPSS output for the regression model with need, empathy, culture, sex, 
and all two-way and three-way linear interactions between them plus trait empathy as 
independent variables and the amount of assistance-money distributed as the dependent 
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Type III Sum of 




Modelb 116350973.470 8 14543871.684 2.777 .006 .087
Intercept 120663317.859 1 120663317.859 23.041 .000 .090
Trait Empathy  1505853.404 1 1505853.404 .288 .592 .001
Empathy  156680.866 1 156680.866 .030 .863 .000
Culture  59954592.163 1 59954592.163 11.449 .001 .047
Sex 1585891.372 1 1585891.372 .303 .583 .001
Empathy * 
Culture  17998286.430 1 17998286.430 3.437 .065 .015
Empathy * Sex  691229.856 1 691229.856 .132 .717 .001
Culture * Sex  12635135.549 1 12635135.549 2.413 .122 .010
Empathy * 
Culture * Sex  8210366.653 1 8210366.653 1.568 .212 .007
Error 1214953192.505 232 5236867.209   
Total 1479100900.000 241   
Corrected Total 1331304165.975 240   
 
 
ªThe table is the SPSS output for the ANCOVA with empathy, culture, and sex as the 
independent variables, trait empathy as the covariate, and the amount of 
scholarship-money distributed as the dependent variable in study 4.  
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